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@jkehne jkehne commented May 1, 2014

If KDB is selected in a kernel with the cko patch applied, compilation fails with

kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_io.c: In function ‘vkdb_printf’:
kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_io.c:706:4: error: too few arguments to function ‘c->write’
    c->write(c, kdb_buffer, retlen);
    ^
kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_io.c:767:4: error: too few arguments to function ‘c->write’
    c->write(c, moreprompt, strlen(moreprompt));
    ^

The reason for this error is that cko adds another parameter indicating the output color to the console->write functions, but not to the c->write calls in KDB.
This patch adds the missing parameter to those calls, currently hardcoded to 7 (KERN_DEBUG).
The same patch should work for other kernel versions as well.

heftig added a commit that referenced this pull request May 1, 2014
Fix compilation of KDB with cko
@heftig heftig merged commit 470ff40 into zen-kernel:3.14/cko May 1, 2014
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heftig commented May 1, 2014

Thank you.

damentz pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 29, 2014
Mike Galbraith captered the following:
| >#11 [ffff88017b243e90] _raw_spin_lock at ffffffff815d2596
| >#12 [ffff88017b243e90] rt_mutex_trylock at ffffffff815d15be
| >#13 [ffff88017b243eb0] get_next_timer_interrupt at ffffffff81063b42
| >#14 [ffff88017b243f00] tick_nohz_stop_sched_tick at ffffffff810bd1fd
| >#15 [ffff88017b243f70] tick_nohz_irq_exit at ffffffff810bd7d2
| >#16 [ffff88017b243f90] irq_exit at ffffffff8105b02d
| >#17 [ffff88017b243fb0] reschedule_interrupt at ffffffff815db3dd
| >--- <IRQ stack> ---
| >#18 [ffff88017a2a9bc8] reschedule_interrupt at ffffffff815db3dd
| >    [exception RIP: task_blocks_on_rt_mutex+51]
| >#19 [ffff88017a2a9ce0] rt_spin_lock_slowlock at ffffffff815d183c
| >#20 [ffff88017a2a9da0] lock_timer_base.isra.35 at ffffffff81061cbf
| >#21 [ffff88017a2a9dd0] schedule_timeout at ffffffff815cf1ce
| >#22 [ffff88017a2a9e50] rcu_gp_kthread at ffffffff810f9bbb
| >#23 [ffff88017a2a9ed0] kthread at ffffffff810796d5
| >#24 [ffff88017a2a9f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff815da04c

lock_timer_base() does a try_lock() which deadlocks on the waiter lock
not the lock itself.
This patch takes the waiter_lock with trylock so it should work from interrupt
context as well. If the fastpath doesn't work and the waiter_lock itself is
taken then it seems that the lock itself taken.
This patch also adds "rt_spin_unlock_after_trylock_in_irq" to keep lockdep
happy. If we managed to take the wait_lock in the first place we should also
be able to take it in the unlock path.

Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 10, 2014
commit 7cd2b0a upstream.

Oleg reports a division by zero error on zero-length write() to the
percpu_pagelist_fraction sysctl:

    divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
    CPU: 1 PID: 9142 Comm: badarea_io Not tainted 3.15.0-rc2-vm-nfs+ #19
    Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
    task: ffff8800d5aeb6e0 ti: ffff8800d87a2000 task.ti: ffff8800d87a2000
    RIP: 0010: percpu_pagelist_fraction_sysctl_handler+0x84/0x120
    RSP: 0018:ffff8800d87a3e78  EFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: 0000000000000f89 RBX: ffff88011f7fd000 RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000010
    RBP: ffff8800d87a3e98 R08: ffffffff81d002c8 R09: ffff8800d87a3f50
    R10: 000000000000000b R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000060
    R13: ffffffff81c3c3e0 R14: ffffffff81cfddf8 R15: ffff8801193b0800
    FS:  00007f614f1e9740(0000) GS:ffff88011f440000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
    CR2: 00007f614f1fa000 CR3: 00000000d9291000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
    Call Trace:
      proc_sys_call_handler+0xb3/0xc0
      proc_sys_write+0x14/0x20
      vfs_write+0xba/0x1e0
      SyS_write+0x46/0xb0
      tracesys+0xe1/0xe6

However, if the percpu_pagelist_fraction sysctl is set by the user, it
is also impossible to restore it to the kernel default since the user
cannot write 0 to the sysctl.

This patch allows the user to write 0 to restore the default behavior.
It still requires a fraction equal to or larger than 8, however, as
stated by the documentation for sanity.  If a value in the range [1, 7]
is written, the sysctl will return EINVAL.

This successfully solves the divide by zero issue at the same time.

Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Oleg Drokin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 4, 2014
Oleg reports a division by zero error on zero-length write() to the
percpu_pagelist_fraction sysctl:

    divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
    CPU: 1 PID: 9142 Comm: badarea_io Not tainted 3.15.0-rc2-vm-nfs+ #19
    Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
    task: ffff8800d5aeb6e0 ti: ffff8800d87a2000 task.ti: ffff8800d87a2000
    RIP: 0010: percpu_pagelist_fraction_sysctl_handler+0x84/0x120
    RSP: 0018:ffff8800d87a3e78  EFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: 0000000000000f89 RBX: ffff88011f7fd000 RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000010
    RBP: ffff8800d87a3e98 R08: ffffffff81d002c8 R09: ffff8800d87a3f50
    R10: 000000000000000b R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000060
    R13: ffffffff81c3c3e0 R14: ffffffff81cfddf8 R15: ffff8801193b0800
    FS:  00007f614f1e9740(0000) GS:ffff88011f440000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
    CR2: 00007f614f1fa000 CR3: 00000000d9291000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
    Call Trace:
      proc_sys_call_handler+0xb3/0xc0
      proc_sys_write+0x14/0x20
      vfs_write+0xba/0x1e0
      SyS_write+0x46/0xb0
      tracesys+0xe1/0xe6

However, if the percpu_pagelist_fraction sysctl is set by the user, it
is also impossible to restore it to the kernel default since the user
cannot write 0 to the sysctl.

This patch allows the user to write 0 to restore the default behavior.
It still requires a fraction equal to or larger than 8, however, as
stated by the documentation for sanity.  If a value in the range [1, 7]
is written, the sysctl will return EINVAL.

This successfully solves the divide by zero issue at the same time.

Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Oleg Drokin <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 4, 2014
This patch tries to fix this crash:

 #5 [ffff88003c1cd690] do_invalid_op at ffffffff810166d5
 #6 [ffff88003c1cd730] invalid_op at ffffffff8159b2de
    [exception RIP: ocfs2_direct_IO_get_blocks+359]
    RIP: ffffffffa05dfa27  RSP: ffff88003c1cd7e8  RFLAGS: 00010202
    RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: ffff88003c1cdaa8  RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 000000000000000c  RSI: ffff880027a95000  RDI: ffff88003c79b540
    RBP: ffff88003c1cd858   R8: 0000000000000000   R9: ffffffff815f6ba0
    R10: 00000000000001c9  R11: 00000000000001c9  R12: ffff88002d271500
    R13: 0000000000000001  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: 0000000000001000
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #7 [ffff88003c1cd860] do_direct_IO at ffffffff811cd31b
 #8 [ffff88003c1cd950] direct_IO_iovec at ffffffff811cde9c
 #9 [ffff88003c1cd9b0] do_blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff811ce764
#10 [ffff88003c1cdb80] __blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff811ce7cc
#11 [ffff88003c1cdbb0] ocfs2_direct_IO at ffffffffa05df756 [ocfs2]
#12 [ffff88003c1cdbe0] generic_file_direct_write_iter at ffffffff8112f935
#13 [ffff88003c1cdc40] ocfs2_file_write_iter at ffffffffa0600ccc [ocfs2]
#14 [ffff88003c1cdd50] do_aio_write at ffffffff8119126c
#15 [ffff88003c1cddc0] aio_rw_vect_retry at ffffffff811d9bb4
#16 [ffff88003c1cddf0] aio_run_iocb at ffffffff811db880
#17 [ffff88003c1cde30] io_submit_one at ffffffff811dc238
#18 [ffff88003c1cde80] do_io_submit at ffffffff811dc437
#19 [ffff88003c1cdf70] sys_io_submit at ffffffff811dc530
#20 [ffff88003c1cdf80] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff8159a159

It crashes at
        BUG_ON(create && (ext_flags & OCFS2_EXT_REFCOUNTED));
in ocfs2_direct_IO_get_blocks.

ocfs2_direct_IO_get_blocks is expecting the OCFS2_EXT_REFCOUNTED be removed in
ocfs2_prepare_inode_for_write() if it was there. But no cluster lock is taken
during the time before (or inside) ocfs2_prepare_inode_for_write() and after
ocfs2_direct_IO_get_blocks().

It can happen in this case:

Node A(which crashes)				Node B
------------------------                 ---------------------------
ocfs2_file_aio_write
  ocfs2_prepare_inode_for_write
    ocfs2_inode_lock
    ...
    ocfs2_inode_unlock
  #no refcount found
....					ocfs2_reflink
                                          ocfs2_inode_lock
                                          ...
                                          ocfs2_inode_unlock
                                          #now, refcount flag set on extent

                                        ...
                                        flush change to disk

ocfs2_direct_IO_get_blocks
  ocfs2_get_clusters
    #extent map miss
    #buffer_head miss
    read extents from disk
  found refcount flag on extent
  crash..

Fix:
Take rw_lock in ocfs2_reflink path

Signed-off-by: Wengang Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]>
Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
eegorov pushed a commit to eegorov/zen-kernel that referenced this pull request Feb 16, 2015
…umask

While creating an exclusive cpuset, we passed cpuset_cpumask_can_shrink()
an empty cpumask (cur), and dl_bw_of(cpumask_any(cur)) made boom with it:

 CPU: 0 PID: 6942 Comm: shield.sh Not tainted 3.19.0-master zen-kernel#19
 Hardware name: MEDIONPC MS-7502/MS-7502, BIOS 6.00 PG 12/26/2007
 task: ffff880224552450 ti: ffff8800caab8000 task.ti: ffff8800caab8000
 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81073846>]  [<ffffffff81073846>] cpuset_cpumask_can_shrink+0x56/0xb0
 [...]
 Call Trace:
  [<ffffffff810cb82a>] validate_change+0x18a/0x200
  [<ffffffff810cc877>] cpuset_write_resmask+0x3b7/0x720
  [<ffffffff810c4d58>] cgroup_file_write+0x38/0x100
  [<ffffffff811d953a>] kernfs_fop_write+0x12a/0x180
  [<ffffffff8116e1a3>] vfs_write+0xb3/0x1d0
  [<ffffffff8116ed06>] SyS_write+0x46/0xb0
  [<ffffffff8159ced6>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Zefan Li <[email protected]>
Fixes: f82f804 ("sched/deadline: Ensure that updates to exclusive cpusets don't break AC")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 17, 2015
commit ecf5fc6 upstream.

Nikolay has reported a hang when a memcg reclaim got stuck with the
following backtrace:

PID: 18308  TASK: ffff883d7c9b0a30  CPU: 1   COMMAND: "rsync"
  #0 __schedule at ffffffff815ab152
  #1 schedule at ffffffff815ab76e
  #2 schedule_timeout at ffffffff815ae5e5
  #3 io_schedule_timeout at ffffffff815aad6a
  #4 bit_wait_io at ffffffff815abfc6
  #5 __wait_on_bit at ffffffff815abda5
  #6 wait_on_page_bit at ffffffff8111fd4f
  #7 shrink_page_list at ffffffff81135445
  #8 shrink_inactive_list at ffffffff81135845
  #9 shrink_lruvec at ffffffff81135ead
 #10 shrink_zone at ffffffff811360c3
 #11 shrink_zones at ffffffff81136eff
 #12 do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff8113712f
 #13 try_to_free_mem_cgroup_pages at ffffffff811372be
 #14 try_charge at ffffffff81189423
 #15 mem_cgroup_try_charge at ffffffff8118c6f5
 #16 __add_to_page_cache_locked at ffffffff8112137d
 #17 add_to_page_cache_lru at ffffffff81121618
 #18 pagecache_get_page at ffffffff8112170b
 #19 grow_dev_page at ffffffff811c8297
 #20 __getblk_slow at ffffffff811c91d6
 #21 __getblk_gfp at ffffffff811c92c1
 #22 ext4_ext_grow_indepth at ffffffff8124565c
 #23 ext4_ext_create_new_leaf at ffffffff81246ca8
 #24 ext4_ext_insert_extent at ffffffff81246f09
 #25 ext4_ext_map_blocks at ffffffff8124a848
 #26 ext4_map_blocks at ffffffff8121a5b7
 #27 mpage_map_one_extent at ffffffff8121b1fa
 #28 mpage_map_and_submit_extent at ffffffff8121f07b
 #29 ext4_writepages at ffffffff8121f6d5
 #30 do_writepages at ffffffff8112c490
 #31 __filemap_fdatawrite_range at ffffffff81120199
 #32 filemap_flush at ffffffff8112041c
 #33 ext4_alloc_da_blocks at ffffffff81219da1
 #34 ext4_rename at ffffffff81229b91
 #35 ext4_rename2 at ffffffff81229e32
 #36 vfs_rename at ffffffff811a08a5
 #37 SYSC_renameat2 at ffffffff811a3ffc
 #38 sys_renameat2 at ffffffff811a408e
 #39 sys_rename at ffffffff8119e51e
 #40 system_call_fastpath at ffffffff815afa89

Dave Chinner has properly pointed out that this is a deadlock in the
reclaim code because ext4 doesn't submit pages which are marked by
PG_writeback right away.

The heuristic was introduced by commit e62e384 ("memcg: prevent OOM
with too many dirty pages") and it was applied only when may_enter_fs
was specified.  The code has been changed by c3b94f4 ("memcg:
further prevent OOM with too many dirty pages") which has removed the
__GFP_FS restriction with a reasoning that we do not get into the fs
code.  But this is not sufficient apparently because the fs doesn't
necessarily submit pages marked PG_writeback for IO right away.

ext4_bio_write_page calls io_submit_add_bh but that doesn't necessarily
submit the bio.  Instead it tries to map more pages into the bio and
mpage_map_one_extent might trigger memcg charge which might end up
waiting on a page which is marked PG_writeback but hasn't been submitted
yet so we would end up waiting for something that never finishes.

Fix this issue by replacing __GFP_IO by may_enter_fs check (for case 2)
before we go to wait on the writeback.  The page fault path, which is
the only path that triggers memcg oom killer since 3.12, shouldn't
require GFP_NOFS and so we shouldn't reintroduce the premature OOM
killer issue which was originally addressed by the heuristic.

As per David Chinner the xfs is doing similar thing since 2.6.15 already
so ext4 is not the only affected filesystem.  Moreover he notes:

: For example: IO completion might require unwritten extent conversion
: which executes filesystem transactions and GFP_NOFS allocations. The
: writeback flag on the pages can not be cleared until unwritten
: extent conversion completes. Hence memory reclaim cannot wait on
: page writeback to complete in GFP_NOFS context because it is not
: safe to do so, memcg reclaim or otherwise.

Cc: [email protected] # 3.9+
[[email protected]: corrected the control flow]
Fixes: c3b94f4 ("memcg: further prevent OOM with too many dirty pages")
Reported-by: Nikolay Borisov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 17, 2016
[ Upstream commit d3e6952 ]

I ran into this:

    kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
    kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
    general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
    CPU: 2 PID: 2012 Comm: trinity-c3 Not tainted 4.7.0-rc7+ #19
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
    task: ffff8800b745f2c0 ti: ffff880111740000 task.ti: ffff880111740000
    RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff82bbf066>]  [<ffffffff82bbf066>] irttp_connect_request+0x36/0x710
    RSP: 0018:ffff880111747bb8  EFLAGS: 00010286
    RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000069dd8358
    RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: 0000000000000048
    RBP: ffff880111747c00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
    R10: 0000000069dd8358 R11: 1ffffffff0759723 R12: 0000000000000000
    R13: ffff88011a7e4780 R14: 0000000000000027 R15: 0000000000000000
    FS:  00007fc738404700(0000) GS:ffff88011af00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
    CR2: 00007fc737fdfb10 CR3: 0000000118087000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
    Stack:
     0000000000000200 ffff880111747bd8 ffffffff810ee611 ffff880119f1f220
     ffff880119f1f4f8 ffff880119f1f4f0 ffff88011a7e4780 ffff880119f1f232
     ffff880119f1f220 ffff880111747d58 ffffffff82bca542 0000000000000000
    Call Trace:
     [<ffffffff82bca542>] irda_connect+0x562/0x1190
     [<ffffffff825ae582>] SYSC_connect+0x202/0x2a0
     [<ffffffff825b4489>] SyS_connect+0x9/0x10
     [<ffffffff8100334c>] do_syscall_64+0x19c/0x410
     [<ffffffff83295ca5>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
    Code: 41 89 ca 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 41 89 d7 53 48 89 fb 48 83 c7 48 48 89 fa 41 89 f6 48 c1 ea 03 48 83 ec 20 4c 8b 65 10 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 84 c0 0f 8e 4c 04 00 00 80 7b 48 00 74
    RIP  [<ffffffff82bbf066>] irttp_connect_request+0x36/0x710
     RSP <ffff880111747bb8>
    ---[ end trace 4cda2588bc055b30 ]---

The problem is that irda_open_tsap() can fail and leave self->tsap = NULL,
and then irttp_connect_request() almost immediately dereferences it.

Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 25, 2016
[ Upstream commit d2fbdf7 ]

tipc_msg_create() can return a NULL skb and if so, we shouldn't try to
call tipc_node_xmit_skb() on it.

    general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
    CPU: 3 PID: 30298 Comm: trinity-c0 Not tainted 4.7.0-rc7+ #19
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
    task: ffff8800baf09980 ti: ffff8800595b8000 task.ti: ffff8800595b8000
    RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff830bb46b>]  [<ffffffff830bb46b>] tipc_node_xmit_skb+0x6b/0x140
    RSP: 0018:ffff8800595bfce8  EFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000003023b0e0
    RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffffffff83d12580
    RBP: ffff8800595bfd78 R08: ffffed000b2b7f32 R09: 0000000000000000
    R10: fffffbfff0759725 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 1ffff1000b2b7f9f
    R13: ffff8800595bfd58 R14: ffffffff83d12580 R15: dffffc0000000000
    FS:  00007fcdde242700(0000) GS:ffff88011af80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
    CR2: 00007fcddde1db10 CR3: 000000006874b000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
    DR0: 00007fcdde248000 DR1: 00007fcddd73d000 DR2: 00007fcdde248000
    DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000090602
    Stack:
     0000000000000018 0000000000000018 0000000041b58ab3 ffffffff83954208
     ffffffff830bb400 ffff8800595bfd30 ffffffff8309d767 0000000000000018
     0000000000000018 ffff8800595bfd78 ffffffff8309da1a 00000000810ee611
    Call Trace:
     [<ffffffff830c84a3>] tipc_shutdown+0x553/0x880
     [<ffffffff825b4a3b>] SyS_shutdown+0x14b/0x170
     [<ffffffff8100334c>] do_syscall_64+0x19c/0x410
     [<ffffffff83295ca5>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
    Code: 90 00 b4 0b 83 c7 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 4c 8d 6d e0 c7 40 04 00 00 00 f4 c7 40 08 f3 f3 f3 f3 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 c7 45 b4 00 00 00 00 <80> 3c 30 00 75 78 48 8d 7b 08 49 8d 75 c0 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00
    RIP  [<ffffffff830bb46b>] tipc_node_xmit_skb+0x6b/0x140
     RSP <ffff8800595bfce8>
    ---[ end trace 57b0484e351e71f1 ]---

I feel like we should maybe return -ENOMEM or -ENOBUFS, but I'm not sure
userspace is equipped to handle that. Anyway, this is better than a GPF
and looks somewhat consistent with other tipc_msg_create() callers.

Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ying Xue <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
damentz pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 29, 2016
commit b6bc1c7 upstream.

Function ib_create_qp() was failing to return an error when
rdma_rw_init_mrs() fails, causing a crash further down in ib_create_qp()
when trying to dereferece the qp pointer which was actually a negative
errno.

The crash:

crash> log|grep BUG
[  136.458121] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000098
crash> bt
PID: 3736   TASK: ffff8808543215c0  CPU: 2   COMMAND: "kworker/u64:2"
 #0 [ffff88084d323340] machine_kexec at ffffffff8105fbb0
 #1 [ffff88084d3233b0] __crash_kexec at ffffffff81116758
 #2 [ffff88084d323480] crash_kexec at ffffffff8111682d
 #3 [ffff88084d3234b0] oops_end at ffffffff81032bd6
 #4 [ffff88084d3234e0] no_context at ffffffff8106e431
 #5 [ffff88084d323530] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff8106e610
 #6 [ffff88084d323590] bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff8106e6f4
 #7 [ffff88084d3235a0] __do_page_fault at ffffffff8106ebdc
 #8 [ffff88084d323620] do_page_fault at ffffffff8106f057
 #9 [ffff88084d323660] page_fault at ffffffff816e3148
    [exception RIP: ib_create_qp+427]
    RIP: ffffffffa02554fb  RSP: ffff88084d323718  RFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: 0000000000000004  RBX: fffffffffffffff4  RCX: 000000018020001f
    RDX: ffff880830997fc0  RSI: 0000000000000001  RDI: ffff88085f407200
    RBP: ffff88084d323778   R8: 0000000000000001   R9: ffffea0020bae210
    R10: ffffea0020bae218  R11: 0000000000000001  R12: ffff88084d3237c8
    R13: 00000000fffffff4  R14: ffff880859fa5000  R15: ffff88082eb89800
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
#10 [ffff88084d323780] rdma_create_qp at ffffffffa0782681 [rdma_cm]
#11 [ffff88084d3237b0] nvmet_rdma_create_queue_ib at ffffffffa07c43f3 [nvmet_rdma]
#12 [ffff88084d323860] nvmet_rdma_alloc_queue at ffffffffa07c5ba9 [nvmet_rdma]
#13 [ffff88084d323900] nvmet_rdma_queue_connect at ffffffffa07c5c96 [nvmet_rdma]
#14 [ffff88084d323980] nvmet_rdma_cm_handler at ffffffffa07c6450 [nvmet_rdma]
#15 [ffff88084d3239b0] iw_conn_req_handler at ffffffffa0787480 [rdma_cm]
#16 [ffff88084d323a60] cm_conn_req_handler at ffffffffa0775f06 [iw_cm]
#17 [ffff88084d323ab0] process_event at ffffffffa0776019 [iw_cm]
#18 [ffff88084d323af0] cm_work_handler at ffffffffa0776170 [iw_cm]
#19 [ffff88084d323cb0] process_one_work at ffffffff810a1483
#20 [ffff88084d323d90] worker_thread at ffffffff810a211d
#21 [ffff88084d323ec0] kthread at ffffffff810a6c5c
#22 [ffff88084d323f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff816e1ebf

Fixes: 632bc3f ("IB/core, RDMA RW API: Do not exceed QP SGE send limit")
Signed-off-by: Steve Wise <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 7, 2017
commit 4dfce57 upstream.

There have been several reports over the years of NULL pointer
dereferences in xfs_trans_log_inode during xfs_fsr processes,
when the process is doing an fput and tearing down extents
on the temporary inode, something like:

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018
PID: 29439  TASK: ffff880550584fa0  CPU: 6   COMMAND: "xfs_fsr"
    [exception RIP: xfs_trans_log_inode+0x10]
 #9 [ffff8800a57bbbe0] xfs_bunmapi at ffffffffa037398e [xfs]
#10 [ffff8800a57bbce8] xfs_itruncate_extents at ffffffffa0391b29 [xfs]
#11 [ffff8800a57bbd88] xfs_inactive_truncate at ffffffffa0391d0c [xfs]
#12 [ffff8800a57bbdb8] xfs_inactive at ffffffffa0392508 [xfs]
#13 [ffff8800a57bbdd8] xfs_fs_evict_inode at ffffffffa035907e [xfs]
#14 [ffff8800a57bbe00] evict at ffffffff811e1b67
#15 [ffff8800a57bbe28] iput at ffffffff811e23a5
#16 [ffff8800a57bbe58] dentry_kill at ffffffff811dcfc8
#17 [ffff8800a57bbe88] dput at ffffffff811dd06c
#18 [ffff8800a57bbea8] __fput at ffffffff811c823b
#19 [ffff8800a57bbef0] ____fput at ffffffff811c846e
#20 [ffff8800a57bbf00] task_work_run at ffffffff81093b27
#21 [ffff8800a57bbf30] do_notify_resume at ffffffff81013b0c
#22 [ffff8800a57bbf50] int_signal at ffffffff8161405d

As it turns out, this is because the i_itemp pointer, along
with the d_ops pointer, has been overwritten with zeros
when we tear down the extents during truncate.  When the in-core
inode fork on the temporary inode used by xfs_fsr was originally
set up during the extent swap, we mistakenly looked at di_nextents
to determine whether all extents fit inline, but this misses extents
generated by speculative preallocation; we should be using if_bytes
instead.

This mistake corrupts the in-memory inode, and code in
xfs_iext_remove_inline eventually gets bad inputs, causing
it to memmove and memset incorrect ranges; this became apparent
because the two values in ifp->if_u2.if_inline_ext[1] contained
what should have been in d_ops and i_itemp; they were memmoved due
to incorrect array indexing and then the original locations
were zeroed with memset, again due to an array overrun.

Fix this by properly using i_df.if_bytes to determine the number
of extents, not di_nextents.

Thanks to dchinner for looking at this with me and spotting the
root cause.

Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 13, 2017
commit faab509 upstream.

Andrey Konovalov reports that fuzz testing with syzkaller causes a
KASAN warning in gadgetfs:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dev_config+0x86f/0x1190 at addr ffff88003c47e160
Write of size 65537 by task syz-executor0/6356
CPU: 3 PID: 6356 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.9.0-rc7+ #19
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
 ffff88003c107ad8 ffffffff81f96aba ffffffff3dc11ef0 1ffff10007820eee
 ffffed0007820ee6 ffff88003dc11f00 0000000041b58ab3 ffffffff8598b4c8
 ffffffff81f96828 ffffffff813fb4a0 ffff88003b6eadc0 ffff88003c107738
Call Trace:
 [<     inline     >] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
 [<ffffffff81f96aba>] dump_stack+0x292/0x398 lib/dump_stack.c:51
 [<ffffffff817e4dec>] kasan_object_err+0x1c/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:159
 [<     inline     >] print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:197
 [<ffffffff817e5080>] kasan_report_error+0x1f0/0x4e0 mm/kasan/report.c:286
 [<ffffffff817e5705>] kasan_report+0x35/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:306
 [<     inline     >] check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/kasan.c:308
 [<ffffffff817e3fb9>] check_memory_region+0x139/0x190 mm/kasan/kasan.c:315
 [<ffffffff817e4044>] kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:326
 [<     inline     >] copy_from_user arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h:689
 [<     inline     >] ep0_write drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c:1135
 [<ffffffff83228caf>] dev_config+0x86f/0x1190 drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c:1759
 [<ffffffff817fdd55>] __vfs_write+0x5d5/0x760 fs/read_write.c:510
 [<ffffffff817ff650>] vfs_write+0x170/0x4e0 fs/read_write.c:560
 [<     inline     >] SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:607
 [<ffffffff81803a5b>] SyS_write+0xfb/0x230 fs/read_write.c:599
 [<ffffffff84f47ec1>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2

Indeed, there is a comment saying that the value of len is restricted
to a 16-bit integer, but the code doesn't actually do this.

This patch fixes the warning.  It replaces the comment with a
computation that forces the amount of data copied from the user in
ep0_write() to be no larger than the wLength size for the control
transfer, which is a 16-bit quantity.

Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 22, 2017
[ Upstream commit 45caeaa ]

As Eric Dumazet pointed out this also needs to be fixed in IPv6.
v2: Contains the IPv6 tcp/Ipv6 dccp patches as well.

We have seen a few incidents lately where a dst_enty has been freed
with a dangling TCP socket reference (sk->sk_dst_cache) pointing to that
dst_entry. If the conditions/timings are right a crash then ensues when the
freed dst_entry is referenced later on. A Common crashing back trace is:

 #8 [] page_fault at ffffffff8163e648
    [exception RIP: __tcp_ack_snd_check+74]
.
.
 #9 [] tcp_rcv_established at ffffffff81580b64
#10 [] tcp_v4_do_rcv at ffffffff8158b54a
#11 [] tcp_v4_rcv at ffffffff8158cd02
#12 [] ip_local_deliver_finish at ffffffff815668f4
#13 [] ip_local_deliver at ffffffff81566bd9
#14 [] ip_rcv_finish at ffffffff8156656d
#15 [] ip_rcv at ffffffff81566f06
#16 [] __netif_receive_skb_core at ffffffff8152b3a2
#17 [] __netif_receive_skb at ffffffff8152b608
#18 [] netif_receive_skb at ffffffff8152b690
#19 [] vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete at ffffffffa015eeaf [vmxnet3]
#20 [] vmxnet3_poll_rx_only at ffffffffa015f32a [vmxnet3]
#21 [] net_rx_action at ffffffff8152bac2
#22 [] __do_softirq at ffffffff81084b4f
#23 [] call_softirq at ffffffff8164845c
#24 [] do_softirq at ffffffff81016fc5
#25 [] irq_exit at ffffffff81084ee5
#26 [] do_IRQ at ffffffff81648ff8

Of course it may happen with other NIC drivers as well.

It's found the freed dst_entry here:

 224 static bool tcp_in_quickack_mode(struct sock *sk)↩
 225 {↩
 226 ▹       const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);↩
 227 ▹       const struct dst_entry *dst = __sk_dst_get(sk);↩
 228 ↩
 229 ▹       return (dst && dst_metric(dst, RTAX_QUICKACK)) ||↩
 230 ▹       ▹       (icsk->icsk_ack.quick && !icsk->icsk_ack.pingpong);↩
 231 }↩

But there are other backtraces attributed to the same freed dst_entry in
netfilter code as well.

All the vmcores showed 2 significant clues:

- Remote hosts behind the default gateway had always been redirected to a
different gateway. A rtable/dst_entry will be added for that host. Making
more dst_entrys with lower reference counts. Making this more probable.

- All vmcores showed a postitive LockDroppedIcmps value, e.g:

LockDroppedIcmps                  267

A closer look at the tcp_v4_err() handler revealed that do_redirect() will run
regardless of whether user space has the socket locked. This can result in a
race condition where the same dst_entry cached in sk->sk_dst_entry can be
decremented twice for the same socket via:

do_redirect()->__sk_dst_check()-> dst_release().

Which leads to the dst_entry being prematurely freed with another socket
pointing to it via sk->sk_dst_cache and a subsequent crash.

To fix this skip do_redirect() if usespace has the socket locked. Instead let
the redirect take place later when user space does not have the socket
locked.

The dccp/IPv6 code is very similar in this respect, so fixing it there too.

As Eric Garver pointed out the following commit now invalidates routes. Which
can set the dst->obsolete flag so that ipv4_dst_check() returns null and
triggers the dst_release().

Fixes: ceb3320 ("ipv4: Kill routes during PMTU/redirect updates.")
Cc: Eric Garver <[email protected]>
Cc: Hannes Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maxwell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 22, 2017
[ Upstream commit 45caeaa ]

As Eric Dumazet pointed out this also needs to be fixed in IPv6.
v2: Contains the IPv6 tcp/Ipv6 dccp patches as well.

We have seen a few incidents lately where a dst_enty has been freed
with a dangling TCP socket reference (sk->sk_dst_cache) pointing to that
dst_entry. If the conditions/timings are right a crash then ensues when the
freed dst_entry is referenced later on. A Common crashing back trace is:

 #8 [] page_fault at ffffffff8163e648
    [exception RIP: __tcp_ack_snd_check+74]
.
.
 #9 [] tcp_rcv_established at ffffffff81580b64
#10 [] tcp_v4_do_rcv at ffffffff8158b54a
#11 [] tcp_v4_rcv at ffffffff8158cd02
#12 [] ip_local_deliver_finish at ffffffff815668f4
#13 [] ip_local_deliver at ffffffff81566bd9
#14 [] ip_rcv_finish at ffffffff8156656d
#15 [] ip_rcv at ffffffff81566f06
#16 [] __netif_receive_skb_core at ffffffff8152b3a2
#17 [] __netif_receive_skb at ffffffff8152b608
#18 [] netif_receive_skb at ffffffff8152b690
#19 [] vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete at ffffffffa015eeaf [vmxnet3]
#20 [] vmxnet3_poll_rx_only at ffffffffa015f32a [vmxnet3]
#21 [] net_rx_action at ffffffff8152bac2
#22 [] __do_softirq at ffffffff81084b4f
#23 [] call_softirq at ffffffff8164845c
#24 [] do_softirq at ffffffff81016fc5
#25 [] irq_exit at ffffffff81084ee5
#26 [] do_IRQ at ffffffff81648ff8

Of course it may happen with other NIC drivers as well.

It's found the freed dst_entry here:

 224 static bool tcp_in_quickack_mode(struct sock *sk)↩
 225 {↩
 226 ▹       const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);↩
 227 ▹       const struct dst_entry *dst = __sk_dst_get(sk);↩
 228 ↩
 229 ▹       return (dst && dst_metric(dst, RTAX_QUICKACK)) ||↩
 230 ▹       ▹       (icsk->icsk_ack.quick && !icsk->icsk_ack.pingpong);↩
 231 }↩

But there are other backtraces attributed to the same freed dst_entry in
netfilter code as well.

All the vmcores showed 2 significant clues:

- Remote hosts behind the default gateway had always been redirected to a
different gateway. A rtable/dst_entry will be added for that host. Making
more dst_entrys with lower reference counts. Making this more probable.

- All vmcores showed a postitive LockDroppedIcmps value, e.g:

LockDroppedIcmps                  267

A closer look at the tcp_v4_err() handler revealed that do_redirect() will run
regardless of whether user space has the socket locked. This can result in a
race condition where the same dst_entry cached in sk->sk_dst_entry can be
decremented twice for the same socket via:

do_redirect()->__sk_dst_check()-> dst_release().

Which leads to the dst_entry being prematurely freed with another socket
pointing to it via sk->sk_dst_cache and a subsequent crash.

To fix this skip do_redirect() if usespace has the socket locked. Instead let
the redirect take place later when user space does not have the socket
locked.

The dccp/IPv6 code is very similar in this respect, so fixing it there too.

As Eric Garver pointed out the following commit now invalidates routes. Which
can set the dst->obsolete flag so that ipv4_dst_check() returns null and
triggers the dst_release().

Fixes: ceb3320 ("ipv4: Kill routes during PMTU/redirect updates.")
Cc: Eric Garver <[email protected]>
Cc: Hannes Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maxwell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
damentz pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 19, 2017
commit 1ec1688 upstream.

Otherwise lockdep says:

[ 1337.483798] ================================================
[ 1337.483999] [ BUG: lock held when returning to user space! ]
[ 1337.484252] 4.11.0-rc6 #19 Not tainted
[ 1337.484423] ------------------------------------------------
[ 1337.484626] mount/14766 is leaving the kernel with locks still held!
[ 1337.484841] 1 lock held by mount/14766:
[ 1337.485017]  #0:  (&type->s_umount_key#33/1){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8124171f>] sget_userns+0x2af/0x520

Caught by xfstests generic/413 which tried to mount with the unsupported
mount option dax.  Then xfstests generic/422 ran sync which deadlocks.

Signed-off-by: Martin Brandenburg <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mike Marshall <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 21, 2017
commit 1ec1688 upstream.

Otherwise lockdep says:

[ 1337.483798] ================================================
[ 1337.483999] [ BUG: lock held when returning to user space! ]
[ 1337.484252] 4.11.0-rc6 #19 Not tainted
[ 1337.484423] ------------------------------------------------
[ 1337.484626] mount/14766 is leaving the kernel with locks still held!
[ 1337.484841] 1 lock held by mount/14766:
[ 1337.485017]  #0:  (&type->s_umount_key#33/1){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8124171f>] sget_userns+0x2af/0x520

Caught by xfstests generic/413 which tried to mount with the unsupported
mount option dax.  Then xfstests generic/422 ran sync which deadlocks.

Signed-off-by: Martin Brandenburg <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mike Marshall <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
damentz pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 1, 2017
commit 1ec1688 upstream.

Otherwise lockdep says:

[ 1337.483798] ================================================
[ 1337.483999] [ BUG: lock held when returning to user space! ]
[ 1337.484252] 4.11.0-rc6 #19 Not tainted
[ 1337.484423] ------------------------------------------------
[ 1337.484626] mount/14766 is leaving the kernel with locks still held!
[ 1337.484841] 1 lock held by mount/14766:
[ 1337.485017]  #0:  (&type->s_umount_key#33/1){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8124171f>] sget_userns+0x2af/0x520

Caught by xfstests generic/413 which tried to mount with the unsupported
mount option dax.  Then xfstests generic/422 ran sync which deadlocks.

Signed-off-by: Martin Brandenburg <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mike Marshall <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 21, 2017
commit bbf29ff upstream.

Reinette reported the following crash:

  BUG: Bad page state in process log2exe  pfn:57600
  page:ffffea00015d8000 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:          (null) index:0x20200
  flags: 0x4000000000040019(locked|uptodate|dirty|swapbacked)
  raw: 4000000000040019 0000000000000000 0000000000020200 00000000ffffffff
  raw: ffffea00015d8020 ffffea00015d8020 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  page dumped because: PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_FREE flag(s) set
  bad because of flags: 0x1(locked)
  Modules linked in: rfcomm 8021q bnep intel_rapl x86_pkg_temp_thermal coretemp efivars btusb btrtl btbcm pwm_lpss_pci snd_hda_codec_hdmi btintel pwm_lpss snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_soc_skl snd_hda_codec_generic snd_soc_skl_ipc spi_pxa2xx_platform snd_soc_sst_ipc snd_soc_sst_dsp i2c_designware_platform i2c_designware_core snd_hda_ext_core snd_soc_sst_match snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec mei_me snd_hda_core mei snd_soc_rt286 snd_soc_rl6347a snd_soc_core efivarfs
  CPU: 1 PID: 354 Comm: log2exe Not tainted 4.12.0-rc7-test-test #19
  Hardware name: Intel corporation NUC6CAYS/NUC6CAYB, BIOS AYAPLCEL.86A.0027.2016.1108.1529 11/08/2016
  Call Trace:
   bad_page+0x16a/0x1f0
   free_pages_check_bad+0x117/0x190
   free_hot_cold_page+0x7b1/0xad0
   __put_page+0x70/0xa0
   madvise_free_huge_pmd+0x627/0x7b0
   madvise_free_pte_range+0x6f8/0x1150
   __walk_page_range+0x6b5/0xe30
   walk_page_range+0x13b/0x310
   madvise_free_page_range.isra.16+0xad/0xd0
   madvise_free_single_vma+0x2e4/0x470
   SyS_madvise+0x8ce/0x1450

If somebody frees the page under us and we hold the last reference to
it, put_page() would attempt to free the page before unlocking it.

The fix is trivial reorder of operations.

Dave said:
 "I came up with the exact same patch.  For posterity, here's the test
  case, generated by syzkaller and trimmed down by Reinette:

  	https://www.sr71.net/~dave/intel/log2.c

  And the config that helps detect this:

  	https://www.sr71.net/~dave/intel/config-log2"

Fixes: b8d3c4c ("mm/huge_memory.c: don't split THP page when MADV_FREE syscall is called")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Reinette Chatre <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Minchan Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Huang Ying <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
damentz pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 27, 2017
commit bbf29ff upstream.

Reinette reported the following crash:

  BUG: Bad page state in process log2exe  pfn:57600
  page:ffffea00015d8000 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:          (null) index:0x20200
  flags: 0x4000000000040019(locked|uptodate|dirty|swapbacked)
  raw: 4000000000040019 0000000000000000 0000000000020200 00000000ffffffff
  raw: ffffea00015d8020 ffffea00015d8020 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  page dumped because: PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_FREE flag(s) set
  bad because of flags: 0x1(locked)
  Modules linked in: rfcomm 8021q bnep intel_rapl x86_pkg_temp_thermal coretemp efivars btusb btrtl btbcm pwm_lpss_pci snd_hda_codec_hdmi btintel pwm_lpss snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_soc_skl snd_hda_codec_generic snd_soc_skl_ipc spi_pxa2xx_platform snd_soc_sst_ipc snd_soc_sst_dsp i2c_designware_platform i2c_designware_core snd_hda_ext_core snd_soc_sst_match snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec mei_me snd_hda_core mei snd_soc_rt286 snd_soc_rl6347a snd_soc_core efivarfs
  CPU: 1 PID: 354 Comm: log2exe Not tainted 4.12.0-rc7-test-test #19
  Hardware name: Intel corporation NUC6CAYS/NUC6CAYB, BIOS AYAPLCEL.86A.0027.2016.1108.1529 11/08/2016
  Call Trace:
   bad_page+0x16a/0x1f0
   free_pages_check_bad+0x117/0x190
   free_hot_cold_page+0x7b1/0xad0
   __put_page+0x70/0xa0
   madvise_free_huge_pmd+0x627/0x7b0
   madvise_free_pte_range+0x6f8/0x1150
   __walk_page_range+0x6b5/0xe30
   walk_page_range+0x13b/0x310
   madvise_free_page_range.isra.16+0xad/0xd0
   madvise_free_single_vma+0x2e4/0x470
   SyS_madvise+0x8ce/0x1450

If somebody frees the page under us and we hold the last reference to
it, put_page() would attempt to free the page before unlocking it.

The fix is trivial reorder of operations.

Dave said:
 "I came up with the exact same patch.  For posterity, here's the test
  case, generated by syzkaller and trimmed down by Reinette:

  	https://www.sr71.net/~dave/intel/log2.c

  And the config that helps detect this:

  	https://www.sr71.net/~dave/intel/config-log2"

Fixes: b8d3c4c ("mm/huge_memory.c: don't split THP page when MADV_FREE syscall is called")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Reinette Chatre <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Minchan Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Huang Ying <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
damentz pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 13, 2017
commit bbf29ff upstream.

Reinette reported the following crash:

  BUG: Bad page state in process log2exe  pfn:57600
  page:ffffea00015d8000 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:          (null) index:0x20200
  flags: 0x4000000000040019(locked|uptodate|dirty|swapbacked)
  raw: 4000000000040019 0000000000000000 0000000000020200 00000000ffffffff
  raw: ffffea00015d8020 ffffea00015d8020 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  page dumped because: PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_FREE flag(s) set
  bad because of flags: 0x1(locked)
  Modules linked in: rfcomm 8021q bnep intel_rapl x86_pkg_temp_thermal coretemp efivars btusb btrtl btbcm pwm_lpss_pci snd_hda_codec_hdmi btintel pwm_lpss snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_soc_skl snd_hda_codec_generic snd_soc_skl_ipc spi_pxa2xx_platform snd_soc_sst_ipc snd_soc_sst_dsp i2c_designware_platform i2c_designware_core snd_hda_ext_core snd_soc_sst_match snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec mei_me snd_hda_core mei snd_soc_rt286 snd_soc_rl6347a snd_soc_core efivarfs
  CPU: 1 PID: 354 Comm: log2exe Not tainted 4.12.0-rc7-test-test #19
  Hardware name: Intel corporation NUC6CAYS/NUC6CAYB, BIOS AYAPLCEL.86A.0027.2016.1108.1529 11/08/2016
  Call Trace:
   bad_page+0x16a/0x1f0
   free_pages_check_bad+0x117/0x190
   free_hot_cold_page+0x7b1/0xad0
   __put_page+0x70/0xa0
   madvise_free_huge_pmd+0x627/0x7b0
   madvise_free_pte_range+0x6f8/0x1150
   __walk_page_range+0x6b5/0xe30
   walk_page_range+0x13b/0x310
   madvise_free_page_range.isra.16+0xad/0xd0
   madvise_free_single_vma+0x2e4/0x470
   SyS_madvise+0x8ce/0x1450

If somebody frees the page under us and we hold the last reference to
it, put_page() would attempt to free the page before unlocking it.

The fix is trivial reorder of operations.

Dave said:
 "I came up with the exact same patch.  For posterity, here's the test
  case, generated by syzkaller and trimmed down by Reinette:

  	https://www.sr71.net/~dave/intel/log2.c

  And the config that helps detect this:

  	https://www.sr71.net/~dave/intel/config-log2"

Fixes: b8d3c4c ("mm/huge_memory.c: don't split THP page when MADV_FREE syscall is called")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Reinette Chatre <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Minchan Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Huang Ying <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 24, 2018
commit a04f001 upstream.

A spinlock is held while updating the internal copy of the IRQ mask,
but not while writing it to the actual IMASK register. After the lock
is released, an IRQ can occur before the IMASK register is written.
If handling this IRQ causes the mask to be changed, when the handler
returns back to the middle of the first mask update, a stale value
will be written to the mask register.

If this causes an IRQ to become unmasked that cannot have its status
cleared by writing a 1 to it in the IREG register, e.g. the SDIO IRQ,
then we can end up stuck with the same IRQ repeatedly being fired but
not handled. Normally the MMC IRQ handler attempts to clear any
unexpected IRQs by writing IREG, but for those that cannot be cleared
in this way then the IRQ will just repeatedly fire.

This was resulting in lockups after a while of using Wi-Fi on the
CI20 (GitHub issue #19).

Resolve by holding the spinlock until after the IMASK register has
been updated.

Cc: [email protected]
Link: MIPS#19
Fixes: 61bfbdb ("MMC: Add support for the controller on JZ4740 SoCs.")
Tested-by: Mathieu Malaterre <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Smith <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 19, 2018
[ Upstream commit af50e4b ]

syzbot caught an infinite recursion in nsh_gso_segment().

Problem here is that we need to make sure the NSH header is of
reasonable length.

BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low!
turning off the locking correctness validator.
depth: 48  max: 48!
48 locks held by syz-executor0/10189:
 #0:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x30f/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3517
 #1:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #1:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #2:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #2:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #3:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #3:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #4:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #4:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #5:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #5:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #6:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #6:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #7:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #7:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #8:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #8:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #9:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #9:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #10:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #10:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #11:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #11:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #12:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #12:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #13:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #13:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #14:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #14:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #15:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #15:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #16:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #16:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #17:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #17:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #18:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #18:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #19:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #19:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #20:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #20:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #21:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #21:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #22:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #22:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #23:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #23:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #24:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #24:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #25:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #25:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #26:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #26:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #27:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #27:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #28:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #28:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #29:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #29:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #30:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #30:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #31:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #31:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread
 #32:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #32:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #33:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #33:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #34:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #34:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #35:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #35:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #36:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #36:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #37:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #37:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #38:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #38:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #39:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #39:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #40:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #40:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #41:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #41:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #42:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #42:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #43:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #43:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #44:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #44:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #45:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #45:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #46:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #46:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #47:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #47:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
INFO: lockdep is turned off.
CPU: 1 PID: 10189 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc2+ #26
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 __lock_acquire+0x1788/0x5140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3449
 lock_acquire+0x1dc/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920
 rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:246 [inline]
 rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:632 [inline]
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x25b/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2789
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 __skb_gso_segment+0x3bb/0x870 net/core/dev.c:2865
 skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4025 [inline]
 validate_xmit_skb+0x54d/0xd90 net/core/dev.c:3118
 validate_xmit_skb_list+0xbf/0x120 net/core/dev.c:3168
 sch_direct_xmit+0x354/0x11e0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:312
 qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:399 [inline]
 __qdisc_run+0x741/0x1af0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:410
 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3243 [inline]
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x28ea/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3551
 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3616
 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2951 [inline]
 packet_sendmsg+0x40f8/0x6070 net/packet/af_packet.c:2976
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639
 __sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1789
 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1801 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1797
 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Fixes: c411ed8 ("nsh: add GSO support")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Benc <[email protected]>
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jiri Benc <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
damentz pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 31, 2018
[ Upstream commit 221b6ec ]

Fixes crash seen on arm smp systems (gateworks ventana imx6):

Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000014
pgd = 80004000
[00000014] *pgd=00000000
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 17 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM
Modules linked in: ip6table_filter nf_conntrack_ipv6 ip6_tables nf_log_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 shortcut_fe ipcomp6 xfrm_ipcomp xfrm6_tunnel xfrm6_mode_tunnel xfrm6_mode_transport xfrm6_mode_ro xfrm6_mode_beet ip6_tunnel tunnel6 mip6 ah6 esp6 xfrm_algo sit ip_tunnel tunnel4 ipv6 ath10k_pci ath10k_core ath9k ath mac80211 cfg80211 compat ath_pci ath_hal(P) caamalg authencesn authenc caamrng caamhash caam_jr caam cdc_ncm usbnet usbcore sky2 imx2_wdt
CPU: 0 PID: 3 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Tainted: P                4.9.85 #19
Hardware name: Freescale i.MX6 Quad/DualLite (Device Tree)
task: bf064980 task.stack: bf07c000
PC is at relay_buf_full+0xc/0x30
LR is at _674+0x740/0xf10 [ath9k]
pc : [<8018bce0>]    lr : [<7f1aa604>]    psr: 80000013
sp : bf07dbf0  ip : bf07dc00  fp : bf07dbfc
r10: 0000003f  r9 : bf130e00  r8 : 809044b0
r7 : 00000000  r6 : be67a9f0  r5 : 00000000  r4 : 809043e4
r3 : c0864c24  r2 : 00000000  r1 : 00000004  r0 : 00000000
Flags: Nzcv  IRQs on  FIQs on  Mode SVC_32  ISA ARM  Segment user
Control: 10c5387d  Table: 4e6a004a  DAC: 00000055
Process ksoftirqd/0 (pid: 3, stack limit = 0xbf07c210)
Stack: (0xbf07dbf0 to 0xbf07e000)
dbe0:                                     bf07dd04 bf07dc00 7f1aa604 8018bce0
dc00: 00004014 be59e010 bf07dc34 bf07dc18 7f1a7084 7f19c07c be59c010 be6470a0
dc20: 0000096c be648954 bf07dc6c bf07dc38 7f1c286c bf07dd90 bf07dc5c bf07dc48
dc40: 8029ea4c 0000003c 00000001 be59c010 00000094 00000000 00000000 00000000
dc60: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
dc80: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
dca0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
dcc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 8010ef24 00000030
dce0: be94f5e8 be6485a0 bddf0200 be59c010 be6465a0 be6415a0 bf07ddf4 bf07dd08
dd00: 7f1cf800 7f1aa55c 1fc38c4c 00000000 bf07dd58 cccccccd 66666667 be640bc0
dd20: bf07dd54 be6415a0 1fc38c4c 00000000 00000000 be59c038 be67a9c0 be59e010
dd40: be67a9f0 be647170 8090c904 be59c010 00000000 00000001 1fc38e84 00000000
dd60: be640bc0 bddf0200 00000200 00000010 0000003f 00000002 20000013 be59c010
dd80: 8092d940 bf7ca2c0 bf07ddb4 bf07dd98 1fc38c4c 2602003f 0100ff1b 80ff1b00
dda0: 00808080 00000000 00000000 80808080 80808080 80808080 80808080 00008080
ddc0: 00000000 00000000 7f1b62b8 00000002 be6470ec be6470f0 00000000 bf07de98
dde0: 8092d940 be6415a0 bf07de94 bf07ddf8 7f1d1ed8 7f1cf1fc 00000000 00000000
de00: bf7cc4c0 00000400 be6470f0 bf07de18 8015165c be59c010 8090453c 8090453c
de20: bf07dec4 be6465a0 8014f614 80148884 0000619a 00000001 bf07c000 00000100
de40: bf07de78 00000001 7f327850 00000002 afb50401 bf064980 bf07de9c bf07de68
de60: bf064a00 803cc668 bf064a00 be6470b4 be6470b8 80844180 00000000 bf07de98
de80: 8092d940 bf07c000 bf07dec4 bf07de98 80124d18 7f1d1c44 80124c94 00000000
dea0: 00000006 80902098 80902080 40000006 00000100 bf07c000 bf07df24 bf07dec8
dec0: 8012501c 80124ca0 bf7cc4c0 bf064980 be95e1c0 04208040 80902d00 000061c7
dee0: 0000000a 80600b54 8092d940 808441f8 80902080 bf07dec8 bf03b200 bf07c000
df00: bf03b200 8090fe54 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 bf07df34 bf07df28
df20: 80125148 80124f28 bf07df5c bf07df38 8013deb4 8012511c 00000000 bf03b240
df40: bf03b200 8013dc90 00000000 00000000 bf07dfac bf07df60 8013ad40 8013dc9c
df60: 70448040 00000001 00000000 bf03b200 00000000 00030003 bf07df78 bf07df78
df80: 00000000 00000000 bf07df88 bf07df88 bf03b240 8013ac48 00000000 00000000
dfa0: 00000000 bf07dfb0 80107760 8013ac54 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
dfc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
dfe0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000013 00000000 8c120004 1190ad04
Backtrace:
[<8018bcd4>] (relay_buf_full) from [<7f1aa604>] (_674+0x740/0xf10 [ath9k])
[<7f1aa550>] (_674 [ath9k]) from [<7f1cf800>] (_582+0x14b4/0x3708 [ath9k])
 r10:be6415a0 r9:be6465a0 r8:be59c010 r7:bddf0200 r6:be6485a0 r5:be94f5e8
 r4:00000030
[<7f1cf1f0>] (_582 [ath9k]) from [<7f1d1ed8>] (_735+0x2a0/0xec4 [ath9k])
 r10:be6415a0 r9:8092d940 r8:bf07de98 r7:00000000 r6:be6470f0 r5:be6470ec
 r4:00000002
[<7f1d1c38>] (_735 [ath9k]) from [<80124d18>] (tasklet_action+0x84/0xf8)
 r10:bf07c000 r9:8092d940 r8:bf07de98 r7:00000000 r6:80844180 r5:be6470b8
 r4:be6470b4
[<80124c94>] (tasklet_action) from [<8012501c>] (__do_softirq+0x100/0x1f4)
 r10:bf07c000 r9:00000100 r8:40000006 r7:80902080 r6:80902098 r5:00000006
 r4:00000000 r3:80124c94
[<80124f1c>] (__do_softirq) from [<80125148>] (run_ksoftirqd+0x38/0x4c)
 r10:00000000 r9:00000000 r8:00000000 r7:00000000 r6:8090fe54 r5:bf03b200
 r4:bf07c000
[<80125110>] (run_ksoftirqd) from [<8013deb4>] (smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x260)
[<8013dc90>] (smpboot_thread_fn) from [<8013ad40>] (kthread+0xf8/0x100)
 r9:00000000 r8:00000000 r7:8013dc90 r6:bf03b200 r5:bf03b240 r4:00000000
[<8013ac48>] (kthread) from [<80107760>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x34)
 r7:00000000 r6:00000000 r5:8013ac48 r4:bf03b240
Code: e89da800 e1a0c00d e92dd800 e24cb004 (e5901014)
---[ end trace dddf11ac9111b272 ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
CPU1: stopping
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Tainted: P      D         4.9.85 #19
Hardware name: Freescale i.MX6 Quad/DualLite (Device Tree)
Backtrace:
[<8010a708>] (dump_backtrace) from [<8010a99c>] (show_stack+0x18/0x1c)
 r7:bf093f58 r6:20000193 r5:809168e8 r4:00000000
[<8010a984>] (show_stack) from [<802a09c4>] (dump_stack+0x94/0xa8)
[<802a0930>] (dump_stack) from [<8010d184>] (handle_IPI+0xe8/0x180)
 r7:bf093f58 r6:00000000 r5:00000001 r4:808478c4
[<8010d09c>] (handle_IPI) from [<801013e8>] (gic_handle_irq+0x78/0x7c)
 r7:f4000100 r6:bf093f58 r5:f400010c r4:8090467c
[<80101370>] (gic_handle_irq) from [<8010b378>] (__irq_svc+0x58/0x8c)
Exception stack(0xbf093f58 to 0xbf093fa0)
3f40:                                                       bf7d62a0 00000000
3f60: 0010a5f4 80113460 bf092000 809043e4 00000002 80904434 bf092008 412fc09a
3f80: 00000000 bf093fb4 bf093fb8 bf093fa8 8010804c 80108050 60000013 ffffffff
 r9:bf092000 r8:bf092008 r7:bf093f8c r6:ffffffff r5:60000013 r4:80108050
[<80108014>] (arch_cpu_idle) from [<80553c2c>] (default_idle_call+0x30/0x34)
[<80553bfc>] (default_idle_call) from [<80158394>] (cpu_startup_entry+0xc4/0xfc)
[<801582d0>] (cpu_startup_entry) from [<8010ce40>] (secondary_start_kernel+0x168/0x174)
 r7:8092d2f8 r4:80913568
[<8010ccd8>] (secondary_start_kernel) from [<10101488>] (0x10101488)
 r5:00000055 r4:4f07806a
Rebooting in 10 seconds..
Reboot failed -- System halted

Signed-off-by: Sebastian Gottschall <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]>

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
damentz pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 31, 2018
[ Upstream commit 2bbea6e ]

when mounting an ISO filesystem sometimes (very rarely)
the system hangs because of a race condition between two tasks.

PID: 6766   TASK: ffff88007b2a6dd0  CPU: 0   COMMAND: "mount"
 #0 [ffff880078447ae0] __schedule at ffffffff8168d605
 #1 [ffff880078447b48] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffff8168ed49
 #2 [ffff880078447b58] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8168c995
 #3 [ffff880078447bb8] mutex_lock at ffffffff8168bdef
 #4 [ffff880078447bd0] sr_block_ioctl at ffffffffa00b6818 [sr_mod]
 #5 [ffff880078447c10] blkdev_ioctl at ffffffff812fea50
 #6 [ffff880078447c70] ioctl_by_bdev at ffffffff8123a8b3
 #7 [ffff880078447c90] isofs_fill_super at ffffffffa04fb1e1 [isofs]
 #8 [ffff880078447da8] mount_bdev at ffffffff81202570
 #9 [ffff880078447e18] isofs_mount at ffffffffa04f9828 [isofs]
#10 [ffff880078447e28] mount_fs at ffffffff81202d09
#11 [ffff880078447e70] vfs_kern_mount at ffffffff8121ea8f
#12 [ffff880078447ea8] do_mount at ffffffff81220fee
#13 [ffff880078447f28] sys_mount at ffffffff812218d6
#14 [ffff880078447f80] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff81698c49
    RIP: 00007fd9ea914e9a  RSP: 00007ffd5d9bf648  RFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: 00000000000000a5  RBX: ffffffff81698c49  RCX: 0000000000000010
    RDX: 00007fd9ec2bc210  RSI: 00007fd9ec2bc290  RDI: 00007fd9ec2bcf30
    RBP: 0000000000000000   R8: 0000000000000000   R9: 0000000000000010
    R10: 00000000c0ed0001  R11: 0000000000000206  R12: 00007fd9ec2bc040
    R13: 00007fd9eb6b2380  R14: 00007fd9ec2bc210  R15: 00007fd9ec2bcf30
    ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5  CS: 0033  SS: 002b

This task was trying to mount the cdrom.  It allocated and configured a
super_block struct and owned the write-lock for the super_block->s_umount
rwsem. While exclusively owning the s_umount lock, it called
sr_block_ioctl and waited to acquire the global sr_mutex lock.

PID: 6785   TASK: ffff880078720fb0  CPU: 0   COMMAND: "systemd-udevd"
 #0 [ffff880078417898] __schedule at ffffffff8168d605
 #1 [ffff880078417900] schedule at ffffffff8168dc59
 #2 [ffff880078417910] rwsem_down_read_failed at ffffffff8168f605
 #3 [ffff880078417980] call_rwsem_down_read_failed at ffffffff81328838
 #4 [ffff8800784179d0] down_read at ffffffff8168cde0
 #5 [ffff8800784179e8] get_super at ffffffff81201cc7
 #6 [ffff880078417a10] __invalidate_device at ffffffff8123a8de
 #7 [ffff880078417a40] flush_disk at ffffffff8123a94b
 #8 [ffff880078417a88] check_disk_change at ffffffff8123ab50
 #9 [ffff880078417ab0] cdrom_open at ffffffffa00a29e1 [cdrom]
#10 [ffff880078417b68] sr_block_open at ffffffffa00b6f9b [sr_mod]
#11 [ffff880078417b98] __blkdev_get at ffffffff8123ba86
#12 [ffff880078417bf0] blkdev_get at ffffffff8123bd65
#13 [ffff880078417c78] blkdev_open at ffffffff8123bf9b
#14 [ffff880078417c90] do_dentry_open at ffffffff811fc7f7
#15 [ffff880078417cd8] vfs_open at ffffffff811fc9cf
#16 [ffff880078417d00] do_last at ffffffff8120d53d
#17 [ffff880078417db0] path_openat at ffffffff8120e6b2
#18 [ffff880078417e48] do_filp_open at ffffffff8121082b
#19 [ffff880078417f18] do_sys_open at ffffffff811fdd33
#20 [ffff880078417f70] sys_open at ffffffff811fde4e
#21 [ffff880078417f80] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff81698c49
    RIP: 00007f29438b0c20  RSP: 00007ffc76624b78  RFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: 0000000000000002  RBX: ffffffff81698c49  RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 00007f2944a5fa70  RSI: 00000000000a0800  RDI: 00007f2944a5fa70
    RBP: 00007f2944a5f540   R8: 0000000000000000   R9: 0000000000000020
    R10: 00007f2943614c40  R11: 0000000000000246  R12: ffffffff811fde4e
    R13: ffff880078417f78  R14: 000000000000000c  R15: 00007f2944a4b010
    ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000002  CS: 0033  SS: 002b

This task tried to open the cdrom device, the sr_block_open function
acquired the global sr_mutex lock. The call to check_disk_change()
then saw an event flag indicating a possible media change and tried
to flush any cached data for the device.
As part of the flush, it tried to acquire the super_block->s_umount
lock associated with the cdrom device.
This was the same super_block as created and locked by the previous task.

The first task acquires the s_umount lock and then the sr_mutex_lock;
the second task acquires the sr_mutex_lock and then the s_umount lock.

This patch fixes the issue by moving check_disk_change() out of
cdrom_open() and let the caller take care of it.

Signed-off-by: Maurizio Lombardi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 11, 2023
commit c43120a upstream.

kvm->lock must be taken outside of the vcpu->mutex. Of course, the
locking documentation for KVM makes this abundantly clear. Nonetheless,
the locking order in KVM/arm64 has been wrong for quite a while; we
acquire the kvm->lock while holding the vcpu->mutex all over the shop.

All was seemingly fine until commit 42a9000 ("KVM: Ensure lockdep
knows about kvm->lock vs. vcpu->mutex ordering rule") caught us with our
pants down, leading to lockdep barfing:

 ======================================================
 WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
 6.2.0-rc7+ #19 Not tainted
 ------------------------------------------------------
 qemu-system-aar/859 is trying to acquire lock:
 ffff5aa69269eba0 (&host_kvm->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_reset_vcpu+0x34/0x274

 but task is already holding lock:
 ffff5aa68768c0b8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x8c/0xba0

 which lock already depends on the new lock.

Add a dedicated lock to serialize writes to VM-scoped configuration from
the context of a vCPU. Protect the register width flags with the new
lock, thus avoiding the need to grab the kvm->lock while holding
vcpu->mutex in kvm_reset_vcpu().

Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Jeremy Linton <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvmarm/[email protected]/
Tested-by: Jeremy Linton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
damentz pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 11, 2023
…probe-ed

commit 7a29fb4 upstream.

Registering a kprobe on __rcu_irq_enter_check_tick() can cause kernel
stack overflow as shown below. This issue can be reproduced by enabling
CONFIG_NO_HZ_FULL and booting the kernel with argument "nohz_full=",
and then giving the following commands at the shell prompt:

  # cd /sys/kernel/tracing/
  # echo 'p:mp1 __rcu_irq_enter_check_tick' >> kprobe_events
  # echo 1 > events/kprobes/enable

This commit therefore adds __rcu_irq_enter_check_tick() to the kprobes
blacklist using NOKPROBE_SYMBOL().

Insufficient stack space to handle exception!
ESR: 0x00000000f2000004 -- BRK (AArch64)
FAR: 0x0000ffffccf3e510
Task stack:     [0xffff80000ad30000..0xffff80000ad38000]
IRQ stack:      [0xffff800008050000..0xffff800008058000]
Overflow stack: [0xffff089c36f9f310..0xffff089c36fa0310]
CPU: 5 PID: 190 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.2.0-rc2-00320-g1f5abbd77e2c #19
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
pstate: 400003c5 (nZcv DAIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : __rcu_irq_enter_check_tick+0x0/0x1b8
lr : ct_nmi_enter+0x11c/0x138
sp : ffff80000ad30080
x29: ffff80000ad30080 x28: ffff089c82e20000 x27: 0000000000000000
x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff089c02a8d100 x24: 0000000000000000
x23: 00000000400003c5 x22: 0000ffffccf3e510 x21: ffff089c36fae148
x20: ffff80000ad30120 x19: ffffa8da8fcce148 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: ffffa8da8e44ea6c
x14: ffffa8da8e44e968 x13: ffffa8da8e03136c x12: 1fffe113804d6809
x11: ffff6113804d6809 x10: 0000000000000a60 x9 : dfff800000000000
x8 : ffff089c026b404f x7 : 00009eec7fb297f7 x6 : 0000000000000001
x5 : ffff80000ad30120 x4 : dfff800000000000 x3 : ffffa8da8e3016f4
x2 : 0000000000000003 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000
Kernel panic - not syncing: kernel stack overflow
CPU: 5 PID: 190 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.2.0-rc2-00320-g1f5abbd77e2c #19
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace+0xf8/0x108
 show_stack+0x20/0x30
 dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x84
 dump_stack+0x1c/0x38
 panic+0x214/0x404
 add_taint+0x0/0xf8
 panic_bad_stack+0x144/0x160
 handle_bad_stack+0x38/0x58
 __bad_stack+0x78/0x7c
 __rcu_irq_enter_check_tick+0x0/0x1b8
 arm64_enter_el1_dbg.isra.0+0x14/0x20
 el1_dbg+0x2c/0x90
 el1h_64_sync_handler+0xcc/0xe8
 el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x68
 __rcu_irq_enter_check_tick+0x0/0x1b8
 arm64_enter_el1_dbg.isra.0+0x14/0x20
 el1_dbg+0x2c/0x90
 el1h_64_sync_handler+0xcc/0xe8
 el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x68
 __rcu_irq_enter_check_tick+0x0/0x1b8
 arm64_enter_el1_dbg.isra.0+0x14/0x20
 el1_dbg+0x2c/0x90
 el1h_64_sync_handler+0xcc/0xe8
 el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x68
 __rcu_irq_enter_check_tick+0x0/0x1b8
 [...]
 el1_dbg+0x2c/0x90
 el1h_64_sync_handler+0xcc/0xe8
 el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x68
 __rcu_irq_enter_check_tick+0x0/0x1b8
 arm64_enter_el1_dbg.isra.0+0x14/0x20
 el1_dbg+0x2c/0x90
 el1h_64_sync_handler+0xcc/0xe8
 el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x68
 __rcu_irq_enter_check_tick+0x0/0x1b8
 arm64_enter_el1_dbg.isra.0+0x14/0x20
 el1_dbg+0x2c/0x90
 el1h_64_sync_handler+0xcc/0xe8
 el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x68
 __rcu_irq_enter_check_tick+0x0/0x1b8
 el1_interrupt+0x28/0x60
 el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x28
 el1h_64_irq+0x64/0x68
 __ftrace_set_clr_event_nolock+0x98/0x198
 __ftrace_set_clr_event+0x58/0x80
 system_enable_write+0x144/0x178
 vfs_write+0x174/0x738
 ksys_write+0xd0/0x188
 __arm64_sys_write+0x4c/0x60
 invoke_syscall+0x64/0x180
 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x84/0x160
 do_el0_svc+0x48/0xe8
 el0_svc+0x34/0xd0
 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xb8/0xc0
 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194
SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
Kernel Offset: 0x28da86000000 from 0xffff800008000000
PHYS_OFFSET: 0xfffff76600000000
CPU features: 0x00000,01a00100,0000421b
Memory Limit: none

Acked-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Fixes: aaf2bc5 ("rcu: Abstract out rcu_irq_enter_check_tick() from rcu_nmi_enter()")
Signed-off-by: Zheng Yejian <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
damentz pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 11, 2023
commit c43120a upstream.

kvm->lock must be taken outside of the vcpu->mutex. Of course, the
locking documentation for KVM makes this abundantly clear. Nonetheless,
the locking order in KVM/arm64 has been wrong for quite a while; we
acquire the kvm->lock while holding the vcpu->mutex all over the shop.

All was seemingly fine until commit 42a9000 ("KVM: Ensure lockdep
knows about kvm->lock vs. vcpu->mutex ordering rule") caught us with our
pants down, leading to lockdep barfing:

 ======================================================
 WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
 6.2.0-rc7+ #19 Not tainted
 ------------------------------------------------------
 qemu-system-aar/859 is trying to acquire lock:
 ffff5aa69269eba0 (&host_kvm->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_reset_vcpu+0x34/0x274

 but task is already holding lock:
 ffff5aa68768c0b8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x8c/0xba0

 which lock already depends on the new lock.

Add a dedicated lock to serialize writes to VM-scoped configuration from
the context of a vCPU. Protect the register width flags with the new
lock, thus avoiding the need to grab the kvm->lock while holding
vcpu->mutex in kvm_reset_vcpu().

Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Jeremy Linton <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvmarm/[email protected]/
Tested-by: Jeremy Linton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 24, 2023
[ Upstream commit 56077b5 ]

When doing link mtu negotiation, a malicious peer may send Activate msg
with a very small mtu, e.g. 4 in Shuang's testing, without checking for
the minimum mtu, l->mtu will be set to 4 in tipc_link_proto_rcv(), then
n->links[bearer_id].mtu is set to 4294967228, which is a overflow of
'4 - INT_H_SIZE - EMSG_OVERHEAD' in tipc_link_mss().

With tipc_link.mtu = 4, tipc_link_xmit() kept printing the warning:

 tipc: Too large msg, purging xmit list 1 5 0 40 4!
 tipc: Too large msg, purging xmit list 1 15 0 60 4!

And with tipc_link_entry.mtu 4294967228, a huge skb was allocated in
named_distribute(), and when purging it in tipc_link_xmit(), a crash
was even caused:

  general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x2100001011000dd: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
  CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.3.0.neta #19
  RIP: 0010:kfree_skb_list_reason+0x7e/0x1f0
  Call Trace:
   <IRQ>
   skb_release_data+0xf9/0x1d0
   kfree_skb_reason+0x40/0x100
   tipc_link_xmit+0x57a/0x740 [tipc]
   tipc_node_xmit+0x16c/0x5c0 [tipc]
   tipc_named_node_up+0x27f/0x2c0 [tipc]
   tipc_node_write_unlock+0x149/0x170 [tipc]
   tipc_rcv+0x608/0x740 [tipc]
   tipc_udp_recv+0xdc/0x1f0 [tipc]
   udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0x33e/0x620
   udp_unicast_rcv_skb.isra.72+0x75/0x90
   __udp4_lib_rcv+0x56d/0xc20
   ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x100/0x2d0

This patch fixes it by checking the new mtu against tipc_bearer_min_mtu(),
and not updating mtu if it is too small.

Fixes: ed193ec ("tipc: simplify link mtu negotiation")
Reported-by: Shuang Li <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
damentz pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 9, 2023
[ Upstream commit 37c3b9f ]

The cited commit adds a compeletion to remove dependency on rtnl
lock. But it causes a deadlock for multiple encapsulations:

 crash> bt ffff8aece8a64000
 PID: 1514557  TASK: ffff8aece8a64000  CPU: 3    COMMAND: "tc"
  #0 [ffffa6d14183f368] __schedule at ffffffffb8ba7f45
  #1 [ffffa6d14183f3f8] schedule at ffffffffb8ba8418
  #2 [ffffa6d14183f418] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffb8ba8898
  #3 [ffffa6d14183f428] __mutex_lock at ffffffffb8baa7f8
  #4 [ffffa6d14183f4d0] mutex_lock_nested at ffffffffb8baabeb
  #5 [ffffa6d14183f4e0] mlx5e_attach_encap at ffffffffc0f48c17 [mlx5_core]
  #6 [ffffa6d14183f628] mlx5e_tc_add_fdb_flow at ffffffffc0f39680 [mlx5_core]
  #7 [ffffa6d14183f688] __mlx5e_add_fdb_flow at ffffffffc0f3b636 [mlx5_core]
  #8 [ffffa6d14183f6f0] mlx5e_tc_add_flow at ffffffffc0f3bcdf [mlx5_core]
  #9 [ffffa6d14183f728] mlx5e_configure_flower at ffffffffc0f3c1d1 [mlx5_core]
 #10 [ffffa6d14183f790] mlx5e_rep_setup_tc_cls_flower at ffffffffc0f3d529 [mlx5_core]
 #11 [ffffa6d14183f7a0] mlx5e_rep_setup_tc_cb at ffffffffc0f3d714 [mlx5_core]
 #12 [ffffa6d14183f7b0] tc_setup_cb_add at ffffffffb8931bb8
 #13 [ffffa6d14183f810] fl_hw_replace_filter at ffffffffc0dae901 [cls_flower]
 #14 [ffffa6d14183f8d8] fl_change at ffffffffc0db5c57 [cls_flower]
 #15 [ffffa6d14183f970] tc_new_tfilter at ffffffffb8936047
 #16 [ffffa6d14183fac8] rtnetlink_rcv_msg at ffffffffb88c7c31
 #17 [ffffa6d14183fb50] netlink_rcv_skb at ffffffffb8942853
 #18 [ffffa6d14183fbc0] rtnetlink_rcv at ffffffffb88c1835
 #19 [ffffa6d14183fbd0] netlink_unicast at ffffffffb8941f27
 #20 [ffffa6d14183fc18] netlink_sendmsg at ffffffffb8942245
 #21 [ffffa6d14183fc98] sock_sendmsg at ffffffffb887d482
 #22 [ffffa6d14183fcb8] ____sys_sendmsg at ffffffffb887d81a
 #23 [ffffa6d14183fd38] ___sys_sendmsg at ffffffffb88806e2
 #24 [ffffa6d14183fe90] __sys_sendmsg at ffffffffb88807a2
 #25 [ffffa6d14183ff28] __x64_sys_sendmsg at ffffffffb888080f
 #26 [ffffa6d14183ff38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffffb8b9b6a8
 #27 [ffffa6d14183ff50] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffffb8c0007c
 crash> bt 0xffff8aeb07544000
 PID: 1110766  TASK: ffff8aeb07544000  CPU: 0    COMMAND: "kworker/u20:9"
  #0 [ffffa6d14e6b7bd8] __schedule at ffffffffb8ba7f45
  #1 [ffffa6d14e6b7c68] schedule at ffffffffb8ba8418
  #2 [ffffa6d14e6b7c88] schedule_timeout at ffffffffb8baef88
  #3 [ffffa6d14e6b7d10] wait_for_completion at ffffffffb8ba968b
  #4 [ffffa6d14e6b7d60] mlx5e_take_all_encap_flows at ffffffffc0f47ec4 [mlx5_core]
  #5 [ffffa6d14e6b7da0] mlx5e_rep_update_flows at ffffffffc0f3e734 [mlx5_core]
  #6 [ffffa6d14e6b7df8] mlx5e_rep_neigh_update at ffffffffc0f400bb [mlx5_core]
  #7 [ffffa6d14e6b7e50] process_one_work at ffffffffb80acc9c
  #8 [ffffa6d14e6b7ed0] worker_thread at ffffffffb80ad012
  #9 [ffffa6d14e6b7f10] kthread at ffffffffb80b615d
 #10 [ffffa6d14e6b7f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffffb8001b2f

After the first encap is attached, flow will be added to encap
entry's flows list. If neigh update is running at this time, the
following encaps of the flow can't hold the encap_tbl_lock and
sleep. If neigh update thread is waiting for that flow's init_done,
deadlock happens.

Fix it by holding lock outside of the for loop. If neigh update is
running, prevent encap flows from offloading. Since the lock is held
outside of the for loop, concurrent creation of encap entries is not
allowed. So remove unnecessary wait_for_completion call for res_ready.

Fixes: 95435ad ("net/mlx5e: Only access fully initialized flows in neigh update")
Signed-off-by: Chris Mi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Roi Dayan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vlad Buslov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
someone5678 pushed a commit to someone5678/zen-kernel that referenced this pull request Jul 12, 2023
When doing link mtu negotiation, a malicious peer may send Activate msg
with a very small mtu, e.g. 4 in Shuang's testing, without checking for
the minimum mtu, l->mtu will be set to 4 in tipc_link_proto_rcv(), then
n->links[bearer_id].mtu is set to 4294967228, which is a overflow of
'4 - INT_H_SIZE - EMSG_OVERHEAD' in tipc_link_mss().

With tipc_link.mtu = 4, tipc_link_xmit() kept printing the warning:

 tipc: Too large msg, purging xmit list 1 5 0 40 4!
 tipc: Too large msg, purging xmit list 1 15 0 60 4!

And with tipc_link_entry.mtu 4294967228, a huge skb was allocated in
named_distribute(), and when purging it in tipc_link_xmit(), a crash
was even caused:

  general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x2100001011000dd: 0000 [zen-kernel#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
  CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.3.0.neta zen-kernel#19
  RIP: 0010:kfree_skb_list_reason+0x7e/0x1f0
  Call Trace:
   <IRQ>
   skb_release_data+0xf9/0x1d0
   kfree_skb_reason+0x40/0x100
   tipc_link_xmit+0x57a/0x740 [tipc]
   tipc_node_xmit+0x16c/0x5c0 [tipc]
   tipc_named_node_up+0x27f/0x2c0 [tipc]
   tipc_node_write_unlock+0x149/0x170 [tipc]
   tipc_rcv+0x608/0x740 [tipc]
   tipc_udp_recv+0xdc/0x1f0 [tipc]
   udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0x33e/0x620
   udp_unicast_rcv_skb.isra.72+0x75/0x90
   __udp4_lib_rcv+0x56d/0xc20
   ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x100/0x2d0

This patch fixes it by checking the new mtu against tipc_bearer_min_mtu(),
and not updating mtu if it is too small.

Fixes: ed193ec ("tipc: simplify link mtu negotiation")
Reported-by: Shuang Li <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
damentz pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 23, 2023
[ Upstream commit b97f96e ]

When compiling the kernel with clang and having HARDENED_USERCOPY
enabled, the liburing openat2.t test case fails during request setup:

usercopy: Kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to SLUB object 'io_kiocb' (offset 24, size 24)!
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
CPU: 3 PID: 413 Comm: openat2.t Tainted: G                 N 6.4.3-g6995e2de6891-dirty #19
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.1-0-g3208b098f51a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:usercopy_abort+0x84/0x90
Code: ce 49 89 ce 48 c7 c3 68 48 98 82 48 0f 44 de 48 c7 c7 56 c6 94 82 4c 89 de 48 89 c1 41 52 41 56 53 e8 e0 51 c5 00 48 83 c4 18 <0f> 0b 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 41 57 41 56
RSP: 0018:ffffc900016b3da0 EFLAGS: 00010296
RAX: 0000000000000062 RBX: ffffffff82984868 RCX: 4e9b661ac6275b00
RDX: ffff8881b90ec580 RSI: ffffffff82949a64 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
RBP: 0000000000000018 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffffc900016b3c88 R11: ffffc900016b3c30 R12: 00007ffe549659e0
R13: ffff888119014000 R14: 0000000000000018 R15: 0000000000000018
FS:  00007f862e3ca680(0000) GS:ffff8881b90c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00005571483542a8 CR3: 0000000118c11000 CR4: 00000000003506e0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ? __die_body+0x63/0xb0
 ? die+0x9d/0xc0
 ? do_trap+0xa7/0x180
 ? usercopy_abort+0x84/0x90
 ? do_error_trap+0xc6/0x110
 ? usercopy_abort+0x84/0x90
 ? handle_invalid_op+0x2c/0x40
 ? usercopy_abort+0x84/0x90
 ? exc_invalid_op+0x2f/0x40
 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
 ? usercopy_abort+0x84/0x90
 __check_heap_object+0xe2/0x110
 __check_object_size+0x142/0x3d0
 io_openat2_prep+0x68/0x140
 io_submit_sqes+0x28a/0x680
 __se_sys_io_uring_enter+0x120/0x580
 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
RIP: 0033:0x55714834de26
Code: ca 01 0f b6 82 d0 00 00 00 8b ba cc 00 00 00 45 31 c0 31 d2 41 b9 08 00 00 00 83 e0 01 c1 e0 04 41 09 c2 b8 aa 01 00 00 0f 05 <c3> 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 89 30 eb 89 0f 1f 40 00 8b 00 a8 06
RSP: 002b:00007ffe549659c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001aa
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe54965a50 RCX: 000055714834de26
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000008
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055714834f057
R13: 00007ffe54965a50 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000557148351dd8
 </TASK>
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

when it tries to copy struct open_how from userspace into the per-command
space in the io_kiocb. There's nothing wrong with the copy, but we're
missing the appropriate annotations for allowing user copies to/from the
io_kiocb slab.

Allow copies in the per-command area, which is from the 'file' pointer to
when 'opcode' starts. We do have existing user copies there, but they are
not all annotated like the one that openat2_prep() uses,
copy_struct_from_user(). But in practice opcodes should be allowed to
copy data into their per-command area in the io_kiocb.

Reported-by: Breno Leitao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
damentz pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 23, 2023
commit 0b0747d upstream.

The following processes run into a deadlock. CPU 41 was waiting for CPU 29
to handle a CSD request while holding spinlock "crashdump_lock", but CPU 29
was hung by that spinlock with IRQs disabled.

  PID: 17360    TASK: ffff95c1090c5c40  CPU: 41  COMMAND: "mrdiagd"
  !# 0 [ffffb80edbf37b58] __read_once_size at ffffffff9b871a40 include/linux/compiler.h:185:0
  !# 1 [ffffb80edbf37b58] atomic_read at ffffffff9b871a40 arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:27:0
  !# 2 [ffffb80edbf37b58] dump_stack at ffffffff9b871a40 lib/dump_stack.c:54:0
   # 3 [ffffb80edbf37b78] csd_lock_wait_toolong at ffffffff9b131ad5 kernel/smp.c:364:0
   # 4 [ffffb80edbf37b78] __csd_lock_wait at ffffffff9b131ad5 kernel/smp.c:384:0
   # 5 [ffffb80edbf37bf8] csd_lock_wait at ffffffff9b13267a kernel/smp.c:394:0
   # 6 [ffffb80edbf37bf8] smp_call_function_many at ffffffff9b13267a kernel/smp.c:843:0
   # 7 [ffffb80edbf37c50] smp_call_function at ffffffff9b13279d kernel/smp.c:867:0
   # 8 [ffffb80edbf37c50] on_each_cpu at ffffffff9b13279d kernel/smp.c:976:0
   # 9 [ffffb80edbf37c78] flush_tlb_kernel_range at ffffffff9b085c4b arch/x86/mm/tlb.c:742:0
   #10 [ffffb80edbf37cb8] __purge_vmap_area_lazy at ffffffff9b23a1e0 mm/vmalloc.c:701:0
   #11 [ffffb80edbf37ce0] try_purge_vmap_area_lazy at ffffffff9b23a2cc mm/vmalloc.c:722:0
   #12 [ffffb80edbf37ce0] free_vmap_area_noflush at ffffffff9b23a2cc mm/vmalloc.c:754:0
   #13 [ffffb80edbf37cf8] free_unmap_vmap_area at ffffffff9b23bb3b mm/vmalloc.c:764:0
   #14 [ffffb80edbf37cf8] remove_vm_area at ffffffff9b23bb3b mm/vmalloc.c:1509:0
   #15 [ffffb80edbf37d18] __vunmap at ffffffff9b23bb8a mm/vmalloc.c:1537:0
   #16 [ffffb80edbf37d40] vfree at ffffffff9b23bc85 mm/vmalloc.c:1612:0
   #17 [ffffb80edbf37d58] megasas_free_host_crash_buffer [megaraid_sas] at ffffffffc020b7f2 drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fusion.c:3932:0
   #18 [ffffb80edbf37d80] fw_crash_state_store [megaraid_sas] at ffffffffc01f804d drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c:3291:0
   #19 [ffffb80edbf37dc0] dev_attr_store at ffffffff9b56dd7b drivers/base/core.c:758:0
   #20 [ffffb80edbf37dd0] sysfs_kf_write at ffffffff9b326acf fs/sysfs/file.c:144:0
   #21 [ffffb80edbf37de0] kernfs_fop_write at ffffffff9b325fd4 fs/kernfs/file.c:316:0
   #22 [ffffb80edbf37e20] __vfs_write at ffffffff9b29418a fs/read_write.c:480:0
   #23 [ffffb80edbf37ea8] vfs_write at ffffffff9b294462 fs/read_write.c:544:0
   #24 [ffffb80edbf37ee8] SYSC_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:590:0
   #25 [ffffb80edbf37ee8] SyS_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:582:0
   #26 [ffffb80edbf37f30] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9b003ca9 arch/x86/entry/common.c:298:0
   #27 [ffffb80edbf37f58] entry_SYSCALL_64 at ffffffff9ba001b1 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:238:0

  PID: 17355    TASK: ffff95c1090c3d80  CPU: 29  COMMAND: "mrdiagd"
  !# 0 [ffffb80f2d3c7d30] __read_once_size at ffffffff9b0f2ab0 include/linux/compiler.h:185:0
  !# 1 [ffffb80f2d3c7d30] native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff9b0f2ab0 kernel/locking/qspinlock.c:368:0
   # 2 [ffffb80f2d3c7d58] pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff9b0f244b arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:674:0
   # 3 [ffffb80f2d3c7d58] queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff9b0f244b arch/x86/include/asm/qspinlock.h:53:0
   # 4 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] queued_spin_lock at ffffffff9b8961a6 include/asm-generic/qspinlock.h:90:0
   # 5 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] do_raw_spin_lock_flags at ffffffff9b8961a6 include/linux/spinlock.h:173:0
   # 6 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] __raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff9b8961a6 include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:122:0
   # 7 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff9b8961a6 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:160:0
   # 8 [ffffb80f2d3c7d88] fw_crash_buffer_store [megaraid_sas] at ffffffffc01f8129 drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c:3205:0
   # 9 [ffffb80f2d3c7dc0] dev_attr_store at ffffffff9b56dd7b drivers/base/core.c:758:0
   #10 [ffffb80f2d3c7dd0] sysfs_kf_write at ffffffff9b326acf fs/sysfs/file.c:144:0
   #11 [ffffb80f2d3c7de0] kernfs_fop_write at ffffffff9b325fd4 fs/kernfs/file.c:316:0
   #12 [ffffb80f2d3c7e20] __vfs_write at ffffffff9b29418a fs/read_write.c:480:0
   #13 [ffffb80f2d3c7ea8] vfs_write at ffffffff9b294462 fs/read_write.c:544:0
   #14 [ffffb80f2d3c7ee8] SYSC_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:590:0
   #15 [ffffb80f2d3c7ee8] SyS_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:582:0
   #16 [ffffb80f2d3c7f30] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9b003ca9 arch/x86/entry/common.c:298:0
   #17 [ffffb80f2d3c7f58] entry_SYSCALL_64 at ffffffff9ba001b1 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:238:0

The lock is used to synchronize different sysfs operations, it doesn't
protect any resource that will be touched by an interrupt. Consequently
it's not required to disable IRQs. Replace the spinlock with a mutex to fix
the deadlock.

Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 23, 2023
The following processes run into a deadlock. CPU 41 was waiting for CPU 29
to handle a CSD request while holding spinlock "crashdump_lock", but CPU 29
was hung by that spinlock with IRQs disabled.

  PID: 17360    TASK: ffff95c1090c5c40  CPU: 41  COMMAND: "mrdiagd"
  !# 0 [ffffb80edbf37b58] __read_once_size at ffffffff9b871a40 include/linux/compiler.h:185:0
  !# 1 [ffffb80edbf37b58] atomic_read at ffffffff9b871a40 arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:27:0
  !# 2 [ffffb80edbf37b58] dump_stack at ffffffff9b871a40 lib/dump_stack.c:54:0
   # 3 [ffffb80edbf37b78] csd_lock_wait_toolong at ffffffff9b131ad5 kernel/smp.c:364:0
   # 4 [ffffb80edbf37b78] __csd_lock_wait at ffffffff9b131ad5 kernel/smp.c:384:0
   # 5 [ffffb80edbf37bf8] csd_lock_wait at ffffffff9b13267a kernel/smp.c:394:0
   # 6 [ffffb80edbf37bf8] smp_call_function_many at ffffffff9b13267a kernel/smp.c:843:0
   # 7 [ffffb80edbf37c50] smp_call_function at ffffffff9b13279d kernel/smp.c:867:0
   # 8 [ffffb80edbf37c50] on_each_cpu at ffffffff9b13279d kernel/smp.c:976:0
   # 9 [ffffb80edbf37c78] flush_tlb_kernel_range at ffffffff9b085c4b arch/x86/mm/tlb.c:742:0
   #10 [ffffb80edbf37cb8] __purge_vmap_area_lazy at ffffffff9b23a1e0 mm/vmalloc.c:701:0
   #11 [ffffb80edbf37ce0] try_purge_vmap_area_lazy at ffffffff9b23a2cc mm/vmalloc.c:722:0
   #12 [ffffb80edbf37ce0] free_vmap_area_noflush at ffffffff9b23a2cc mm/vmalloc.c:754:0
   #13 [ffffb80edbf37cf8] free_unmap_vmap_area at ffffffff9b23bb3b mm/vmalloc.c:764:0
   #14 [ffffb80edbf37cf8] remove_vm_area at ffffffff9b23bb3b mm/vmalloc.c:1509:0
   #15 [ffffb80edbf37d18] __vunmap at ffffffff9b23bb8a mm/vmalloc.c:1537:0
   #16 [ffffb80edbf37d40] vfree at ffffffff9b23bc85 mm/vmalloc.c:1612:0
   #17 [ffffb80edbf37d58] megasas_free_host_crash_buffer [megaraid_sas] at ffffffffc020b7f2 drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fusion.c:3932:0
   #18 [ffffb80edbf37d80] fw_crash_state_store [megaraid_sas] at ffffffffc01f804d drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c:3291:0
   #19 [ffffb80edbf37dc0] dev_attr_store at ffffffff9b56dd7b drivers/base/core.c:758:0
   #20 [ffffb80edbf37dd0] sysfs_kf_write at ffffffff9b326acf fs/sysfs/file.c:144:0
   #21 [ffffb80edbf37de0] kernfs_fop_write at ffffffff9b325fd4 fs/kernfs/file.c:316:0
   #22 [ffffb80edbf37e20] __vfs_write at ffffffff9b29418a fs/read_write.c:480:0
   #23 [ffffb80edbf37ea8] vfs_write at ffffffff9b294462 fs/read_write.c:544:0
   #24 [ffffb80edbf37ee8] SYSC_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:590:0
   #25 [ffffb80edbf37ee8] SyS_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:582:0
   #26 [ffffb80edbf37f30] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9b003ca9 arch/x86/entry/common.c:298:0
   #27 [ffffb80edbf37f58] entry_SYSCALL_64 at ffffffff9ba001b1 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:238:0

  PID: 17355    TASK: ffff95c1090c3d80  CPU: 29  COMMAND: "mrdiagd"
  !# 0 [ffffb80f2d3c7d30] __read_once_size at ffffffff9b0f2ab0 include/linux/compiler.h:185:0
  !# 1 [ffffb80f2d3c7d30] native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff9b0f2ab0 kernel/locking/qspinlock.c:368:0
   # 2 [ffffb80f2d3c7d58] pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff9b0f244b arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:674:0
   # 3 [ffffb80f2d3c7d58] queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff9b0f244b arch/x86/include/asm/qspinlock.h:53:0
   # 4 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] queued_spin_lock at ffffffff9b8961a6 include/asm-generic/qspinlock.h:90:0
   # 5 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] do_raw_spin_lock_flags at ffffffff9b8961a6 include/linux/spinlock.h:173:0
   # 6 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] __raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff9b8961a6 include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:122:0
   # 7 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff9b8961a6 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:160:0
   # 8 [ffffb80f2d3c7d88] fw_crash_buffer_store [megaraid_sas] at ffffffffc01f8129 drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c:3205:0
   # 9 [ffffb80f2d3c7dc0] dev_attr_store at ffffffff9b56dd7b drivers/base/core.c:758:0
   #10 [ffffb80f2d3c7dd0] sysfs_kf_write at ffffffff9b326acf fs/sysfs/file.c:144:0
   #11 [ffffb80f2d3c7de0] kernfs_fop_write at ffffffff9b325fd4 fs/kernfs/file.c:316:0
   #12 [ffffb80f2d3c7e20] __vfs_write at ffffffff9b29418a fs/read_write.c:480:0
   #13 [ffffb80f2d3c7ea8] vfs_write at ffffffff9b294462 fs/read_write.c:544:0
   #14 [ffffb80f2d3c7ee8] SYSC_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:590:0
   #15 [ffffb80f2d3c7ee8] SyS_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:582:0
   #16 [ffffb80f2d3c7f30] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9b003ca9 arch/x86/entry/common.c:298:0
   #17 [ffffb80f2d3c7f58] entry_SYSCALL_64 at ffffffff9ba001b1 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:238:0

The lock is used to synchronize different sysfs operations, it doesn't
protect any resource that will be touched by an interrupt. Consequently
it's not required to disable IRQs. Replace the spinlock with a mutex to fix
the deadlock.

Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 6, 2023
The following call trace shows a deadlock issue due to recursive locking of
mutex "device_mutex". First lock acquire is in target_for_each_device() and
second in target_free_device().

 PID: 148266   TASK: ffff8be21ffb5d00  CPU: 10   COMMAND: "iscsi_ttx"
  #0 [ffffa2bfc9ec3b18] __schedule at ffffffffa8060e7f
  #1 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ba0] schedule at ffffffffa8061224
  #2 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bb8] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffa80615ee
  #3 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bc8] __mutex_lock at ffffffffa8062fd7
  #4 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c40] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffffa80631d3
  #5 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c50] mutex_lock at ffffffffa806320c
  #6 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c68] target_free_device at ffffffffc0935998 [target_core_mod]
  #7 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c90] target_core_dev_release at ffffffffc092f975 [target_core_mod]
  #8 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ca0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d250f
  #9 [ffffa2bfc9ec3cd0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d2583
 #10 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ce0] target_devices_idr_iter at ffffffffc0933f3a [target_core_mod]
 #11 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d00] idr_for_each at ffffffffa803f6fc
 #12 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d60] target_for_each_device at ffffffffc0935670 [target_core_mod]
 #13 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d98] transport_deregister_session at ffffffffc0946408 [target_core_mod]
 #14 [ffffa2bfc9ec3dc8] iscsit_close_session at ffffffffc09a44a6 [iscsi_target_mod]
 #15 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df0] iscsit_close_connection at ffffffffc09a4a88 [iscsi_target_mod]
 #16 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df8] finish_task_switch at ffffffffa76e5d07
 #17 [ffffa2bfc9ec3e78] iscsit_take_action_for_connection_exit at ffffffffc0991c23 [iscsi_target_mod]
 #18 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ea0] iscsi_target_tx_thread at ffffffffc09a403b [iscsi_target_mod]
 #19 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f08] kthread at ffffffffa76d8080
 #20 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffffa8200364

Fixes: 36d4cb4 ("scsi: target: Avoid that EXTENDED COPY commands trigger lock inversion")
Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 10, 2023
[ Upstream commit a154f5f ]

The following call trace shows a deadlock issue due to recursive locking of
mutex "device_mutex". First lock acquire is in target_for_each_device() and
second in target_free_device().

 PID: 148266   TASK: ffff8be21ffb5d00  CPU: 10   COMMAND: "iscsi_ttx"
  #0 [ffffa2bfc9ec3b18] __schedule at ffffffffa8060e7f
  #1 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ba0] schedule at ffffffffa8061224
  #2 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bb8] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffa80615ee
  #3 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bc8] __mutex_lock at ffffffffa8062fd7
  #4 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c40] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffffa80631d3
  #5 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c50] mutex_lock at ffffffffa806320c
  #6 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c68] target_free_device at ffffffffc0935998 [target_core_mod]
  #7 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c90] target_core_dev_release at ffffffffc092f975 [target_core_mod]
  #8 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ca0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d250f
  #9 [ffffa2bfc9ec3cd0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d2583
 #10 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ce0] target_devices_idr_iter at ffffffffc0933f3a [target_core_mod]
 #11 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d00] idr_for_each at ffffffffa803f6fc
 #12 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d60] target_for_each_device at ffffffffc0935670 [target_core_mod]
 #13 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d98] transport_deregister_session at ffffffffc0946408 [target_core_mod]
 #14 [ffffa2bfc9ec3dc8] iscsit_close_session at ffffffffc09a44a6 [iscsi_target_mod]
 #15 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df0] iscsit_close_connection at ffffffffc09a4a88 [iscsi_target_mod]
 #16 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df8] finish_task_switch at ffffffffa76e5d07
 #17 [ffffa2bfc9ec3e78] iscsit_take_action_for_connection_exit at ffffffffc0991c23 [iscsi_target_mod]
 #18 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ea0] iscsi_target_tx_thread at ffffffffc09a403b [iscsi_target_mod]
 #19 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f08] kthread at ffffffffa76d8080
 #20 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffffa8200364

Fixes: 36d4cb4 ("scsi: target: Avoid that EXTENDED COPY commands trigger lock inversion")
Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 11, 2023
When creating ceq_0 during probing irdma, cqp.sc_cqp will be sent as a
cqp_request to cqp->sc_cqp.sq_ring. If the request is pending when
removing the irdma driver or unplugging its aux device, cqp.sc_cqp will be
dereferenced as wrong struct in irdma_free_pending_cqp_request().

  PID: 3669   TASK: ffff88aef892c000  CPU: 28  COMMAND: "kworker/28:0"
   #0 [fffffe0000549e38] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff810e3a34
   #1 [fffffe0000549e40] nmi_handle at ffffffff810788b2
   #2 [fffffe0000549ea0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8107938f
   #3 [fffffe0000549eb8] do_nmi at ffffffff81079582
   #4 [fffffe0000549ef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff82e016b4
      [exception RIP: native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+1291]
      RIP: ffffffff8127e72b  RSP: ffff88aa841ef778  RFLAGS: 00000046
      RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: ffff88b01f849700  RCX: ffffffff8127e47e
      RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: 0000000000000004  RDI: ffffffff83857ec0
      RBP: ffff88afe3e4efc8   R8: ffffed15fc7c9dfa   R9: ffffed15fc7c9dfa
      R10: 0000000000000001  R11: ffffed15fc7c9df9  R12: 0000000000740000
      R13: ffff88b01f849708  R14: 0000000000000003  R15: ffffed1603f092e1
      ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0000
  -- <NMI exception stack> --
   #5 [ffff88aa841ef778] native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8127e72b
   #6 [ffff88aa841ef7b0] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff82c22aa4
   #7 [ffff88aa841ef7c8] __wake_up_common_lock at ffffffff81257363
   #8 [ffff88aa841ef888] irdma_free_pending_cqp_request at ffffffffa0ba12cc [irdma]
   #9 [ffff88aa841ef958] irdma_cleanup_pending_cqp_op at ffffffffa0ba1469 [irdma]
   #10 [ffff88aa841ef9c0] irdma_ctrl_deinit_hw at ffffffffa0b2989f [irdma]
   #11 [ffff88aa841efa28] irdma_remove at ffffffffa0b252df [irdma]
   #12 [ffff88aa841efae8] auxiliary_bus_remove at ffffffff8219afdb
   #13 [ffff88aa841efb00] device_release_driver_internal at ffffffff821882e6
   #14 [ffff88aa841efb38] bus_remove_device at ffffffff82184278
   #15 [ffff88aa841efb88] device_del at ffffffff82179d23
   #16 [ffff88aa841efc48] ice_unplug_aux_dev at ffffffffa0eb1c14 [ice]
   #17 [ffff88aa841efc68] ice_service_task at ffffffffa0d88201 [ice]
   #18 [ffff88aa841efde8] process_one_work at ffffffff811c589a
   #19 [ffff88aa841efe60] worker_thread at ffffffff811c71ff
   #20 [ffff88aa841eff10] kthread at ffffffff811d87a0
   #21 [ffff88aa841eff50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff82e0022f

Fixes: 44d9e52 ("RDMA/irdma: Implement device initialization definitions")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Suggested-by: "Ismail, Mustafa" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Shifeng Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Shiraz Saleem <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 14, 2023
[ Upstream commit e3e82fc ]

When creating ceq_0 during probing irdma, cqp.sc_cqp will be sent as a
cqp_request to cqp->sc_cqp.sq_ring. If the request is pending when
removing the irdma driver or unplugging its aux device, cqp.sc_cqp will be
dereferenced as wrong struct in irdma_free_pending_cqp_request().

  PID: 3669   TASK: ffff88aef892c000  CPU: 28  COMMAND: "kworker/28:0"
   #0 [fffffe0000549e38] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff810e3a34
   #1 [fffffe0000549e40] nmi_handle at ffffffff810788b2
   #2 [fffffe0000549ea0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8107938f
   #3 [fffffe0000549eb8] do_nmi at ffffffff81079582
   #4 [fffffe0000549ef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff82e016b4
      [exception RIP: native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+1291]
      RIP: ffffffff8127e72b  RSP: ffff88aa841ef778  RFLAGS: 00000046
      RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: ffff88b01f849700  RCX: ffffffff8127e47e
      RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: 0000000000000004  RDI: ffffffff83857ec0
      RBP: ffff88afe3e4efc8   R8: ffffed15fc7c9dfa   R9: ffffed15fc7c9dfa
      R10: 0000000000000001  R11: ffffed15fc7c9df9  R12: 0000000000740000
      R13: ffff88b01f849708  R14: 0000000000000003  R15: ffffed1603f092e1
      ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0000
  -- <NMI exception stack> --
   #5 [ffff88aa841ef778] native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8127e72b
   #6 [ffff88aa841ef7b0] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff82c22aa4
   #7 [ffff88aa841ef7c8] __wake_up_common_lock at ffffffff81257363
   #8 [ffff88aa841ef888] irdma_free_pending_cqp_request at ffffffffa0ba12cc [irdma]
   #9 [ffff88aa841ef958] irdma_cleanup_pending_cqp_op at ffffffffa0ba1469 [irdma]
   #10 [ffff88aa841ef9c0] irdma_ctrl_deinit_hw at ffffffffa0b2989f [irdma]
   #11 [ffff88aa841efa28] irdma_remove at ffffffffa0b252df [irdma]
   #12 [ffff88aa841efae8] auxiliary_bus_remove at ffffffff8219afdb
   #13 [ffff88aa841efb00] device_release_driver_internal at ffffffff821882e6
   #14 [ffff88aa841efb38] bus_remove_device at ffffffff82184278
   #15 [ffff88aa841efb88] device_del at ffffffff82179d23
   #16 [ffff88aa841efc48] ice_unplug_aux_dev at ffffffffa0eb1c14 [ice]
   #17 [ffff88aa841efc68] ice_service_task at ffffffffa0d88201 [ice]
   #18 [ffff88aa841efde8] process_one_work at ffffffff811c589a
   #19 [ffff88aa841efe60] worker_thread at ffffffff811c71ff
   #20 [ffff88aa841eff10] kthread at ffffffff811d87a0
   #21 [ffff88aa841eff50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff82e0022f

Fixes: 44d9e52 ("RDMA/irdma: Implement device initialization definitions")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Suggested-by: "Ismail, Mustafa" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Shifeng Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Shiraz Saleem <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
damentz pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 3, 2024
[ Upstream commit e8a1e58 ]

mac802154_llsec_key_del() can free resources of a key directly without
following the RCU rules for waiting before the end of a grace period. This
may lead to use-after-free in case llsec_lookup_key() is traversing the
list of keys in parallel with a key deletion:

refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 16000 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0x162/0x2a0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 4 PID: 16000 Comm: wpan-ping Not tainted 6.7.0 #19
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x162/0x2a0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 llsec_lookup_key.isra.0+0x890/0x9e0
 mac802154_llsec_encrypt+0x30c/0x9c0
 ieee802154_subif_start_xmit+0x24/0x1e0
 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x13e/0x690
 sch_direct_xmit+0x2ae/0xbc0
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x11dd/0x3c20
 dgram_sendmsg+0x90b/0xd60
 __sys_sendto+0x466/0x4c0
 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe0/0x1c0
 do_syscall_64+0x45/0xf0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76

Also, ieee802154_llsec_key_entry structures are not freed by
mac802154_llsec_key_del():

unreferenced object 0xffff8880613b6980 (size 64):
  comm "iwpan", pid 2176, jiffies 4294761134 (age 60.475s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    78 0d 8f 18 80 88 ff ff 22 01 00 00 00 00 ad de  x.......".......
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 00 cd ab 00 00 00 00  ................
  backtrace:
    [<ffffffff81dcfa62>] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1e2/0x2d0
    [<ffffffff81c43865>] kmalloc_trace+0x25/0xc0
    [<ffffffff88968b09>] mac802154_llsec_key_add+0xac9/0xcf0
    [<ffffffff8896e41a>] ieee802154_add_llsec_key+0x5a/0x80
    [<ffffffff8892adc6>] nl802154_add_llsec_key+0x426/0x5b0
    [<ffffffff86ff293e>] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1fe/0x2f0
    [<ffffffff86ff46d1>] genl_rcv_msg+0x531/0x7d0
    [<ffffffff86fee7a9>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x169/0x440
    [<ffffffff86ff1d88>] genl_rcv+0x28/0x40
    [<ffffffff86fec15c>] netlink_unicast+0x53c/0x820
    [<ffffffff86fecd8b>] netlink_sendmsg+0x93b/0xe60
    [<ffffffff86b91b35>] ____sys_sendmsg+0xac5/0xca0
    [<ffffffff86b9c3dd>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x11d/0x1c0
    [<ffffffff86b9c65a>] __sys_sendmsg+0xfa/0x1d0
    [<ffffffff88eadbf5>] do_syscall_64+0x45/0xf0
    [<ffffffff890000ea>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76

Handle the proper resource release in the RCU callback function
mac802154_llsec_key_del_rcu().

Note that if llsec_lookup_key() finds a key, it gets a refcount via
llsec_key_get() and locally copies key id from key_entry (which is a
list element). So it's safe to call llsec_key_put() and free the list
entry after the RCU grace period elapses.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org).

Fixes: 5d637d5 ("mac802154: add llsec structures and mutators")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Alexander Aring <[email protected]>
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 3, 2024
[ Upstream commit e8a1e58 ]

mac802154_llsec_key_del() can free resources of a key directly without
following the RCU rules for waiting before the end of a grace period. This
may lead to use-after-free in case llsec_lookup_key() is traversing the
list of keys in parallel with a key deletion:

refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 16000 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0x162/0x2a0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 4 PID: 16000 Comm: wpan-ping Not tainted 6.7.0 #19
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x162/0x2a0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 llsec_lookup_key.isra.0+0x890/0x9e0
 mac802154_llsec_encrypt+0x30c/0x9c0
 ieee802154_subif_start_xmit+0x24/0x1e0
 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x13e/0x690
 sch_direct_xmit+0x2ae/0xbc0
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x11dd/0x3c20
 dgram_sendmsg+0x90b/0xd60
 __sys_sendto+0x466/0x4c0
 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe0/0x1c0
 do_syscall_64+0x45/0xf0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76

Also, ieee802154_llsec_key_entry structures are not freed by
mac802154_llsec_key_del():

unreferenced object 0xffff8880613b6980 (size 64):
  comm "iwpan", pid 2176, jiffies 4294761134 (age 60.475s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    78 0d 8f 18 80 88 ff ff 22 01 00 00 00 00 ad de  x.......".......
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 00 cd ab 00 00 00 00  ................
  backtrace:
    [<ffffffff81dcfa62>] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1e2/0x2d0
    [<ffffffff81c43865>] kmalloc_trace+0x25/0xc0
    [<ffffffff88968b09>] mac802154_llsec_key_add+0xac9/0xcf0
    [<ffffffff8896e41a>] ieee802154_add_llsec_key+0x5a/0x80
    [<ffffffff8892adc6>] nl802154_add_llsec_key+0x426/0x5b0
    [<ffffffff86ff293e>] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1fe/0x2f0
    [<ffffffff86ff46d1>] genl_rcv_msg+0x531/0x7d0
    [<ffffffff86fee7a9>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x169/0x440
    [<ffffffff86ff1d88>] genl_rcv+0x28/0x40
    [<ffffffff86fec15c>] netlink_unicast+0x53c/0x820
    [<ffffffff86fecd8b>] netlink_sendmsg+0x93b/0xe60
    [<ffffffff86b91b35>] ____sys_sendmsg+0xac5/0xca0
    [<ffffffff86b9c3dd>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x11d/0x1c0
    [<ffffffff86b9c65a>] __sys_sendmsg+0xfa/0x1d0
    [<ffffffff88eadbf5>] do_syscall_64+0x45/0xf0
    [<ffffffff890000ea>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76

Handle the proper resource release in the RCU callback function
mac802154_llsec_key_del_rcu().

Note that if llsec_lookup_key() finds a key, it gets a refcount via
llsec_key_get() and locally copies key id from key_entry (which is a
list element). So it's safe to call llsec_key_put() and free the list
entry after the RCU grace period elapses.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org).

Fixes: 5d637d5 ("mac802154: add llsec structures and mutators")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Alexander Aring <[email protected]>
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
damentz pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 28, 2024
[ Upstream commit 751de20 ]

For historical reasons, when bridge device is in promisc mode, packets
that are directed to the taps follow bridge input hook path. This patch
adds a workaround to reset conntrack for these packets.

Jianbo Liu reports warning splats in their test infrastructure where
cloned packets reach the br_netfilter input hook to confirm the
conntrack object.

Scratch one bit from BR_INPUT_SKB_CB to annotate that this packet has
reached the input hook because it is passed up to the bridge device to
reach the taps.

[   57.571874] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c:616 br_nf_local_in+0x157/0x180 [br_netfilter]
[   57.572749] Modules linked in: xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink iptable_nat xt_addrtype xt_conntrack nf_nat br_netfilter rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss oid_registry overlay rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_isc si ib_umad rdma_cm ib_ipoib iw_cm ib_cm mlx5_ib ib_uverbs ib_core mlx5ctl mlx5_core
[   57.575158] CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 6.8.0+ #19
[   57.575700] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[   57.576662] RIP: 0010:br_nf_local_in+0x157/0x180 [br_netfilter]
[   57.577195] Code: fe ff ff 41 bd 04 00 00 00 be 04 00 00 00 e9 4a ff ff ff be 04 00 00 00 48 89 ef e8 f3 a9 3c e1 66 83 ad b4 00 00 00 04 eb 91 <0f> 0b e9 f1 fe ff ff 0f 0b e9 df fe ff ff 48 89 df e8 b3 53 47 e1
[   57.578722] RSP: 0018:ffff88885f845a08 EFLAGS: 00010202
[   57.579207] RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff88812dfe8000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   57.579830] RDX: ffff88885f845a60 RSI: ffff8881022dc300 RDI: 0000000000000000
[   57.580454] RBP: ffff88885f845a60 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000003
[   57.581076] R10: 00000000ffff1300 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000000
[   57.581695] R13: ffff8881047ffe00 R14: ffff888108dbee00 R15: ffff88814519b800
[   57.582313] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88885f840000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   57.583040] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   57.583564] CR2: 000000c4206aa000 CR3: 0000000103847001 CR4: 0000000000370eb0
[   57.584194] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2:
0000000000000000
[   57.584820] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7:
0000000000000400
[   57.585440] Call Trace:
[   57.585721]  <IRQ>
[   57.585976]  ? __warn+0x7d/0x130
[   57.586323]  ? br_nf_local_in+0x157/0x180 [br_netfilter]
[   57.586811]  ? report_bug+0xf1/0x1c0
[   57.587177]  ? handle_bug+0x3f/0x70
[   57.587539]  ? exc_invalid_op+0x13/0x60
[   57.587929]  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
[   57.588336]  ? br_nf_local_in+0x157/0x180 [br_netfilter]
[   57.588825]  nf_hook_slow+0x3d/0xd0
[   57.589188]  ? br_handle_vlan+0x4b/0x110
[   57.589579]  br_pass_frame_up+0xfc/0x150
[   57.589970]  ? br_port_flags_change+0x40/0x40
[   57.590396]  br_handle_frame_finish+0x346/0x5e0
[   57.590837]  ? ipt_do_table+0x32e/0x430
[   57.591221]  ? br_handle_local_finish+0x20/0x20
[   57.591656]  br_nf_hook_thresh+0x4b/0xf0 [br_netfilter]
[   57.592286]  ? br_handle_local_finish+0x20/0x20
[   57.592802]  br_nf_pre_routing_finish+0x178/0x480 [br_netfilter]
[   57.593348]  ? br_handle_local_finish+0x20/0x20
[   57.593782]  ? nf_nat_ipv4_pre_routing+0x25/0x60 [nf_nat]
[   57.594279]  br_nf_pre_routing+0x24c/0x550 [br_netfilter]
[   57.594780]  ? br_nf_hook_thresh+0xf0/0xf0 [br_netfilter]
[   57.595280]  br_handle_frame+0x1f3/0x3d0
[   57.595676]  ? br_handle_local_finish+0x20/0x20
[   57.596118]  ? br_handle_frame_finish+0x5e0/0x5e0
[   57.596566]  __netif_receive_skb_core+0x25b/0xfc0
[   57.597017]  ? __napi_build_skb+0x37/0x40
[   57.597418]  __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0xfb/0x220

Fixes: 62e7151 ("netfilter: bridge: confirm multicast packets before passing them up the stack")
Reported-by: Jianbo Liu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
damentz pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 28, 2024
[ Upstream commit f8bbc07 ]

vhost_worker will call tun call backs to receive packets. If too many
illegal packets arrives, tun_do_read will keep dumping packet contents.
When console is enabled, it will costs much more cpu time to dump
packet and soft lockup will be detected.

net_ratelimit mechanism can be used to limit the dumping rate.

PID: 33036    TASK: ffff949da6f20000  CPU: 23   COMMAND: "vhost-32980"
 #0 [fffffe00003fce50] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff89249253
 #1 [fffffe00003fce58] nmi_handle at ffffffff89225fa3
 #2 [fffffe00003fceb0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8922642e
 #3 [fffffe00003fced0] do_nmi at ffffffff8922660d
 #4 [fffffe00003fcef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff89c01663
    [exception RIP: io_serial_in+20]
    RIP: ffffffff89792594  RSP: ffffa655314979e8  RFLAGS: 00000002
    RAX: ffffffff89792500  RBX: ffffffff8af428a0  RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 00000000000003fd  RSI: 0000000000000005  RDI: ffffffff8af428a0
    RBP: 0000000000002710   R8: 0000000000000004   R9: 000000000000000f
    R10: 0000000000000000  R11: ffffffff8acbf64f  R12: 0000000000000020
    R13: ffffffff8acbf698  R14: 0000000000000058  R15: 0000000000000000
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #5 [ffffa655314979e8] io_serial_in at ffffffff89792594
 #6 [ffffa655314979e8] wait_for_xmitr at ffffffff89793470
 #7 [ffffa65531497a08] serial8250_console_putchar at ffffffff897934f6
 #8 [ffffa65531497a20] uart_console_write at ffffffff8978b605
 #9 [ffffa65531497a48] serial8250_console_write at ffffffff89796558
 #10 [ffffa65531497ac8] console_unlock at ffffffff89316124
 #11 [ffffa65531497b10] vprintk_emit at ffffffff89317c07
 #12 [ffffa65531497b68] printk at ffffffff89318306
 #13 [ffffa65531497bc8] print_hex_dump at ffffffff89650765
 #14 [ffffa65531497ca8] tun_do_read at ffffffffc0b06c27 [tun]
 #15 [ffffa65531497d38] tun_recvmsg at ffffffffc0b06e34 [tun]
 #16 [ffffa65531497d68] handle_rx at ffffffffc0c5d682 [vhost_net]
 #17 [ffffa65531497ed0] vhost_worker at ffffffffc0c644dc [vhost]
 #18 [ffffa65531497f10] kthread at ffffffff892d2e72
 #19 [ffffa65531497f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff89c0022f

Fixes: ef3db4a ("tun: avoid BUG, dump packet on GSO errors")
Signed-off-by: Lei Chen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 28, 2024
For historical reasons, when bridge device is in promisc mode, packets
that are directed to the taps follow bridge input hook path. This patch
adds a workaround to reset conntrack for these packets.

Jianbo Liu reports warning splats in their test infrastructure where
cloned packets reach the br_netfilter input hook to confirm the
conntrack object.

Scratch one bit from BR_INPUT_SKB_CB to annotate that this packet has
reached the input hook because it is passed up to the bridge device to
reach the taps.

[   57.571874] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c:616 br_nf_local_in+0x157/0x180 [br_netfilter]
[   57.572749] Modules linked in: xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink iptable_nat xt_addrtype xt_conntrack nf_nat br_netfilter rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss oid_registry overlay rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_isc si ib_umad rdma_cm ib_ipoib iw_cm ib_cm mlx5_ib ib_uverbs ib_core mlx5ctl mlx5_core
[   57.575158] CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 6.8.0+ #19
[   57.575700] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[   57.576662] RIP: 0010:br_nf_local_in+0x157/0x180 [br_netfilter]
[   57.577195] Code: fe ff ff 41 bd 04 00 00 00 be 04 00 00 00 e9 4a ff ff ff be 04 00 00 00 48 89 ef e8 f3 a9 3c e1 66 83 ad b4 00 00 00 04 eb 91 <0f> 0b e9 f1 fe ff ff 0f 0b e9 df fe ff ff 48 89 df e8 b3 53 47 e1
[   57.578722] RSP: 0018:ffff88885f845a08 EFLAGS: 00010202
[   57.579207] RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff88812dfe8000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   57.579830] RDX: ffff88885f845a60 RSI: ffff8881022dc300 RDI: 0000000000000000
[   57.580454] RBP: ffff88885f845a60 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000003
[   57.581076] R10: 00000000ffff1300 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000000
[   57.581695] R13: ffff8881047ffe00 R14: ffff888108dbee00 R15: ffff88814519b800
[   57.582313] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88885f840000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   57.583040] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   57.583564] CR2: 000000c4206aa000 CR3: 0000000103847001 CR4: 0000000000370eb0
[   57.584194] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2:
0000000000000000
[   57.584820] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7:
0000000000000400
[   57.585440] Call Trace:
[   57.585721]  <IRQ>
[   57.585976]  ? __warn+0x7d/0x130
[   57.586323]  ? br_nf_local_in+0x157/0x180 [br_netfilter]
[   57.586811]  ? report_bug+0xf1/0x1c0
[   57.587177]  ? handle_bug+0x3f/0x70
[   57.587539]  ? exc_invalid_op+0x13/0x60
[   57.587929]  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
[   57.588336]  ? br_nf_local_in+0x157/0x180 [br_netfilter]
[   57.588825]  nf_hook_slow+0x3d/0xd0
[   57.589188]  ? br_handle_vlan+0x4b/0x110
[   57.589579]  br_pass_frame_up+0xfc/0x150
[   57.589970]  ? br_port_flags_change+0x40/0x40
[   57.590396]  br_handle_frame_finish+0x346/0x5e0
[   57.590837]  ? ipt_do_table+0x32e/0x430
[   57.591221]  ? br_handle_local_finish+0x20/0x20
[   57.591656]  br_nf_hook_thresh+0x4b/0xf0 [br_netfilter]
[   57.592286]  ? br_handle_local_finish+0x20/0x20
[   57.592802]  br_nf_pre_routing_finish+0x178/0x480 [br_netfilter]
[   57.593348]  ? br_handle_local_finish+0x20/0x20
[   57.593782]  ? nf_nat_ipv4_pre_routing+0x25/0x60 [nf_nat]
[   57.594279]  br_nf_pre_routing+0x24c/0x550 [br_netfilter]
[   57.594780]  ? br_nf_hook_thresh+0xf0/0xf0 [br_netfilter]
[   57.595280]  br_handle_frame+0x1f3/0x3d0
[   57.595676]  ? br_handle_local_finish+0x20/0x20
[   57.596118]  ? br_handle_frame_finish+0x5e0/0x5e0
[   57.596566]  __netif_receive_skb_core+0x25b/0xfc0
[   57.597017]  ? __napi_build_skb+0x37/0x40
[   57.597418]  __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0xfb/0x220

Fixes: 62e7151 ("netfilter: bridge: confirm multicast packets before passing them up the stack")
Reported-by: Jianbo Liu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 28, 2024
vhost_worker will call tun call backs to receive packets. If too many
illegal packets arrives, tun_do_read will keep dumping packet contents.
When console is enabled, it will costs much more cpu time to dump
packet and soft lockup will be detected.

net_ratelimit mechanism can be used to limit the dumping rate.

PID: 33036    TASK: ffff949da6f20000  CPU: 23   COMMAND: "vhost-32980"
 #0 [fffffe00003fce50] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff89249253
 #1 [fffffe00003fce58] nmi_handle at ffffffff89225fa3
 #2 [fffffe00003fceb0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8922642e
 #3 [fffffe00003fced0] do_nmi at ffffffff8922660d
 #4 [fffffe00003fcef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff89c01663
    [exception RIP: io_serial_in+20]
    RIP: ffffffff89792594  RSP: ffffa655314979e8  RFLAGS: 00000002
    RAX: ffffffff89792500  RBX: ffffffff8af428a0  RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 00000000000003fd  RSI: 0000000000000005  RDI: ffffffff8af428a0
    RBP: 0000000000002710   R8: 0000000000000004   R9: 000000000000000f
    R10: 0000000000000000  R11: ffffffff8acbf64f  R12: 0000000000000020
    R13: ffffffff8acbf698  R14: 0000000000000058  R15: 0000000000000000
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #5 [ffffa655314979e8] io_serial_in at ffffffff89792594
 #6 [ffffa655314979e8] wait_for_xmitr at ffffffff89793470
 #7 [ffffa65531497a08] serial8250_console_putchar at ffffffff897934f6
 #8 [ffffa65531497a20] uart_console_write at ffffffff8978b605
 #9 [ffffa65531497a48] serial8250_console_write at ffffffff89796558
 #10 [ffffa65531497ac8] console_unlock at ffffffff89316124
 #11 [ffffa65531497b10] vprintk_emit at ffffffff89317c07
 #12 [ffffa65531497b68] printk at ffffffff89318306
 #13 [ffffa65531497bc8] print_hex_dump at ffffffff89650765
 #14 [ffffa65531497ca8] tun_do_read at ffffffffc0b06c27 [tun]
 #15 [ffffa65531497d38] tun_recvmsg at ffffffffc0b06e34 [tun]
 #16 [ffffa65531497d68] handle_rx at ffffffffc0c5d682 [vhost_net]
 #17 [ffffa65531497ed0] vhost_worker at ffffffffc0c644dc [vhost]
 #18 [ffffa65531497f10] kthread at ffffffff892d2e72
 #19 [ffffa65531497f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff89c0022f

Fixes: ef3db4a ("tun: avoid BUG, dump packet on GSO errors")
Signed-off-by: Lei Chen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
damentz pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 12, 2024
[ Upstream commit 769e6a1 ]

ui_browser__show() is capturing the input title that is stack allocated
memory in hist_browser__run().

Avoid a use after return by strdup-ing the string.

Committer notes:

Further explanation from Ian Rogers:

My command line using tui is:
$ sudo bash -c 'rm /tmp/asan.log*; export
ASAN_OPTIONS="log_path=/tmp/asan.log"; /tmp/perf/perf mem record -a
sleep 1; /tmp/perf/perf mem report'
I then go to the perf annotate view and quit. This triggers the asan
error (from the log file):
```
==1254591==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-use-after-return on address
0x7f2813331920 at pc 0x7f28180
65991 bp 0x7fff0a21c750 sp 0x7fff0a21bf10
READ of size 80 at 0x7f2813331920 thread T0
    #0 0x7f2818065990 in __interceptor_strlen
../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:461
    #1 0x7f2817698251 in SLsmg_write_wrapped_string
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x98251)
    #2 0x7f28176984b9 in SLsmg_write_nstring
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x984b9)
    #3 0x55c94045b365 in ui_browser__write_nstring ui/browser.c:60
    #4 0x55c94045c558 in __ui_browser__show_title ui/browser.c:266
    #5 0x55c94045c776 in ui_browser__show ui/browser.c:288
    #6 0x55c94045c06d in ui_browser__handle_resize ui/browser.c:206
    #7 0x55c94047979b in do_annotate ui/browsers/hists.c:2458
    #8 0x55c94047fb17 in evsel__hists_browse ui/browsers/hists.c:3412
    #9 0x55c940480a0c in perf_evsel_menu__run ui/browsers/hists.c:3527
    #10 0x55c940481108 in __evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3613
    #11 0x55c9404813f7 in evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3661
    #12 0x55c93ffa253f in report__browse_hists tools/perf/builtin-report.c:671
    #13 0x55c93ffa58ca in __cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1141
    #14 0x55c93ffaf159 in cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1805
    #15 0x55c94000c05c in report_events tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:374
    #16 0x55c94000d96d in cmd_mem tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:516
    #17 0x55c9400e44ee in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:350
    #18 0x55c9400e4a5a in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:403
    #19 0x55c9400e4e22 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:447
    #20 0x55c9400e53ad in main tools/perf/perf.c:561
    #21 0x7f28170456c9 in __libc_start_call_main
../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
    #22 0x7f2817045784 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360
    #23 0x55c93ff544c0 in _start (/tmp/perf/perf+0x19a4c0) (BuildId:
84899b0e8c7d3a3eaa67b2eb35e3d8b2f8cd4c93)

Address 0x7f2813331920 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 32 in frame
    #0 0x55c94046e85e in hist_browser__run ui/browsers/hists.c:746

  This frame has 1 object(s):
    [32, 192) 'title' (line 747) <== Memory access at offset 32 is
inside this variable
HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom
stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
```
hist_browser__run isn't on the stack so the asan error looks legit.
There's no clean init/exit on struct ui_browser so I may be trading a
use-after-return for a memory leak, but that seems look a good trade
anyway.

Fixes: 05e8b08 ("perf ui browser: Stop using 'self'")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc: Athira Rajeev <[email protected]>
Cc: Ben Gainey <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: James Clark <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Kajol Jain <[email protected]>
Cc: Kan Liang <[email protected]>
Cc: K Prateek Nayak <[email protected]>
Cc: Li Dong <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Oliver Upton <[email protected]>
Cc: Paran Lee <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <[email protected]>
Cc: Sun Haiyong <[email protected]>
Cc: Tim Chen <[email protected]>
Cc: Yanteng Si <[email protected]>
Cc: Yicong Yang <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 28, 2024
The code in ocfs2_dio_end_io_write() estimates number of necessary
transaction credits using ocfs2_calc_extend_credits().  This however does
not take into account that the IO could be arbitrarily large and can
contain arbitrary number of extents.

Extent tree manipulations do often extend the current transaction but not
in all of the cases.  For example if we have only single block extents in
the tree, ocfs2_mark_extent_written() will end up calling
ocfs2_replace_extent_rec() all the time and we will never extend the
current transaction and eventually exhaust all the transaction credits if
the IO contains many single block extents.  Once that happens a
WARN_ON(jbd2_handle_buffer_credits(handle) <= 0) is triggered in
jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata() and subsequently OCFS2 aborts in response to
this error.  This was actually triggered by one of our customers on a
heavily fragmented OCFS2 filesystem.

To fix the issue make sure the transaction always has enough credits for
one extent insert before each call of ocfs2_mark_extent_written().

Heming Zhao said:

------
PANIC: "Kernel panic - not syncing: OCFS2: (device dm-1): panic forced after error"

PID: xxx  TASK: xxxx  CPU: 5  COMMAND: "SubmitThread-CA"
  #0 machine_kexec at ffffffff8c069932
  #1 __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c1338fa
  #2 panic at ffffffff8c1d69b9
  #3 ocfs2_handle_error at ffffffffc0c86c0c [ocfs2]
  #4 __ocfs2_abort at ffffffffc0c88387 [ocfs2]
  #5 ocfs2_journal_dirty at ffffffffc0c51e98 [ocfs2]
  #6 ocfs2_split_extent at ffffffffc0c27ea3 [ocfs2]
  #7 ocfs2_change_extent_flag at ffffffffc0c28053 [ocfs2]
  #8 ocfs2_mark_extent_written at ffffffffc0c28347 [ocfs2]
  #9 ocfs2_dio_end_io_write at ffffffffc0c2bef9 [ocfs2]
#10 ocfs2_dio_end_io at ffffffffc0c2c0f5 [ocfs2]
#11 dio_complete at ffffffff8c2b9fa7
#12 do_blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff8c2bc09f
#13 ocfs2_direct_IO at ffffffffc0c2b653 [ocfs2]
#14 generic_file_direct_write at ffffffff8c1dcf14
#15 __generic_file_write_iter at ffffffff8c1dd07b
#16 ocfs2_file_write_iter at ffffffffc0c49f1f [ocfs2]
#17 aio_write at ffffffff8c2cc72e
#18 kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff8c248dde
#19 do_io_submit at ffffffff8c2ccada
#20 do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8c004984
#21 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff8c8000ba

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: c15471f ("ocfs2: fix sparse file & data ordering issue in direct io")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Heming Zhao <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]>
Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
Cc: Changwei Ge <[email protected]>
Cc: Gang He <[email protected]>
Cc: Jun Piao <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 5, 2024
commit be346c1 upstream.

The code in ocfs2_dio_end_io_write() estimates number of necessary
transaction credits using ocfs2_calc_extend_credits().  This however does
not take into account that the IO could be arbitrarily large and can
contain arbitrary number of extents.

Extent tree manipulations do often extend the current transaction but not
in all of the cases.  For example if we have only single block extents in
the tree, ocfs2_mark_extent_written() will end up calling
ocfs2_replace_extent_rec() all the time and we will never extend the
current transaction and eventually exhaust all the transaction credits if
the IO contains many single block extents.  Once that happens a
WARN_ON(jbd2_handle_buffer_credits(handle) <= 0) is triggered in
jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata() and subsequently OCFS2 aborts in response to
this error.  This was actually triggered by one of our customers on a
heavily fragmented OCFS2 filesystem.

To fix the issue make sure the transaction always has enough credits for
one extent insert before each call of ocfs2_mark_extent_written().

Heming Zhao said:

------
PANIC: "Kernel panic - not syncing: OCFS2: (device dm-1): panic forced after error"

PID: xxx  TASK: xxxx  CPU: 5  COMMAND: "SubmitThread-CA"
  #0 machine_kexec at ffffffff8c069932
  #1 __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c1338fa
  #2 panic at ffffffff8c1d69b9
  #3 ocfs2_handle_error at ffffffffc0c86c0c [ocfs2]
  #4 __ocfs2_abort at ffffffffc0c88387 [ocfs2]
  #5 ocfs2_journal_dirty at ffffffffc0c51e98 [ocfs2]
  #6 ocfs2_split_extent at ffffffffc0c27ea3 [ocfs2]
  #7 ocfs2_change_extent_flag at ffffffffc0c28053 [ocfs2]
  #8 ocfs2_mark_extent_written at ffffffffc0c28347 [ocfs2]
  #9 ocfs2_dio_end_io_write at ffffffffc0c2bef9 [ocfs2]
#10 ocfs2_dio_end_io at ffffffffc0c2c0f5 [ocfs2]
#11 dio_complete at ffffffff8c2b9fa7
#12 do_blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff8c2bc09f
#13 ocfs2_direct_IO at ffffffffc0c2b653 [ocfs2]
#14 generic_file_direct_write at ffffffff8c1dcf14
#15 __generic_file_write_iter at ffffffff8c1dd07b
#16 ocfs2_file_write_iter at ffffffffc0c49f1f [ocfs2]
#17 aio_write at ffffffff8c2cc72e
#18 kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff8c248dde
#19 do_io_submit at ffffffff8c2ccada
#20 do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8c004984
#21 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff8c8000ba

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: c15471f ("ocfs2: fix sparse file & data ordering issue in direct io")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Heming Zhao <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]>
Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
Cc: Changwei Ge <[email protected]>
Cc: Gang He <[email protected]>
Cc: Jun Piao <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 9, 2024
commit 98100e8 upstream.

The action force umount(umount -f) will attempt to kill all rpc_task even
umount operation may ultimately fail if some files remain open.
Consequently, if an action attempts to open a file, it can potentially
send two rpc_task to nfs server.

                   NFS CLIENT
thread1                             thread2
open("file")
...
nfs4_do_open
 _nfs4_do_open
  _nfs4_open_and_get_state
   _nfs4_proc_open
    nfs4_run_open_task
     /* rpc_task1 */
     rpc_run_task
     rpc_wait_for_completion_task

                                    umount -f
                                    nfs_umount_begin
                                     rpc_killall_tasks
                                      rpc_signal_task
     rpc_task1 been wakeup
     and return -512
 _nfs4_do_open // while loop
    ...
    nfs4_run_open_task
     /* rpc_task2 */
     rpc_run_task
     rpc_wait_for_completion_task

While processing an open request, nfsd will first attempt to find or
allocate an nfs4_openowner. If it finds an nfs4_openowner that is not
marked as NFS4_OO_CONFIRMED, this nfs4_openowner will released. Since
two rpc_task can attempt to open the same file simultaneously from the
client to server, and because two instances of nfsd can run
concurrently, this situation can lead to lots of memory leak.
Additionally, when we echo 0 to /proc/fs/nfsd/threads, warning will be
triggered.

                    NFS SERVER
nfsd1                  nfsd2       echo 0 > /proc/fs/nfsd/threads

nfsd4_open
 nfsd4_process_open1
  find_or_alloc_open_stateowner
   // alloc oo1, stateid1
                       nfsd4_open
                        nfsd4_process_open1
                        find_or_alloc_open_stateowner
                        // find oo1, without NFS4_OO_CONFIRMED
                         release_openowner
                          unhash_openowner_locked
                          list_del_init(&oo->oo_perclient)
                          // cannot find this oo
                          // from client, LEAK!!!
                         alloc_stateowner // alloc oo2

 nfsd4_process_open2
  init_open_stateid
  // associate oo1
  // with stateid1, stateid1 LEAK!!!
  nfs4_get_vfs_file
  // alloc nfsd_file1 and nfsd_file_mark1
  // all LEAK!!!

                         nfsd4_process_open2
                         ...

                                    write_threads
                                     ...
                                     nfsd_destroy_serv
                                      nfsd_shutdown_net
                                       nfs4_state_shutdown_net
                                        nfs4_state_destroy_net
                                         destroy_client
                                          __destroy_client
                                          // won't find oo1!!!
                                     nfsd_shutdown_generic
                                      nfsd_file_cache_shutdown
                                       kmem_cache_destroy
                                       for nfsd_file_slab
                                       and nfsd_file_mark_slab
                                       // bark since nfsd_file1
                                       // and nfsd_file_mark1
                                       // still alive

=======================================================================
BUG nfsd_file (Not tainted): Objects remaining in nfsd_file on
__kmem_cache_shutdown()
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Slab 0xffd4000004438a80 objects=34 used=1 fp=0xff11000110e2ad28
flags=0x17ffffc0000240(workingset|head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 757 Comm: sh Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6+ #19
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70
 slab_err+0xb0/0xf0
 __kmem_cache_shutdown+0x15c/0x310
 kmem_cache_destroy+0x66/0x160
 nfsd_file_cache_shutdown+0xac/0x210 [nfsd]
 nfsd_destroy_serv+0x251/0x2a0 [nfsd]
 nfsd_svc+0x125/0x1e0 [nfsd]
 write_threads+0x16a/0x2a0 [nfsd]
 nfsctl_transaction_write+0x74/0xa0 [nfsd]
 vfs_write+0x1ae/0x6d0
 ksys_write+0xc1/0x160
 do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x170
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
Object 0xff11000110e2ac38 @offset=3128
Allocated in nfsd_file_do_acquire+0x20f/0xa30 [nfsd] age=1635 cpu=3
pid=800
 nfsd_file_do_acquire+0x20f/0xa30 [nfsd]
 nfsd_file_acquire_opened+0x5f/0x90 [nfsd]
 nfs4_get_vfs_file+0x4c9/0x570 [nfsd]
 nfsd4_process_open2+0x713/0x1070 [nfsd]
 nfsd4_open+0x74b/0x8b0 [nfsd]
 nfsd4_proc_compound+0x70b/0xc20 [nfsd]
 nfsd_dispatch+0x1b4/0x3a0 [nfsd]
 svc_process_common+0x5b8/0xc50 [sunrpc]
 svc_process+0x2ab/0x3b0 [sunrpc]
 svc_handle_xprt+0x681/0xa20 [sunrpc]
 nfsd+0x183/0x220 [nfsd]
 kthread+0x199/0x1e0
 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x60
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

Add nfs4_openowner_unhashed to help found unhashed nfs4_openowner, and
break nfsd4_open process to fix this problem.

Cc: [email protected] # v5.4+
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yang Erkun <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
someone5678 pushed a commit to someone5678/zen-kernel that referenced this pull request Dec 11, 2024
commit 98100e8 upstream.

The action force umount(umount -f) will attempt to kill all rpc_task even
umount operation may ultimately fail if some files remain open.
Consequently, if an action attempts to open a file, it can potentially
send two rpc_task to nfs server.

                   NFS CLIENT
thread1                             thread2
open("file")
...
nfs4_do_open
 _nfs4_do_open
  _nfs4_open_and_get_state
   _nfs4_proc_open
    nfs4_run_open_task
     /* rpc_task1 */
     rpc_run_task
     rpc_wait_for_completion_task

                                    umount -f
                                    nfs_umount_begin
                                     rpc_killall_tasks
                                      rpc_signal_task
     rpc_task1 been wakeup
     and return -512
 _nfs4_do_open // while loop
    ...
    nfs4_run_open_task
     /* rpc_task2 */
     rpc_run_task
     rpc_wait_for_completion_task

While processing an open request, nfsd will first attempt to find or
allocate an nfs4_openowner. If it finds an nfs4_openowner that is not
marked as NFS4_OO_CONFIRMED, this nfs4_openowner will released. Since
two rpc_task can attempt to open the same file simultaneously from the
client to server, and because two instances of nfsd can run
concurrently, this situation can lead to lots of memory leak.
Additionally, when we echo 0 to /proc/fs/nfsd/threads, warning will be
triggered.

                    NFS SERVER
nfsd1                  nfsd2       echo 0 > /proc/fs/nfsd/threads

nfsd4_open
 nfsd4_process_open1
  find_or_alloc_open_stateowner
   // alloc oo1, stateid1
                       nfsd4_open
                        nfsd4_process_open1
                        find_or_alloc_open_stateowner
                        // find oo1, without NFS4_OO_CONFIRMED
                         release_openowner
                          unhash_openowner_locked
                          list_del_init(&oo->oo_perclient)
                          // cannot find this oo
                          // from client, LEAK!!!
                         alloc_stateowner // alloc oo2

 nfsd4_process_open2
  init_open_stateid
  // associate oo1
  // with stateid1, stateid1 LEAK!!!
  nfs4_get_vfs_file
  // alloc nfsd_file1 and nfsd_file_mark1
  // all LEAK!!!

                         nfsd4_process_open2
                         ...

                                    write_threads
                                     ...
                                     nfsd_destroy_serv
                                      nfsd_shutdown_net
                                       nfs4_state_shutdown_net
                                        nfs4_state_destroy_net
                                         destroy_client
                                          __destroy_client
                                          // won't find oo1!!!
                                     nfsd_shutdown_generic
                                      nfsd_file_cache_shutdown
                                       kmem_cache_destroy
                                       for nfsd_file_slab
                                       and nfsd_file_mark_slab
                                       // bark since nfsd_file1
                                       // and nfsd_file_mark1
                                       // still alive

=======================================================================
BUG nfsd_file (Not tainted): Objects remaining in nfsd_file on
__kmem_cache_shutdown()
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Slab 0xffd4000004438a80 objects=34 used=1 fp=0xff11000110e2ad28
flags=0x17ffffc0000240(workingset|head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 757 Comm: sh Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6+ zen-kernel#19
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70
 slab_err+0xb0/0xf0
 __kmem_cache_shutdown+0x15c/0x310
 kmem_cache_destroy+0x66/0x160
 nfsd_file_cache_shutdown+0xac/0x210 [nfsd]
 nfsd_destroy_serv+0x251/0x2a0 [nfsd]
 nfsd_svc+0x125/0x1e0 [nfsd]
 write_threads+0x16a/0x2a0 [nfsd]
 nfsctl_transaction_write+0x74/0xa0 [nfsd]
 vfs_write+0x1ae/0x6d0
 ksys_write+0xc1/0x160
 do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x170
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
Object 0xff11000110e2ac38 @offset=3128
Allocated in nfsd_file_do_acquire+0x20f/0xa30 [nfsd] age=1635 cpu=3
pid=800
 nfsd_file_do_acquire+0x20f/0xa30 [nfsd]
 nfsd_file_acquire_opened+0x5f/0x90 [nfsd]
 nfs4_get_vfs_file+0x4c9/0x570 [nfsd]
 nfsd4_process_open2+0x713/0x1070 [nfsd]
 nfsd4_open+0x74b/0x8b0 [nfsd]
 nfsd4_proc_compound+0x70b/0xc20 [nfsd]
 nfsd_dispatch+0x1b4/0x3a0 [nfsd]
 svc_process_common+0x5b8/0xc50 [sunrpc]
 svc_process+0x2ab/0x3b0 [sunrpc]
 svc_handle_xprt+0x681/0xa20 [sunrpc]
 nfsd+0x183/0x220 [nfsd]
 kthread+0x199/0x1e0
 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x60
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

Add nfs4_openowner_unhashed to help found unhashed nfs4_openowner, and
break nfsd4_open process to fix this problem.

Cc: [email protected] # v5.4+
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yang Erkun <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 17, 2025
This commit addresses a circular locking dependency issue within the GFX
isolation mechanism. The problem was identified by a warning indicating
a potential deadlock due to inconsistent lock acquisition order.

- The `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use` and
  `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_end_use` functions previously
  acquired `enforce_isolation_mutex` and called `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl`,
  leading to potential deadlocks. ie., If `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` is
  called while `enforce_isolation_mutex` is held, and
  `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler` is called while `kfd_sch_mutex` is
  held, it can create a circular dependency.

By ensuring consistent lock usage, this fix resolves the issue:

[  606.297333] ======================================================
[  606.297343] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[  606.297353] 6.10.0-amd-mlkd-610-311224-lof #19 Tainted: G           OE
[  606.297365] ------------------------------------------------------
[  606.297375] kworker/u96:3/3825 is trying to acquire lock:
[  606.297385] ffff9aa64e431cb8 ((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x232/0x610
[  606.297413]
               but task is already holding lock:
[  606.297423] ffff9aa64e432338 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.297725]
               which lock already depends on the new lock.

[  606.297738]
               the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[  606.297749]
               -> #2 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[  606.297765]        __mutex_lock+0x85/0x930
[  606.297776]        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[  606.297786]        amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.298007]        amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.298225]        amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu]
[  606.298412]        amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu]
[  606.298603]        amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu]
[  606.298866]        drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched]
[  606.298880]        process_one_work+0x21e/0x680
[  606.298890]        worker_thread+0x190/0x350
[  606.298899]        kthread+0xe7/0x120
[  606.298908]        ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[  606.298919]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  606.298929]
               -> #1 (&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[  606.298947]        __mutex_lock+0x85/0x930
[  606.298956]        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[  606.298966]        amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler+0x87/0x370 [amdgpu]
[  606.299190]        process_one_work+0x21e/0x680
[  606.299199]        worker_thread+0x190/0x350
[  606.299208]        kthread+0xe7/0x120
[  606.299217]        ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[  606.299227]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  606.299236]
               -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
[  606.299257]        __lock_acquire+0x16f9/0x2810
[  606.299267]        lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300
[  606.299276]        __flush_work+0x250/0x610
[  606.299286]        cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x71/0x80
[  606.299296]        amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x287/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.299509]        amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.299723]        amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu]
[  606.299909]        amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu]
[  606.300101]        amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu]
[  606.300355]        drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched]
[  606.300369]        process_one_work+0x21e/0x680
[  606.300378]        worker_thread+0x190/0x350
[  606.300387]        kthread+0xe7/0x120
[  606.300396]        ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[  606.300406]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  606.300416]
               other info that might help us debug this:

[  606.300428] Chain exists of:
                 (work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work) --> &adev->enforce_isolation_mutex --> &adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex

[  606.300458]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[  606.300468]        CPU0                    CPU1
[  606.300476]        ----                    ----
[  606.300484]   lock(&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex);
[  606.300494]                                lock(&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex);
[  606.300508]                                lock(&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex);
[  606.300521]   lock((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work));
[  606.300536]
                *** DEADLOCK ***

[  606.300546] 5 locks held by kworker/u96:3/3825:
[  606.300555]  #0: ffff9aa5aa1f5d58 ((wq_completion)comp_1.1.0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x3f5/0x680
[  606.300577]  #1: ffffaa53c3c97e40 ((work_completion)(&sched->work_run_job)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1d6/0x680
[  606.300600]  #2: ffff9aa64e463c98 (&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x1c3/0x5d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.300837]  #3: ffff9aa64e432338 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.301062]  #4: ffffffff8c1a5660 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __flush_work+0x70/0x610
[  606.301083]
               stack backtrace:
[  606.301092] CPU: 14 PID: 3825 Comm: kworker/u96:3 Tainted: G           OE      6.10.0-amd-mlkd-610-311224-lof #19
[  606.301109] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. X570S GAMING X/X570S GAMING X, BIOS F7 03/22/2024
[  606.301124] Workqueue: comp_1.1.0 drm_sched_run_job_work [gpu_sched]
[  606.301140] Call Trace:
[  606.301146]  <TASK>
[  606.301154]  dump_stack_lvl+0x9b/0xf0
[  606.301166]  dump_stack+0x10/0x20
[  606.301175]  print_circular_bug+0x26c/0x340
[  606.301187]  check_noncircular+0x157/0x170
[  606.301197]  ? register_lock_class+0x48/0x490
[  606.301213]  __lock_acquire+0x16f9/0x2810
[  606.301230]  lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300
[  606.301239]  ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610
[  606.301250]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  606.301261]  ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90
[  606.301274]  ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610
[  606.301284]  __flush_work+0x250/0x610
[  606.301293]  ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610
[  606.301305]  ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10
[  606.301318]  ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90
[  606.301331]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  606.301345]  cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x71/0x80
[  606.301356]  amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x287/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.301661]  amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.302050]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  606.302069]  amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu]
[  606.302452]  amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu]
[  606.302862]  ? drm_sched_entity_error+0x82/0x190 [gpu_sched]
[  606.302890]  amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu]
[  606.303366]  drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched]
[  606.303388]  process_one_work+0x21e/0x680
[  606.303409]  worker_thread+0x190/0x350
[  606.303424]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[  606.303437]  kthread+0xe7/0x120
[  606.303449]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  606.303463]  ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[  606.303476]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  606.303489]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  606.303512]  </TASK>

v2: Refactor lock handling to resolve circular dependency (Alex)

- Introduced a `sched_work` flag to defer the call to
  `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` until after releasing
  `enforce_isolation_mutex`.
- This change ensures that `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` is called outside
  the critical section, preventing the circular dependency and deadlock.
- The `sched_work` flag is set within the mutex-protected section if
  conditions are met, and the actual function call is made afterward.
- This approach ensures consistent lock acquisition order.

Fixes: afefd6f ("drm/amdgpu: Implement Enforce Isolation Handler for KGD/KFD serialization")
Cc: Christian König <[email protected]>
Cc: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Srinivasan Shanmugam <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 0b6b2dd)
Cc: [email protected]
damentz pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 17, 2025
[ Upstream commit 1e8c193 ]

This commit addresses a circular locking dependency issue within the GFX
isolation mechanism. The problem was identified by a warning indicating
a potential deadlock due to inconsistent lock acquisition order.

- The `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use` and
  `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_end_use` functions previously
  acquired `enforce_isolation_mutex` and called `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl`,
  leading to potential deadlocks. ie., If `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` is
  called while `enforce_isolation_mutex` is held, and
  `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler` is called while `kfd_sch_mutex` is
  held, it can create a circular dependency.

By ensuring consistent lock usage, this fix resolves the issue:

[  606.297333] ======================================================
[  606.297343] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[  606.297353] 6.10.0-amd-mlkd-610-311224-lof #19 Tainted: G           OE
[  606.297365] ------------------------------------------------------
[  606.297375] kworker/u96:3/3825 is trying to acquire lock:
[  606.297385] ffff9aa64e431cb8 ((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x232/0x610
[  606.297413]
               but task is already holding lock:
[  606.297423] ffff9aa64e432338 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.297725]
               which lock already depends on the new lock.

[  606.297738]
               the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[  606.297749]
               -> #2 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[  606.297765]        __mutex_lock+0x85/0x930
[  606.297776]        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[  606.297786]        amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.298007]        amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.298225]        amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu]
[  606.298412]        amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu]
[  606.298603]        amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu]
[  606.298866]        drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched]
[  606.298880]        process_one_work+0x21e/0x680
[  606.298890]        worker_thread+0x190/0x350
[  606.298899]        kthread+0xe7/0x120
[  606.298908]        ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[  606.298919]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  606.298929]
               -> #1 (&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[  606.298947]        __mutex_lock+0x85/0x930
[  606.298956]        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[  606.298966]        amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler+0x87/0x370 [amdgpu]
[  606.299190]        process_one_work+0x21e/0x680
[  606.299199]        worker_thread+0x190/0x350
[  606.299208]        kthread+0xe7/0x120
[  606.299217]        ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[  606.299227]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  606.299236]
               -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
[  606.299257]        __lock_acquire+0x16f9/0x2810
[  606.299267]        lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300
[  606.299276]        __flush_work+0x250/0x610
[  606.299286]        cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x71/0x80
[  606.299296]        amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x287/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.299509]        amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.299723]        amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu]
[  606.299909]        amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu]
[  606.300101]        amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu]
[  606.300355]        drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched]
[  606.300369]        process_one_work+0x21e/0x680
[  606.300378]        worker_thread+0x190/0x350
[  606.300387]        kthread+0xe7/0x120
[  606.300396]        ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[  606.300406]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  606.300416]
               other info that might help us debug this:

[  606.300428] Chain exists of:
                 (work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work) --> &adev->enforce_isolation_mutex --> &adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex

[  606.300458]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[  606.300468]        CPU0                    CPU1
[  606.300476]        ----                    ----
[  606.300484]   lock(&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex);
[  606.300494]                                lock(&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex);
[  606.300508]                                lock(&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex);
[  606.300521]   lock((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work));
[  606.300536]
                *** DEADLOCK ***

[  606.300546] 5 locks held by kworker/u96:3/3825:
[  606.300555]  #0: ffff9aa5aa1f5d58 ((wq_completion)comp_1.1.0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x3f5/0x680
[  606.300577]  #1: ffffaa53c3c97e40 ((work_completion)(&sched->work_run_job)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1d6/0x680
[  606.300600]  #2: ffff9aa64e463c98 (&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x1c3/0x5d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.300837]  #3: ffff9aa64e432338 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.301062]  #4: ffffffff8c1a5660 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __flush_work+0x70/0x610
[  606.301083]
               stack backtrace:
[  606.301092] CPU: 14 PID: 3825 Comm: kworker/u96:3 Tainted: G           OE      6.10.0-amd-mlkd-610-311224-lof #19
[  606.301109] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. X570S GAMING X/X570S GAMING X, BIOS F7 03/22/2024
[  606.301124] Workqueue: comp_1.1.0 drm_sched_run_job_work [gpu_sched]
[  606.301140] Call Trace:
[  606.301146]  <TASK>
[  606.301154]  dump_stack_lvl+0x9b/0xf0
[  606.301166]  dump_stack+0x10/0x20
[  606.301175]  print_circular_bug+0x26c/0x340
[  606.301187]  check_noncircular+0x157/0x170
[  606.301197]  ? register_lock_class+0x48/0x490
[  606.301213]  __lock_acquire+0x16f9/0x2810
[  606.301230]  lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300
[  606.301239]  ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610
[  606.301250]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  606.301261]  ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90
[  606.301274]  ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610
[  606.301284]  __flush_work+0x250/0x610
[  606.301293]  ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610
[  606.301305]  ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10
[  606.301318]  ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90
[  606.301331]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  606.301345]  cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x71/0x80
[  606.301356]  amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x287/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.301661]  amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.302050]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  606.302069]  amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu]
[  606.302452]  amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu]
[  606.302862]  ? drm_sched_entity_error+0x82/0x190 [gpu_sched]
[  606.302890]  amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu]
[  606.303366]  drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched]
[  606.303388]  process_one_work+0x21e/0x680
[  606.303409]  worker_thread+0x190/0x350
[  606.303424]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[  606.303437]  kthread+0xe7/0x120
[  606.303449]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  606.303463]  ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[  606.303476]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  606.303489]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  606.303512]  </TASK>

v2: Refactor lock handling to resolve circular dependency (Alex)

- Introduced a `sched_work` flag to defer the call to
  `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` until after releasing
  `enforce_isolation_mutex`.
- This change ensures that `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` is called outside
  the critical section, preventing the circular dependency and deadlock.
- The `sched_work` flag is set within the mutex-protected section if
  conditions are met, and the actual function call is made afterward.
- This approach ensures consistent lock acquisition order.

Fixes: afefd6f ("drm/amdgpu: Implement Enforce Isolation Handler for KGD/KFD serialization")
Cc: Christian König <[email protected]>
Cc: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Srinivasan Shanmugam <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 20, 2025
commit 17d253a upstream.

Checking TPM_CHIP_FLAG_SUSPENDED after the call to tpm_find_get_ops() can
lead to a spurious tpm_chip_start() call:

[35985.503771] i2c i2c-1: Transfer while suspended
[35985.503796] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 74 at drivers/i2c/i2c-core.h:56 __i2c_transfer+0xbe/0x810
[35985.503802] Modules linked in:
[35985.503808] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 74 Comm: hwrng Tainted: G        W          6.13.0-next-20250203-00005-gfa0cb5642941 #19 9c3d7f78192f2d38e32010ac9c90fdc71109ef6f
[35985.503814] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[35985.503817] Hardware name: Google Morphius/Morphius, BIOS Google_Morphius.13434.858.0 10/26/2023
[35985.503819] RIP: 0010:__i2c_transfer+0xbe/0x810
[35985.503825] Code: 30 01 00 00 4c 89 f7 e8 40 fe d8 ff 48 8b 93 80 01 00 00 48 85 d2 75 03 49 8b 16 48 c7 c7 0a fb 7c a7 48 89 c6 e8 32 ad b0 fe <0f> 0b b8 94 ff ff ff e9 33 04 00 00 be 02 00 00 00 83 fd 02 0f 5
[35985.503828] RSP: 0018:ffffa106c0333d30 EFLAGS: 00010246
[35985.503833] RAX: 074ba64aa20f7000 RBX: ffff8aa4c1167120 RCX: 0000000000000000
[35985.503836] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffa77ab0e4 RDI: 0000000000000001
[35985.503838] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
[35985.503841] R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 00000001000313d5 R12: ffff8aa4c10f1820
[35985.503843] R13: ffff8aa4c0e243c0 R14: ffff8aa4c1167250 R15: ffff8aa4c1167120
[35985.503846] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8aa4eae00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[35985.503849] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[35985.503852] CR2: 00007fab0aaf1000 CR3: 0000000105328000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
[35985.503855] Call Trace:
[35985.503859]  <TASK>
[35985.503863]  ? __warn+0xd4/0x260
[35985.503868]  ? __i2c_transfer+0xbe/0x810
[35985.503874]  ? report_bug+0xf3/0x210
[35985.503882]  ? handle_bug+0x63/0xb0
[35985.503887]  ? exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x50
[35985.503892]  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
[35985.503904]  ? __i2c_transfer+0xbe/0x810
[35985.503913]  tpm_cr50_i2c_transfer_message+0x24/0xf0
[35985.503920]  tpm_cr50_i2c_read+0x8e/0x120
[35985.503928]  tpm_cr50_request_locality+0x75/0x170
[35985.503935]  tpm_chip_start+0x116/0x160
[35985.503942]  tpm_try_get_ops+0x57/0x90
[35985.503948]  tpm_find_get_ops+0x26/0xd0
[35985.503955]  tpm_get_random+0x2d/0x80

Don't move forward with tpm_chip_start() inside tpm_try_get_ops(), unless
TPM_CHIP_FLAG_SUSPENDED is not set. tpm_find_get_ops() will return NULL in
such a failure case.

Fixes: 9265fed ("tpm: Lock TPM chip in tpm_pm_suspend() first")
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Jerry Snitselaar <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Seo <[email protected]>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jerry Snitselaar <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 27, 2025
[ Upstream commit eedf3e3 ]

ACPICA commit 1c28da2242783579d59767617121035dafba18c3

This was originally done in NetBSD:
NetBSD/src@b69d1ac
and is the correct alternative to the smattering of `memcpy`s I
previously contributed to this repository.

This also sidesteps the newly strict checks added in UBSAN:
llvm/llvm-project@7926744

Before this change we see the following UBSAN stack trace in Fuchsia:

  #0    0x000021afcfdeca5e in acpi_rs_get_address_common(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsaddr.c:329 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6aca5e
  #1.2  0x000021982bc4af3c in ubsan_get_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:41 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c
  #1.1  0x000021982bc4af3c in maybe_print_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:51 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c
  #1    0x000021982bc4af3c in ~scoped_report() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:395 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c
  #2    0x000021982bc4bb6f in handletype_mismatch_impl() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:137 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x42b6f
  #3    0x000021982bc4b723 in __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1 compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:142 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x42723
  #4    0x000021afcfdeca5e in acpi_rs_get_address_common(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsaddr.c:329 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6aca5e
  #5    0x000021afcfdf2089 in acpi_rs_convert_aml_to_resource(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*, struct acpi_rsconvert_info*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsmisc.c:355 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b2089
  #6    0x000021afcfded169 in acpi_rs_convert_aml_to_resources(u8*, u32, u32, u8, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rslist.c:137 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6ad169
  #7    0x000021afcfe2d24a in acpi_ut_walk_aml_resources(struct acpi_walk_state*, u8*, acpi_size, acpi_walk_aml_callback, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/utilities/utresrc.c:237 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6ed24a
  #8    0x000021afcfde66b7 in acpi_rs_create_resource_list(union acpi_operand_object*, struct acpi_buffer*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rscreate.c:199 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6a66b7
  #9    0x000021afcfdf6979 in acpi_rs_get_method_data(acpi_handle, const char*, struct acpi_buffer*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsutils.c:770 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b6979
  #10   0x000021afcfdf708f in acpi_walk_resources(acpi_handle, char*, acpi_walk_resource_callback, void*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsxface.c:731 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b708f
  #11   0x000021afcfa95dcf in acpi::acpi_impl::walk_resources(acpi::acpi_impl*, acpi_handle, const char*, acpi::Acpi::resources_callable) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/acpi-impl.cc:41 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x355dcf
  #12   0x000021afcfaa8278 in acpi::device_builder::gather_resources(acpi::device_builder*, acpi::Acpi*, fidl::any_arena&, acpi::Manager*, acpi::device_builder::gather_resources_callback) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/device-builder.cc:84 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x368278
  #13   0x000021afcfbddb87 in acpi::Manager::configure_discovered_devices(acpi::Manager*) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/manager.cc:75 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x49db87
  #14   0x000021afcf99091d in publish_acpi_devices(acpi::Manager*, zx_device_t*, zx_device_t*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/acpi-nswalk.cc:95 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x25091d
  #15   0x000021afcf9c1d4e in x86::X86::do_init(x86::X86*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:60 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x281d4e
  #16   0x000021afcf9e33ad in λ(x86::X86::ddk_init::(anon class)*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:77 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2a33ad
  #17   0x000021afcf9e313e in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:76:19), false, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void>::invoke(void*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:183 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2a313e
  #18   0x000021afcfbab4c7 in fit::internal::function_base<16UL, false, void(), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<16UL, false, void (), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x46b4c7
  #19   0x000021afcfbab342 in fit::function_impl<16UL, false, void(), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(const fit::function_impl<16UL, false, void (), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:315 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x46b342
  #20   0x000021afcfcd98c3 in async::internal::retained_task::Handler(async_dispatcher_t*, async_task_t*, zx_status_t) ../../sdk/lib/async/task.cc:24 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x5998c3
  #21   0x00002290f9924616 in λ(const driver_runtime::Dispatcher::post_task::(anon class)*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, zx_status_t) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:789 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x10a616
  #22   0x00002290f9924323 in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:788:7), true, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int>::invoke(void*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:128 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x10a323
  #23   0x00002290f9904b76 in fit::internal::function_base<24UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<24UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xeab76
  #24   0x00002290f9904831 in fit::callback_impl<24UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(fit::callback_impl<24UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:471 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xea831
  #25   0x00002290f98d5adc in driver_runtime::callback_request::Call(driver_runtime::callback_request*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, zx_status_t) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/callback_request.h:74 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xbbadc
  #26   0x00002290f98e1e58 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::dispatch_callback(driver_runtime::Dispatcher*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1248 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xc7e58
  #27   0x00002290f98e4159 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::dispatch_callbacks(driver_runtime::Dispatcher*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1308 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xca159
  #28   0x00002290f9918414 in λ(const driver_runtime::Dispatcher::create_with_adder::(anon class)*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:353 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe414
  #29   0x00002290f991812d in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:351:7), true, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>>::invoke(void*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:128 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe12d
  #30   0x00002290f9906fc7 in fit::internal::function_base<8UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<8UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xecfc7
  #31   0x00002290f9906c66 in fit::function_impl<8UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(const fit::function_impl<8UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:315 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xecc66
  #32   0x00002290f98e73d9 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter::invoke_callback(driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.h:543 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xcd3d9
  #33   0x00002290f98e700d in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter::handle_event(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, async_dispatcher_t*, async::wait_base*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1442 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xcd00d
  #34   0x00002290f9918983 in async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>::handle_event(async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>*, async_dispatcher_t*, async::wait_base*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/async_loop_owned_event_handler.h:59 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe983
  #35   0x00002290f9918b9e in async::wait_method<async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>, &async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>::handle_event>::call_handler(async_dispatcher_t*, async_wait_t*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../sdk/lib/async/include/lib/async/cpp/wait.h:201 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfeb9e
  #36   0x00002290f99bf509 in async_loop_dispatch_wait(async_loop_t*, async_wait_t*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:394 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x1a5509
  #37   0x00002290f99b9958 in async_loop_run_once(async_loop_t*, zx_time_t) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:343 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x19f958
  #38   0x00002290f99b9247 in async_loop_run(async_loop_t*, zx_time_t, _Bool) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:301 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x19f247
  #39   0x00002290f99ba962 in async_loop_run_thread(void*) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:860 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x1a0962
  #40   0x000041afd176ef30 in start_c11(void*) ../../zircon/third_party/ulib/musl/pthread/pthread_create.c:63 <libc.so>+0x84f30
  #41   0x000041afd18a448d in thread_trampoline(uintptr_t, uintptr_t) ../../zircon/system/ulib/runtime/thread.cc:100 <libc.so>+0x1ba48d

Link: acpica/acpica@1c28da22
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Tamir Duberstein <[email protected]>
[ rjw: Pick up the tag from Tamir ]
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 3, 2025
Without the change `perf `hangs up on charaster devices. On my system
it's enough to run system-wide sampler for a few seconds to get the
hangup:

    $ perf record -a -g --call-graph=dwarf
    $ perf report
    # hung

`strace` shows that hangup happens on reading on a character device
`/dev/dri/renderD128`

    $ strace -y -f -p 2780484
    strace: Process 2780484 attached
    pread64(101</dev/dri/renderD128>, strace: Process 2780484 detached

It's call trace descends into `elfutils`:

    $ gdb -p 2780484
    (gdb) bt
    #0  0x00007f5e508f04b7 in __libc_pread64 (fd=101, buf=0x7fff9df7edb0, count=0, offset=0)
        at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/pread64.c:25
    #1  0x00007f5e52b79515 in read_file () from /<<NIX>>/elfutils-0.192/lib/libelf.so.1
    #2  0x00007f5e52b25666 in libdw_open_elf () from /<<NIX>>/elfutils-0.192/lib/libdw.so.1
    #3  0x00007f5e52b25907 in __libdw_open_file () from /<<NIX>>/elfutils-0.192/lib/libdw.so.1
    #4  0x00007f5e52b120a9 in dwfl_report_elf@@ELFUTILS_0.156 ()
       from /<<NIX>>/elfutils-0.192/lib/libdw.so.1
    #5  0x000000000068bf20 in __report_module (al=al@entry=0x7fff9df80010, ip=ip@entry=139803237033216, ui=ui@entry=0x5369b5e0)
        at util/dso.h:537
    #6  0x000000000068c3d1 in report_module (ip=139803237033216, ui=0x5369b5e0) at util/unwind-libdw.c:114
    #7  frame_callback (state=0x535aef10, arg=0x5369b5e0) at util/unwind-libdw.c:242
    #8  0x00007f5e52b261d3 in dwfl_thread_getframes () from /<<NIX>>/elfutils-0.192/lib/libdw.so.1
    #9  0x00007f5e52b25bdb in get_one_thread_cb () from /<<NIX>>/elfutils-0.192/lib/libdw.so.1
    #10 0x00007f5e52b25faa in dwfl_getthreads () from /<<NIX>>/elfutils-0.192/lib/libdw.so.1
    #11 0x00007f5e52b26514 in dwfl_getthread_frames () from /<<NIX>>/elfutils-0.192/lib/libdw.so.1
    #12 0x000000000068c6ce in unwind__get_entries (cb=cb@entry=0x5d4620 <unwind_entry>, arg=arg@entry=0x10cd5fa0,
        thread=thread@entry=0x1076a290, data=data@entry=0x7fff9df80540, max_stack=max_stack@entry=127,
        best_effort=best_effort@entry=false) at util/thread.h:152
    #13 0x00000000005dae95 in thread__resolve_callchain_unwind (evsel=0x106006d0, thread=0x1076a290, cursor=0x10cd5fa0,
        sample=0x7fff9df80540, max_stack=127, symbols=true) at util/machine.c:2939
    #14 thread__resolve_callchain_unwind (thread=0x1076a290, cursor=0x10cd5fa0, evsel=0x106006d0, sample=0x7fff9df80540,
        max_stack=127, symbols=true) at util/machine.c:2920
    #15 __thread__resolve_callchain (thread=0x1076a290, cursor=0x10cd5fa0, evsel=0x106006d0, evsel@entry=0x7fff9df80440,
        sample=0x7fff9df80540, parent=parent@entry=0x7fff9df804a0, root_al=root_al@entry=0x7fff9df80440, max_stack=127, symbols=true)
        at util/machine.c:2970
    #16 0x00000000005d0cb2 in thread__resolve_callchain (thread=<optimized out>, cursor=<optimized out>, evsel=0x7fff9df80440,
        sample=<optimized out>, parent=0x7fff9df804a0, root_al=0x7fff9df80440, max_stack=127) at util/machine.h:198
    #17 sample__resolve_callchain (sample=<optimized out>, cursor=<optimized out>, parent=parent@entry=0x7fff9df804a0,
        evsel=evsel@entry=0x106006d0, al=al@entry=0x7fff9df80440, max_stack=max_stack@entry=127) at util/callchain.c:1127
    #18 0x0000000000617e08 in hist_entry_iter__add (iter=iter@entry=0x7fff9df80480, al=al@entry=0x7fff9df80440, max_stack_depth=127,
        arg=arg@entry=0x7fff9df81ae0) at util/hist.c:1255
    #19 0x000000000045d2d0 in process_sample_event (tool=0x7fff9df81ae0, event=<optimized out>, sample=0x7fff9df80540,
        evsel=0x106006d0, machine=<optimized out>) at builtin-report.c:334
    #20 0x00000000005e3bb1 in perf_session__deliver_event (session=0x105ff2c0, event=0x7f5c7d735ca0, tool=0x7fff9df81ae0,
        file_offset=2914716832, file_path=0x105ffbf0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1367
    #21 0x00000000005e8d93 in do_flush (oe=0x105ffa50, show_progress=false) at util/ordered-events.c:245
    #22 __ordered_events__flush (oe=0x105ffa50, how=OE_FLUSH__ROUND, timestamp=<optimized out>) at util/ordered-events.c:324
    #23 0x00000000005e1f64 in perf_session__process_user_event (session=0x105ff2c0, event=0x7f5c7d752b18, file_offset=2914835224,
        file_path=0x105ffbf0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1419
    #24 0x00000000005e47c7 in reader__read_event (rd=rd@entry=0x7fff9df81260, session=session@entry=0x105ff2c0,
    --Type <RET> for more, q to quit, c to continue without paging--
    quit
        prog=prog@entry=0x7fff9df81220) at util/session.c:2132
    #25 0x00000000005e4b37 in reader__process_events (rd=0x7fff9df81260, session=0x105ff2c0, prog=0x7fff9df81220)
        at util/session.c:2181
    #26 __perf_session__process_events (session=0x105ff2c0) at util/session.c:2226
    #27 perf_session__process_events (session=session@entry=0x105ff2c0) at util/session.c:2390
    #28 0x0000000000460add in __cmd_report (rep=0x7fff9df81ae0) at builtin-report.c:1076
    #29 cmd_report (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at builtin-report.c:1827
    #30 0x00000000004c5a40 in run_builtin (p=p@entry=0xd8f7f8 <commands+312>, argc=argc@entry=1, argv=argv@entry=0x7fff9df844b0)
        at perf.c:351
    #31 0x00000000004c5d63 in handle_internal_command (argc=argc@entry=1, argv=argv@entry=0x7fff9df844b0) at perf.c:404
    #32 0x0000000000442de3 in run_argv (argcp=<synthetic pointer>, argv=<synthetic pointer>) at perf.c:448
    #33 main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=0x7fff9df844b0) at perf.c:556

The hangup happens because nothing in` perf` or `elfutils` checks if a
mapped file is easily readable.

The change conservatively skips all non-regular files.

Signed-off-by: Sergei Trofimovich <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 3, 2025
Symbolize stack traces by creating a live machine. Add this
functionality to dump_stack and switch dump_stack users to use
it. Switch TUI to use it. Add stack traces to the child test function
which can be useful to diagnose blocked code.

Example output:
```
$ perf test -vv PERF_RECORD_
...
  7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields:
  7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields                       : Running (1 active)
^C
Signal (2) while running tests.
Terminating tests with the same signal
Internal test harness failure. Completing any started tests:
:  7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields:

---- unexpected signal (2) ----
    #0 0x55788c6210a3 in child_test_sig_handler builtin-test.c:0
    #1 0x7fc12fe49df0 in __restore_rt libc_sigaction.c:0
    #2 0x7fc12fe99687 in __internal_syscall_cancel cancellation.c:64
    #3 0x7fc12fee5f7a in clock_nanosleep@GLIBC_2.2.5 clock_nanosleep.c:72
    #4 0x7fc12fef1393 in __nanosleep nanosleep.c:26
    #5 0x7fc12ff02d68 in __sleep sleep.c:55
    #6 0x55788c63196b in test__PERF_RECORD perf-record.c:0
    #7 0x55788c620fb0 in run_test_child builtin-test.c:0
    #8 0x55788c5bd18d in start_command run-command.c:127
    #9 0x55788c621ef3 in __cmd_test builtin-test.c:0
    #10 0x55788c6225bf in cmd_test ??:0
    #11 0x55788c5afbd0 in run_builtin perf.c:0
    #12 0x55788c5afeeb in handle_internal_command perf.c:0
    #13 0x55788c52b383 in main ??:0
    #14 0x7fc12fe33ca8 in __libc_start_call_main libc_start_call_main.h:74
    #15 0x7fc12fe33d65 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 libc-start.c:128
    #16 0x55788c52b9d1 in _start ??:0

---- unexpected signal (2) ----
    #0 0x55788c6210a3 in child_test_sig_handler builtin-test.c:0
    #1 0x7fc12fe49df0 in __restore_rt libc_sigaction.c:0
    #2 0x7fc12fea3a14 in pthread_sigmask@GLIBC_2.2.5 pthread_sigmask.c:45
    #3 0x7fc12fe49fd9 in __GI___sigprocmask sigprocmask.c:26
    #4 0x7fc12ff2601b in __longjmp_chk longjmp.c:36
    #5 0x55788c6210c0 in print_test_result.isra.0 builtin-test.c:0
    #6 0x7fc12fe49df0 in __restore_rt libc_sigaction.c:0
    #7 0x7fc12fe99687 in __internal_syscall_cancel cancellation.c:64
    #8 0x7fc12fee5f7a in clock_nanosleep@GLIBC_2.2.5 clock_nanosleep.c:72
    #9 0x7fc12fef1393 in __nanosleep nanosleep.c:26
    #10 0x7fc12ff02d68 in __sleep sleep.c:55
    #11 0x55788c63196b in test__PERF_RECORD perf-record.c:0
    #12 0x55788c620fb0 in run_test_child builtin-test.c:0
    #13 0x55788c5bd18d in start_command run-command.c:127
    #14 0x55788c621ef3 in __cmd_test builtin-test.c:0
    #15 0x55788c6225bf in cmd_test ??:0
    #16 0x55788c5afbd0 in run_builtin perf.c:0
    #17 0x55788c5afeeb in handle_internal_command perf.c:0
    #18 0x55788c52b383 in main ??:0
    #19 0x7fc12fe33ca8 in __libc_start_call_main libc_start_call_main.h:74
    #20 0x7fc12fe33d65 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 libc-start.c:128
    #21 0x55788c52b9d1 in _start ??:0
  7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields                       : Skip (permissions)
```

Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
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2 participants