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bpf-lsm: Extend interoperability with IMA #9
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Fix some warnings in ima_main.c, displayed with W=n make argument. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
__ima_inode_hash() checks if a digest has been already calculated by looking for the integrity_iint_cache structure associated to the passed inode. Users of ima_file_hash() (e.g. eBPF) might be interested in obtaining the information without having to setup an IMA policy so that the digest is always available at the time they call this function. Call ima_collect_measurement() in __ima_inode_hash(), if the file descriptor is available (passed by ima_file_hash()), and store the file measurement in a temporary integrity_iint_cache structure. This change does not cause memory usage increase, due to using the temporary integrity_iint_cache structure, and due to freeing the ima_digest_data structure inside integrity_iint_cache before exiting from __ima_inode_hash(). For compatibility reasons, the behavior of ima_inode_hash() remains unchanged. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>
ima_file_hash() has been modified to calculate the measurement of a file on demand, if it has not been already performed by IMA. For compatibility reasons, ima_inode_hash() remains unchanged. Keep the same approach in eBPF and introduce the new helper bpf_ima_file_hash() to take advantage of the modified behavior of ima_file_hash(). Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>
Modify the existing IMA test to call bpf_ima_file_hash() and update the expected result accordingly. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>
Make bpf_lsm_kernel_read_file() as sleepable, so that bpf_ima_inode_hash() or bpf_ima_file_hash() can be called inside the implementation of this hook. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>
Test the ability of bpf_lsm_kernel_read_file() to call the sleepable functions bpf_ima_inode_hash() or bpf_ima_file_hash() to obtain a measurement of a loaded IMA policy. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>
Author
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Master branch: edc21dc |
Author
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At least one diff in series https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/list/?series=614520 expired. Closing PR. |
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When bringing down the netdevice or system shutdown, a panic can be
triggered while accessing the sysfs path because the device is already
removed.
[ 755.549084] mlx5_core 0000:12:00.1: Shutdown was called
[ 756.404455] mlx5_core 0000:12:00.0: Shutdown was called
...
[ 757.937260] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 758.031397] IP: [<ffffffff8ee11acb>] dma_pool_alloc+0x1ab/0x280
crash> bt
...
PID: 12649 TASK: ffff8924108f2100 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "amsd"
...
#9 [ffff89240e1a38b0] page_fault at ffffffff8f38c778
[exception RIP: dma_pool_alloc+0x1ab]
RIP: ffffffff8ee11acb RSP: ffff89240e1a3968 RFLAGS: 00010046
RAX: 0000000000000246 RBX: ffff89243d874100 RCX: 0000000000001000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: ffff89243d874090
RBP: ffff89240e1a39c0 R8: 000000000001f080 R9: ffff8905ffc03c00
R10: ffffffffc04680d4 R11: ffffffff8edde9fd R12: 00000000000080d0
R13: ffff89243d874090 R14: ffff89243d874080 R15: 0000000000000000
ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018
#10 [ffff89240e1a39c8] mlx5_alloc_cmd_msg at ffffffffc04680f3 [mlx5_core]
#11 [ffff89240e1a3a18] cmd_exec at ffffffffc046ad62 [mlx5_core]
#12 [ffff89240e1a3ab8] mlx5_cmd_exec at ffffffffc046b4fb [mlx5_core]
#13 [ffff89240e1a3ae8] mlx5_core_access_reg at ffffffffc0475434 [mlx5_core]
#14 [ffff89240e1a3b40] mlx5e_get_fec_caps at ffffffffc04a7348 [mlx5_core]
#15 [ffff89240e1a3bb0] get_fec_supported_advertised at ffffffffc04992bf [mlx5_core]
#16 [ffff89240e1a3c08] mlx5e_get_link_ksettings at ffffffffc049ab36 [mlx5_core]
#17 [ffff89240e1a3ce8] __ethtool_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff8f25db46
#18 [ffff89240e1a3d48] speed_show at ffffffff8f277208
#19 [ffff89240e1a3dd8] dev_attr_show at ffffffff8f0b70e3
#20 [ffff89240e1a3df8] sysfs_kf_seq_show at ffffffff8eedbedf
#21 [ffff89240e1a3e18] kernfs_seq_show at ffffffff8eeda596
#22 [ffff89240e1a3e28] seq_read at ffffffff8ee76d10
#23 [ffff89240e1a3e98] kernfs_fop_read at ffffffff8eedaef5
#24 [ffff89240e1a3ed8] vfs_read at ffffffff8ee4e3ff
#25 [ffff89240e1a3f08] sys_read at ffffffff8ee4f27f
#26 [ffff89240e1a3f50] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff8f395f92
crash> net_device.state ffff89443b0c0000
state = 0x5 (__LINK_STATE_START| __LINK_STATE_NOCARRIER)
To prevent this scenario, we also make sure that the netdevice is present.
Signed-off-by: suresh kumar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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Ido Schimmel says:
====================
HW counters for soft devices
Petr says:
Offloading switch device drivers may be able to collect statistics of the
traffic taking place in the HW datapath that pertains to a certain soft
netdevice, such as a VLAN. In this patch set, add the necessary
infrastructure to allow exposing these statistics to the offloaded
netdevice in question, and add mlxsw offload.
Across HW platforms, the counter itself very likely constitutes a limited
resource, and the act of counting may have a performance impact. Therefore
this patch set makes the HW statistics collection opt-in and togglable from
userspace on a per-netdevice basis.
Additionally, HW devices may have various limiting conditions under which
they can realize the counter. Therefore it is also possible to query
whether the requested counter is realized by any driver. In TC parlance,
which is to a degree reused in this patch set, two values are recognized:
"request" tracks whether the user enabled collecting HW statistics, and
"used" tracks whether any HW statistics are actually collected.
In the past, this author has expressed the opinion that `a typical user
doing "ip -s l sh", including various scripts, wants to see the full
picture and not worry what's going on where'. While that would be nice,
unfortunately it cannot work:
- Packets that trap from the HW datapath to the SW datapath would be
double counted.
For a given netdevice, some traffic can be purely a SW artifact, and some
may flow through the HW object corresponding to the netdevice. But some
traffic can also get trapped to the SW datapath after bumping the HW
counter. It is not clear how to make sure double-counting does not occur
in the SW datapath in that case, while still making sure that possibly
divergent SW forwarding path gets bumped as appropriate.
So simply adding HW and SW stats may work roughly, most of the time, but
there are scenarios where the result is nonsensical.
- HW devices will have limitations as to what type of traffic they can
count.
In case of mlxsw, which is part of this patch set, there is no reasonable
way to count all traffic going through a certain netdevice, such as a
VLAN netdevice enslaved to a bridge. It is however very simple to count
traffic flowing through an L3 object, such as a VLAN netdevice with an IP
address.
Similarly for physical netdevices, the L3 object at which the counter is
installed is the subport carrying untagged traffic.
These are not "just counters". It is important that the user understands
what is being counted. It would be incorrect to conflate these statistics
with another existing statistics suite.
To that end, this patch set introduces a statistics suite called "L3
stats". This label should make it easy to understand what is being counted,
and to decide whether a given device can or cannot implement this suite for
some type of netdevice. At the same time, the code is written to make
future extensions easy, should a device pop up that can implement a
different flavor of statistics suite (say L2, or an address-family-specific
suite).
For example, using a work-in-progress iproute2[1], to turn on and then list
the counters on a VLAN netdevice:
# ip stats set dev swp1.200 l3_stats on
# ip stats show dev swp1.200 group offload subgroup l3_stats
56: swp1.200: group offload subgroup l3_stats on used on
RX: bytes packets errors dropped missed mcast
0 0 0 0 0 0
TX: bytes packets errors dropped carrier collsns
0 0 0 0 0 0
The patchset progresses as follows:
- Patch #1 is a cleanup.
- In patch #2, remove the assumption that all LINK_OFFLOAD_XSTATS are
dev-backed.
The only attribute defined under the nest is currently
IFLA_OFFLOAD_XSTATS_CPU_HIT. L3_STATS differs from CPU_HIT in that the
driver that supplies the statistics is not the same as the driver that
implements the netdevice. Make the code compatible with this in patch #2.
- In patch #3, add the possibility to filter inside nests.
The filter_mask field of RTM_GETSTATS header determines which
top-level attributes should be included in the netlink response. This
saves processing time by only including the bits that the user cares
about instead of always dumping everything. This is doubly important
for HW-backed statistics that would typically require a trip to the
device to fetch the stats. In this patch, the UAPI is extended to
allow filtering inside IFLA_STATS_LINK_OFFLOAD_XSTATS in particular,
but the scheme is easily extensible to other nests as well.
- In patch #4, propagate extack where we need it.
In patch #5, make it possible to propagate errors from drivers to the
user.
- In patch #6, add the in-kernel APIs for keeping track of the new stats
suite, and the notifiers that the core uses to communicate with the
drivers.
- In patch #7, add UAPI for obtaining the new stats suite.
- In patch #8, add a new UAPI message, RTM_SETSTATS, which will carry
the message to toggle the newly-added stats suite.
In patch #9, add the toggle itself.
At this point the core is ready for drivers to add support for the new
stats suite.
- In patches #10, #11 and #12, apply small tweaks to mlxsw code.
- In patch #13, add support for L3 stats, which are realized as RIF
counters.
- Finally in patch #14, a selftest is added to the net/forwarding
directory. Technically this is a HW-specific test, in that without a HW
implementing the counters, it just will not pass. But devices that
support L3 statistics at all are likely to be able to reuse this
selftest, so it seems appropriate to put it in the general forwarding
directory.
We also have a netdevsim implementation, and a corresponding selftest that
verifies specifically some of the core code. We intend to contribute these
later. Interested parties can take a look at the raw code at [2].
[1] https://github.com/pmachata/iproute2/commits/soft_counters
[2] https://github.com/pmachata/linux_mlxsw/commits/petrm_soft_counters_2
v2:
- Patch #3:
- Do not declare strict_start_type at the new policies, since they are
used with nla_parse_nested() (sans _deprecated).
- Use NLA_POLICY_NESTED to declare what the nest contents should be
- Use NLA_POLICY_MASK instead of BITFIELD32 for the filtering
attribute.
- Patch #6:
- s/monotonous/monotonic/ in commit message
- Use a newly-added struct rtnl_hw_stats64 for stats transfer
- Patch #7:
- Use a newly-added struct rtnl_hw_stats64 for stats transfer
- Patch #8:
- Do not declare strict_start_type at the new policies, since they are
used with nla_parse_nested() (sans _deprecated).
- Patch #13:
- Use a newly-added struct rtnl_hw_stats64 for stats transfer
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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In remove_phb_dynamic() we use &phb->io_resource, after we've called device_unregister(&host_bridge->dev). But the unregister may have freed phb, because pcibios_free_controller_deferred() is the release function for the host_bridge. If there are no outstanding references when we call device_unregister() then phb will be freed out from under us. This has gone mainly unnoticed, but with slub_debug and page_poison enabled it can lead to a crash: PID: 7574 TASK: c0000000d492cb80 CPU: 13 COMMAND: "drmgr" #0 [c0000000e4f075a0] crash_kexec at c00000000027d7dc #1 [c0000000e4f075d0] oops_end at c000000000029608 #2 [c0000000e4f07650] __bad_page_fault at c0000000000904b4 #3 [c0000000e4f076c0] do_bad_slb_fault at c00000000009a5a8 #4 [c0000000e4f076f0] data_access_slb_common_virt at c000000000008b30 Data SLB Access [380] exception frame: R0: c000000000167250 R1: c0000000e4f07a00 R2: c000000002a46100 R3: c000000002b39ce8 R4: 00000000000000c0 R5: 00000000000000a9 R6: 3894674d000000c0 R7: 0000000000000000 R8: 00000000000000ff R9: 0000000000000100 R10: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b R11: 0000000000008000 R12: c00000000023da80 R13: c0000009ffd38b00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000000011c87f0f0 R16: 0000000000000006 R17: 0000000000000003 R18: 0000000000000002 R19: 0000000000000004 R20: 0000000000000005 R21: 000000011c87ede8 R22: 000000011c87c5a8 R23: 000000011c87d3a0 R24: 0000000000000000 R25: 0000000000000001 R26: c0000000e4f07cc8 R27: c00000004d1cc400 R28: c0080000031d00e8 R29: c00000004d23d800 R30: c00000004d1d2400 R31: c00000004d1d2540 NIP: c000000000167258 MSR: 8000000000009033 OR3: c000000000e9f474 CTR: 0000000000000000 LR: c000000000167250 XER: 0000000020040003 CCR: 0000000024088420 MQ: 0000000000000000 DAR: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6ba3 DSISR: c0000000e4f07920 Syscall Result: fffffffffffffff2 [NIP : release_resource+56] [LR : release_resource+48] #5 [c0000000e4f07a00] release_resource at c000000000167258 (unreliable) #6 [c0000000e4f07a30] remove_phb_dynamic at c000000000105648 #7 [c0000000e4f07ab0] dlpar_remove_slot at c0080000031a09e8 [rpadlpar_io] #8 [c0000000e4f07b50] remove_slot_store at c0080000031a0b9c [rpadlpar_io] #9 [c0000000e4f07be0] kobj_attr_store at c000000000817d8c #10 [c0000000e4f07c00] sysfs_kf_write at c00000000063e504 #11 [c0000000e4f07c20] kernfs_fop_write_iter at c00000000063d868 #12 [c0000000e4f07c70] new_sync_write at c00000000054339c #13 [c0000000e4f07d10] vfs_write at c000000000546624 #14 [c0000000e4f07d60] ksys_write at c0000000005469f4 #15 [c0000000e4f07db0] system_call_exception at c000000000030840 #16 [c0000000e4f07e10] system_call_vectored_common at c00000000000c168 To avoid it, we can take a reference to the host_bridge->dev until we're done using phb. Then when we drop the reference the phb will be freed. Fixes: 2dd9c11 ("powerpc/pseries: use pci_host_bridge.release_fn() to kfree(phb)") Reported-by: David Dai <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> Tested-by: Sachin Sant <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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Patch series "mm: COW fixes part 1: fix the COW security issue for THP and swap", v3. This series attempts to optimize and streamline the COW logic for ordinary anon pages and THP anon pages, fixing two remaining instances of CVE-2020-29374 in do_swap_page() and do_huge_pmd_wp_page(): information can leak from a parent process to a child process via anonymous pages shared during fork(). This issue, including other related COW issues, has been summarized in [2]: "1. Observing Memory Modifications of Private Pages From A Child Process Long story short: process-private memory might not be as private as you think once you fork(): successive modifications of private memory regions in the parent process can still be observed by the child process, for example, by smart use of vmsplice()+munmap(). The core problem is that pinning pages readable in a child process, such as done via the vmsplice system call, can result in a child process observing memory modifications done in the parent process the child is not supposed to observe. [1] contains an excellent summary and [2] contains further details. This issue was assigned CVE-2020-29374 [9]. For this to trigger, it's required to use a fork() without subsequent exec(), for example, as used under Android zygote. Without further details about an application that forks less-privileged child processes, one cannot really say what's actually affected and what's not -- see the details section the end of this mail for a short sshd/openssh analysis. While commit 1783985 ("gup: document and work around "COW can break either way" issue") fixed this issue and resulted in other problems (e.g., ptrace on pmem), commit 09854ba ("mm: do_wp_page() simplification") re-introduced part of the problem unfortunately. The original reproducer can be modified quite easily to use THP [3] and make the issue appear again on upstream kernels. I modified it to use hugetlb [4] and it triggers as well. The problem is certainly less severe with hugetlb than with THP; it merely highlights that we still have plenty of open holes we should be closing/fixing. Regarding vmsplice(), the only known workaround is to disallow the vmsplice() system call ... or disable THP and hugetlb. But who knows what else is affected (RDMA? O_DIRECT?) to achieve the same goal -- in the end, it's a more generic issue" This security issue was first reported by Jann Horn on 27 May 2020 and it currently affects anonymous pages during swapin, anonymous THP and hugetlb. This series tackles anonymous pages during swapin and anonymous THP: - do_swap_page() for handling COW on PTEs during swapin directly - do_huge_pmd_wp_page() for handling COW on PMD-mapped THP during write faults With this series, we'll apply the same COW logic we have in do_wp_page() to all swappable anon pages: don't reuse (map writable) the page in case there are additional references (page_count() != 1). All users of reuse_swap_page() are remove, and consequently reuse_swap_page() is removed. In general, we're struggling with the following COW-related issues: (1) "missed COW": we miss to copy on write and reuse the page (map it writable) although we must copy because there are pending references from another process to this page. The result is a security issue. (2) "wrong COW": we copy on write although we wouldn't have to and shouldn't: if there are valid GUP references, they will become out of sync with the pages mapped into the page table. We fail to detect that such a page can be reused safely, especially if never more than a single process mapped the page. The result is an intra process memory corruption. (3) "unnecessary COW": we copy on write although we wouldn't have to: performance degradation and temporary increases swap+memory consumption can be the result. While this series fixes (1) for swappable anon pages, it tries to reduce reported cases of (3) first as good and easy as possible to limit the impact when streamlining. The individual patches try to describe in which cases we will run into (3). This series certainly makes (2) worse for THP, because a THP will now get PTE-mapped on write faults if there are additional references, even if there was only ever a single process involved: once PTE-mapped, we'll copy each and every subpage and won't reuse any subpage as long as the underlying compound page wasn't split. I'm working on an approach to fix (2) and improve (3): PageAnonExclusive to mark anon pages that are exclusive to a single process, allow GUP pins only on such exclusive pages, and allow turning exclusive pages shared (clearing PageAnonExclusive) only if there are no GUP pins. Anon pages with PageAnonExclusive set never have to be copied during write faults, but eventually during fork() if they cannot be turned shared. The improved reuse logic in this series will essentially also be the logic to reset PageAnonExclusive. This work will certainly take a while, but I'm planning on sharing details before having code fully ready. #1-#5 can be applied independently of the rest. #6-#9 are mostly only cleanups related to reuse_swap_page(). Notes: * For now, I'll leave hugetlb code untouched: "unnecessary COW" might easily break existing setups because hugetlb pages are a scarce resource and we could just end up having to crash the application when we run out of hugetlb pages. We have to be very careful and the security aspect with hugetlb is most certainly less relevant than for unprivileged anon pages. * Instead of lru_add_drain() we might actually just drain the lru_add list or even just remove the single page of interest from the lru_add list. This would require a new helper function, and could be added if the conditional lru_add_drain() turn out to be a problem. * I extended the test case already included in [1] to also test for the newly found do_swap_page() case. I'll send that out separately once/if this part was merged. [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] [2] https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] This patch (of 9): Liang Zhang reported [1] that the current COW logic in do_wp_page() is sub-optimal when it comes to swap+read fault+write fault of anonymous pages that have a single user, visible via a performance degradation in the redis benchmark. Something similar was previously reported [2] by Nadav with a simple reproducer. After we put an anon page into the swapcache and unmapped it from a single process, that process might read that page again and refault it read-only. If that process then writes to that page, the process is actually the exclusive user of the page, however, the COW logic in do_co_page() won't be able to reuse it due to the additional reference from the swapcache. Let's optimize for pages that have been added to the swapcache but only have an exclusive user. Try removing the swapcache reference if there is hope that we're the exclusive user. We will fail removing the swapcache reference in two scenarios: (1) There are additional swap entries referencing the page: copying instead of reusing is the right thing to do. (2) The page is under writeback: theoretically we might be able to reuse in some cases, however, we cannot remove the additional reference and will have to copy. Note that we'll only try removing the page from the swapcache when it's highly likely that we'll be the exclusive owner after removing the page from the swapache. As we're about to map that page writable and redirty it, that should not affect reclaim but is rather the right thing to do. Further, we might have additional references from the LRU pagevecs, which will force us to copy instead of being able to reuse. We'll try handling such references for some scenarios next. Concurrent writeback cannot be handled easily and we'll always have to copy. While at it, remove the superfluous page_mapcount() check: it's implicitly covered by the page_count() for ordinary anon pages. [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] [2] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Reported-by: Liang Zhang <[email protected]> Reported-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <[email protected]> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Shakeel Butt <[email protected]> Cc: John Hubbard <[email protected]> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]> Cc: Mike Kravetz <[email protected]> Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]> Cc: Yang Shi <[email protected]> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]> Cc: Jann Horn <[email protected]> Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Xu <[email protected]> Cc: Don Dutile <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]> Cc: Jan Kara <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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As guest_irq is coming from KVM_IRQFD API call, it may trigger crash in svm_update_pi_irte() due to out-of-bounds: crash> bt PID: 22218 TASK: ffff951a6ad74980 CPU: 73 COMMAND: "vcpu8" #0 [ffffb1ba6707fa40] machine_kexec at ffffffff8565b397 #1 [ffffb1ba6707fa90] __crash_kexec at ffffffff85788a6d #2 [ffffb1ba6707fb58] crash_kexec at ffffffff8578995d #3 [ffffb1ba6707fb70] oops_end at ffffffff85623c0d #4 [ffffb1ba6707fb90] no_context at ffffffff856692c9 #5 [ffffb1ba6707fbf8] exc_page_fault at ffffffff85f95b51 #6 [ffffb1ba6707fc50] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff86000ace [exception RIP: svm_update_pi_irte+227] RIP: ffffffffc0761b53 RSP: ffffb1ba6707fd08 RFLAGS: 00010086 RAX: ffffb1ba6707fd78 RBX: ffffb1ba66d91000 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 00003c803f63f1c0 RSI: 000000000000019a RDI: ffffb1ba66db2ab8 RBP: 000000000000019a R8: 0000000000000040 R9: ffff94ca41b82200 R10: ffffffffffffffcf R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffffffffffffffcf R15: 000000000000005f ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffffb1ba6707fdb8] kvm_irq_routing_update at ffffffffc09f19a1 [kvm] #8 [ffffb1ba6707fde0] kvm_set_irq_routing at ffffffffc09f2133 [kvm] #9 [ffffb1ba6707fe18] kvm_vm_ioctl at ffffffffc09ef544 [kvm] RIP: 00007f143c36488b RSP: 00007f143a4e04b8 RFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f05780041d0 RCX: 00007f143c36488b RDX: 00007f05780041d0 RSI: 000000004008ae6a RDI: 0000000000000020 RBP: 00000000000004e8 R8: 0000000000000008 R9: 00007f05780041e0 R10: 00007f0578004560 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000004e0 R13: 000000000000001a R14: 00007f1424001c60 R15: 00007f0578003bc0 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 CS: 0033 SS: 002b Vmx have been fix this in commit 3a8b067 (KVM: VMX: Do not BUG() on out-of-bounds guest IRQ), so we can just copy source from that to fix this. Co-developed-by: Yi Liu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yi Liu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yi Wang <[email protected]> Message-Id: <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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Apr 26, 2022
Andrii Nakryiko says: ==================== This patch set teaches libbpf to enhance BPF verifier log with human-readable and relevant information about failed CO-RE relocation. Patch #9 is the main one with the new logic. See relevant commit messages for some more details. All the other patches are either fixing various bugs detected while working on this feature, most prominently a bug with libbpf not handling CO-RE relocations for SEC("?...") programs, or are refactoring libbpf internals to allow for easier reuse of CO-RE relo lookup and formatting logic. ==================== Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
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…e name Add prefix "lc#n" to thermal zones associated with the thermal objects found on line cards. For example thermal zone for module #9 located at line card #7 will have type: mlxsw-lc7-module9. And thermal zone for gearbox #3 located at line card #5 will have type: mlxsw-lc5-gearbox3. Signed-off-by: Vadim Pasternak <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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Ido Schimmel says: ==================== mlxsw: Preparations for line cards support Currently, mlxsw registers thermal zones as well as hwmon entries for objects such as transceiver modules and gearboxes. In upcoming modular systems, these objects are no longer found on the main board (i.e., slot 0), but on plug-able line cards. This patchset prepares mlxsw for such systems in terms of hwmon, thermal and cable access support. Patches #1-#3 gradually prepare mlxsw for transceiver modules access support for line cards by splitting some of the internal structures and some APIs. Patches #4-#5 gradually prepare mlxsw for hwmon support for line cards by splitting some of the internal structures and augmenting them with a slot index. Patches #6-#7 do the same for thermal zones. Patch #8 selects cooling device for binding to a thermal zone by exact name match to prevent binding to non-relevant devices. Patch #9 replaces internal define for thermal zone name length with a common define. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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…de-initialization Add callback functions for line card thermal area initialization and de-initialization. Each line card is associated with the relevant thermal area, which may contain thermal zones for cages and gearboxes found on this line card. The line card thermal initialization / de-initialization APIs are to be called when line card is set to active / inactive state by got_active() / got_inactive() callbacks from line card state machine. For example thermal zone for module #9 located at line card #7 will have type: mlxsw-lc7-module9. And thermal zone for gearbox #2 located at line card #5 will have type: mlxsw-lc5-gearbox2. Signed-off-by: Vadim Pasternak <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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…-initialization Add callback functions for line card 'hwmon' initialization and de-initialization. Each line card is associated with the relevant 'hwmon' device, which may contain thermal attributes for the cages and gearboxes found on this line card. The line card 'hwmon' initialization / de-initialization APIs are to be called when line card is set to active / inactive state by got_active() / got_inactive() callbacks from line card state machine. For example cage temperature for module #9 located at line card #7 will be exposed by utility 'sensors' like: linecard#07 front panel 009: +32.0C (crit = +70.0C, emerg = +80.0C) And temperature for gearbox #3 located at line card #5 will be exposed like: linecard#05 gearbox 003: +41.0C (highest = +41.0C) Signed-off-by: Vadim Pasternak <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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May 12, 2022
While handling PCI errors (AER flow) driver tries to disable NAPI [napi_disable()] after NAPI is deleted [__netif_napi_del()] which causes unexpected system hang/crash. System message log shows the following: ======================================= [ 3222.537510] EEH: Detected PCI bus error on PHB#384-PE#800000 [ 3222.537511] EEH: This PCI device has failed 2 times in the last hour and will be permanently disabled after 5 failures. [ 3222.537512] EEH: Notify device drivers to shutdown [ 3222.537513] EEH: Beginning: 'error_detected(IO frozen)' [ 3222.537514] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): Invoking bnx2x->error_detected(IO frozen) [ 3222.537516] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_error_detected:14236(eth14)]IO error detected [ 3222.537650] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): bnx2x driver reports: 'need reset' [ 3222.537651] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.1): Invoking bnx2x->error_detected(IO frozen) [ 3222.537651] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_error_detected:14236(eth13)]IO error detected [ 3222.537729] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.1): bnx2x driver reports: 'need reset' [ 3222.537729] EEH: Finished:'error_detected(IO frozen)' with aggregate recovery state:'need reset' [ 3222.537890] EEH: Collect temporary log [ 3222.583481] EEH: of node=0384:80:00.0 [ 3222.583519] EEH: PCI device/vendor: 168e14e4 [ 3222.583557] EEH: PCI cmd/status register: 00100140 [ 3222.583557] EEH: PCI-E capabilities and status follow: [ 3222.583744] EEH: PCI-E 00: 00020010 012c8da 00095d5e 00455c82 [ 3222.583892] EEH: PCI-E 10: 10820000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.583893] EEH: PCI-E 20: 00000000 [ 3222.583893] EEH: PCI-E AER capability register set follows: [ 3222.584079] EEH: PCI-E AER 00: 13c10001 00000000 00000000 00062030 [ 3222.584230] EEH: PCI-E AER 10: 00002000 000031c0 000001e0 00000000 [ 3222.584378] EEH: PCI-E AER 20: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584416] EEH: PCI-E AER 30: 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584416] EEH: of node=0384:80:00.1 [ 3222.584454] EEH: PCI device/vendor: 168e14e4 [ 3222.584491] EEH: PCI cmd/status register: 00100140 [ 3222.584492] EEH: PCI-E capabilities and status follow: [ 3222.584677] EEH: PCI-E 00: 00020010 012c8da 00095d5e 00455c82 [ 3222.584825] EEH: PCI-E 10: 10820000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584826] EEH: PCI-E 20: 00000000 [ 3222.584826] EEH: PCI-E AER capability register set follows: [ 3222.585011] EEH: PCI-E AER 00: 13c10001 00000000 00000000 00062030 [ 3222.585160] EEH: PCI-E AER 10: 00002000 000031c0 000001e0 00000000 [ 3222.585309] EEH: PCI-E AER 20: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.585347] EEH: PCI-E AER 30: 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.586872] RTAS: event: 5, Type: Platform Error (224), Severity: 2 [ 3222.586873] EEH: Reset without hotplug activity [ 3224.762767] EEH: Beginning: 'slot_reset' [ 3224.762770] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): Invoking bnx2x->slot_reset() [ 3224.762771] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14271(eth14)]IO slot reset initializing... [ 3224.762887] bnx2x 0384:80:00.0: enabling device (0140 -> 0142) [ 3224.768157] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14287(eth14)]IO slot reset --> driver unload Uninterruptible tasks ===================== crash> ps | grep UN 213 2 11 c000000004c89e00 UN 0.0 0 0 [eehd] 215 2 0 c000000004c80000 UN 0.0 0 0 [kworker/0:2] 2196 1 28 c000000004504f00 UN 0.1 15936 11136 wickedd 4287 1 9 c00000020d076800 UN 0.0 4032 3008 agetty 4289 1 20 c00000020d056680 UN 0.0 7232 3840 agetty 32423 2 26 c00000020038c580 UN 0.0 0 0 [kworker/26:3] 32871 4241 27 c0000002609ddd00 UN 0.1 18624 11648 sshd 32920 10130 16 c00000027284a100 UN 0.1 48512 12608 sendmail 33092 32987 0 c000000205218b00 UN 0.1 48512 12608 sendmail 33154 4567 16 c000000260e51780 UN 0.1 48832 12864 pickup 33209 4241 36 c000000270cb6500 UN 0.1 18624 11712 sshd 33473 33283 0 c000000205211480 UN 0.1 48512 12672 sendmail 33531 4241 37 c00000023c902780 UN 0.1 18624 11648 sshd EEH handler hung while bnx2x sleeping and holding RTNL lock =========================================================== crash> bt 213 PID: 213 TASK: c000000004c89e00 CPU: 11 COMMAND: "eehd" #0 [c000000004d477e0] __schedule at c000000000c70808 #1 [c000000004d478b0] schedule at c000000000c70ee0 #2 [c000000004d478e0] schedule_timeout at c000000000c76dec #3 [c000000004d479c0] msleep at c0000000002120cc #4 [c000000004d479f0] napi_disable at c000000000a06448 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ #5 [c000000004d47a30] bnx2x_netif_stop at c0080000018dba94 [bnx2x] #6 [c000000004d47a60] bnx2x_io_slot_reset at c0080000018a551c [bnx2x] #7 [c000000004d47b20] eeh_report_reset at c00000000004c9bc #8 [c000000004d47b90] eeh_pe_report at c00000000004d1a8 #9 [c000000004d47c40] eeh_handle_normal_event at c00000000004da64 And the sleeping source code ============================ crash> dis -ls c000000000a06448 FILE: ../net/core/dev.c LINE: 6702 6697 { 6698 might_sleep(); 6699 set_bit(NAPI_STATE_DISABLE, &n->state); 6700 6701 while (test_and_set_bit(NAPI_STATE_SCHED, &n->state)) * 6702 msleep(1); 6703 while (test_and_set_bit(NAPI_STATE_NPSVC, &n->state)) 6704 msleep(1); 6705 6706 hrtimer_cancel(&n->timer); 6707 6708 clear_bit(NAPI_STATE_DISABLE, &n->state); 6709 } EEH calls into bnx2x twice based on the system log above, first through bnx2x_io_error_detected() and then bnx2x_io_slot_reset(), and executes the following call chains: bnx2x_io_error_detected() +-> bnx2x_eeh_nic_unload() +-> bnx2x_del_all_napi() +-> __netif_napi_del() bnx2x_io_slot_reset() +-> bnx2x_netif_stop() +-> bnx2x_napi_disable() +->napi_disable() Fix this by correcting the sequence of NAPI APIs usage, that is delete the NAPI after disabling it. Fixes: 7fa6f34 ("bnx2x: AER revised") Reported-by: David Christensen <[email protected]> Tested-by: David Christensen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Manish Chopra <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ariel Elior <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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This fixes the following error caused by a race condition between phydev->adjust_link() and a MDIO transaction in the phy interrupt handler. The issue was reproduced with the ethernet FEC driver and a micrel KSZ9031 phy. [ 146.195696] fec 2188000.ethernet eth0: MDIO read timeout [ 146.201779] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 146.206671] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 571 at drivers/net/phy/phy.c:942 phy_error+0x24/0x6c [ 146.214744] Modules linked in: bnep imx_vdoa imx_sdma evbug [ 146.220640] CPU: 0 PID: 571 Comm: irq/128-2188000 Not tainted 5.18.0-rc3-00080-gd569e86915b7 #9 [ 146.229563] Hardware name: Freescale i.MX6 Quad/DualLite (Device Tree) [ 146.236257] unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x10/0x14 [ 146.241640] show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x58/0x70 [ 146.246841] dump_stack_lvl from __warn+0xb4/0x24c [ 146.251772] __warn from warn_slowpath_fmt+0x5c/0xd4 [ 146.256873] warn_slowpath_fmt from phy_error+0x24/0x6c [ 146.262249] phy_error from kszphy_handle_interrupt+0x40/0x48 [ 146.268159] kszphy_handle_interrupt from irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x78 [ 146.274417] irq_thread_fn from irq_thread+0xf0/0x1dc [ 146.279605] irq_thread from kthread+0xe4/0x104 [ 146.284267] kthread from ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28 [ 146.289164] Exception stack(0xe6fa1fb0 to 0xe6fa1ff8) [ 146.294448] 1fa0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 146.302842] 1fc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 146.311281] 1fe0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000013 00000000 [ 146.318262] irq event stamp: 12325 [ 146.321780] hardirqs last enabled at (12333): [<c01984c4>] __up_console_sem+0x50/0x60 [ 146.330013] hardirqs last disabled at (12342): [<c01984b0>] __up_console_sem+0x3c/0x60 [ 146.338259] softirqs last enabled at (12324): [<c01017f0>] __do_softirq+0x2c0/0x624 [ 146.346311] softirqs last disabled at (12319): [<c01300ac>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x138/0x178 [ 146.354447] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- With the FEC driver phydev->adjust_link() calls fec_enet_adjust_link() calls fec_stop()/fec_restart() and both these function reset and temporary disable the FEC disrupting any MII transaction that could be happening at the same time. fec_enet_adjust_link() and phy_read() can be running at the same time when we have one additional interrupt before the phy_state_machine() is able to terminate. Thread 1 (phylib WQ) | Thread 2 (phy interrupt) | | phy_interrupt() <-- PHY IRQ | handle_interrupt() | phy_read() | phy_trigger_machine() | --> schedule phylib WQ | | phy_state_machine() | phy_check_link_status() | phy_link_change() | phydev->adjust_link() | fec_enet_adjust_link() | --> FEC reset | phy_interrupt() <-- PHY IRQ | phy_read() | Fix this by acquiring the phydev lock in phy_interrupt(). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Fixes: c974bdb ("net: phy: Use threaded IRQ, to allow IRQ from sleeping devices") cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Francesco Dolcini <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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Add bpf trampoline support for arm64. Most of the logic is the same as x86. Tested on raspberry pi 4b and qemu with KASLR disabled (avoid long jump), result: #9 /1 bpf_cookie/kprobe:OK #9 /2 bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_link_api:FAIL #9 /3 bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_attach_api:FAIL #9 /4 bpf_cookie/uprobe:OK #9 /5 bpf_cookie/tracepoint:OK #9 /6 bpf_cookie/perf_event:OK #9 /7 bpf_cookie/trampoline:OK #9 /8 bpf_cookie/lsm:OK #9 bpf_cookie:FAIL #18 /1 bpf_tcp_ca/dctcp:OK #18 /2 bpf_tcp_ca/cubic:OK #18 /3 bpf_tcp_ca/invalid_license:OK #18 /4 bpf_tcp_ca/dctcp_fallback:OK #18 /5 bpf_tcp_ca/rel_setsockopt:OK #18 bpf_tcp_ca:OK #51 /1 dummy_st_ops/dummy_st_ops_attach:OK #51 /2 dummy_st_ops/dummy_init_ret_value:OK #51 /3 dummy_st_ops/dummy_init_ptr_arg:OK #51 /4 dummy_st_ops/dummy_multiple_args:OK #51 dummy_st_ops:OK #55 fentry_fexit:OK #56 fentry_test:OK #57 /1 fexit_bpf2bpf/target_no_callees:OK #57 /2 fexit_bpf2bpf/target_yes_callees:OK #57 /3 fexit_bpf2bpf/func_replace:OK #57 /4 fexit_bpf2bpf/func_replace_verify:OK #57 /5 fexit_bpf2bpf/func_sockmap_update:OK #57 /6 fexit_bpf2bpf/func_replace_return_code:OK #57 /7 fexit_bpf2bpf/func_map_prog_compatibility:OK #57 /8 fexit_bpf2bpf/func_replace_multi:OK #57 /9 fexit_bpf2bpf/fmod_ret_freplace:OK #57 fexit_bpf2bpf:OK #58 fexit_sleep:OK #59 fexit_stress:OK #60 fexit_test:OK #67 get_func_args_test:OK #68 get_func_ip_test:OK #104 modify_return:OK #237 xdp_bpf2bpf:OK bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_link_api and bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_attach_api failed due to lack of multi_kprobe on arm64. Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <[email protected]> Acked-by: Song Liu <[email protected]>
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Add bpf trampoline support for arm64. Most of the logic is the same as x86. Tested on raspberry pi 4b and qemu with KASLR disabled (avoid long jump), result: #9 /1 bpf_cookie/kprobe:OK #9 /2 bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_link_api:FAIL #9 /3 bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_attach_api:FAIL #9 /4 bpf_cookie/uprobe:OK #9 /5 bpf_cookie/tracepoint:OK #9 /6 bpf_cookie/perf_event:OK #9 /7 bpf_cookie/trampoline:OK #9 /8 bpf_cookie/lsm:OK #9 bpf_cookie:FAIL #18 /1 bpf_tcp_ca/dctcp:OK #18 /2 bpf_tcp_ca/cubic:OK #18 /3 bpf_tcp_ca/invalid_license:OK #18 /4 bpf_tcp_ca/dctcp_fallback:OK #18 /5 bpf_tcp_ca/rel_setsockopt:OK #18 bpf_tcp_ca:OK #51 /1 dummy_st_ops/dummy_st_ops_attach:OK #51 /2 dummy_st_ops/dummy_init_ret_value:OK #51 /3 dummy_st_ops/dummy_init_ptr_arg:OK #51 /4 dummy_st_ops/dummy_multiple_args:OK #51 dummy_st_ops:OK #55 fentry_fexit:OK #56 fentry_test:OK #57 /1 fexit_bpf2bpf/target_no_callees:OK #57 /2 fexit_bpf2bpf/target_yes_callees:OK #57 /3 fexit_bpf2bpf/func_replace:OK #57 /4 fexit_bpf2bpf/func_replace_verify:OK #57 /5 fexit_bpf2bpf/func_sockmap_update:OK #57 /6 fexit_bpf2bpf/func_replace_return_code:OK #57 /7 fexit_bpf2bpf/func_map_prog_compatibility:OK #57 /8 fexit_bpf2bpf/func_replace_multi:OK #57 /9 fexit_bpf2bpf/fmod_ret_freplace:OK #57 fexit_bpf2bpf:OK #58 fexit_sleep:OK #59 fexit_stress:OK #60 fexit_test:OK #67 get_func_args_test:OK #68 get_func_ip_test:OK #104 modify_return:OK #237 xdp_bpf2bpf:OK bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_link_api and bpf_cookie/multi_kprobe_attach_api failed due to lack of multi_kprobe on arm64. Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <[email protected]> Acked-by: Song Liu <[email protected]>
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Ido Schimmel says: ==================== net: fib_rules: Add flow label selector support In some deployments users would like to encode path information into certain bits of the IPv6 flow label, the UDP source port and the DSCP and use this information to route packets accordingly. Redirecting traffic to a routing table based on the flow label is not currently possible with Linux as FIB rules cannot match on it despite the flow label being available in the IPv6 flow key. This patchset extends FIB rules to match on the flow label with a mask. Future patches will add mask attributes to L4 ports and DSCP matches. Patches #1-#5 gradually extend FIB rules to match on the flow label. Patches #6-#7 allow user space to specify a flow label in route get requests. This is useful for both debugging and testing. Patch #8 adjusts the fib6_table_lookup tracepoint to print the flow label to the trace buffer for better observability. Patch #9 extends the FIB rule selftest with flow label test cases while utilizing the route get functionality from patch #6. ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
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Daniel Machon says:
====================
net: lan969x: add RGMII support
== Description:
This series is the fourth of a multi-part series, that prepares and adds
support for the new lan969x switch driver.
The upstreaming efforts is split into multiple series (might change a
bit as we go along):
1) Prepare the Sparx5 driver for lan969x (merged)
2) Add support for lan969x (same basic features as Sparx5
provides excl. FDMA and VCAP, merged).
3) Add lan969x VCAP functionality (merged).
--> 4) Add RGMII support.
5) Add FDMA support.
== RGMII support:
The lan969x switch device includes two RGMII port interfaces (port 28
and 29) supporting data speeds of 1 Gbps, 100 Mbps and 10 Mbps.
== Patch breakdown:
Patch #1 does some preparation work.
Patch #2 adds new function: is_port_rgmii() to the match data ops.
Patch #3 uses the is_port_rgmii() in a number of places.
Patch #4 makes sure that we do not configure an RGMII device as a
low-speed device, when doing a port config.
Patch #5 makes sure we only return the PCS if the port mode requires
it.
Patch #6 adds checks for RGMII PHY modes in sparx5_verify_speeds().
Patch #7 adds registers required to configure RGMII.
Patch #8 adds RGMII implementation.
Patch #9 documents RGMII delays in the dt-bindings.
Details are in the commit description of the individual patches
v4: https://lore.kernel.org/20241213-sparx5-lan969x-switch-driver-4-v4-0-d1a72c9c4714@microchip.com
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/20241118-sparx5-lan969x-switch-driver-4-v3-0-3cefee5e7e3a@microchip.com
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/20241113-sparx5-lan969x-switch-driver-4-v2-0-0db98ac096d1@microchip.com
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/20241106-sparx5-lan969x-switch-driver-4-v1-0-f7f7316436bd@microchip.com
====================
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241220-sparx5-lan969x-switch-driver-4-v5-0-fa8ba5dff732@microchip.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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libtraceevent parses and returns an array of argument fields, sometimes
larger than RAW_SYSCALL_ARGS_NUM (6) because it includes "__syscall_nr",
idx will traverse to index 6 (7th element) whereas sc->fmt->arg holds 6
elements max, creating an out-of-bounds access. This runtime error is
found by UBsan. The error message:
$ sudo UBSAN_OPTIONS=print_stacktrace=1 ./perf trace -a --max-events=1
builtin-trace.c:1966:35: runtime error: index 6 out of bounds for type 'syscall_arg_fmt [6]'
#0 0x5c04956be5fe in syscall__alloc_arg_fmts /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:1966
#1 0x5c04956c0510 in trace__read_syscall_info /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:2110
#2 0x5c04956c372b in trace__syscall_info /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:2436
#3 0x5c04956d2f39 in trace__init_syscalls_bpf_prog_array_maps /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3897
#4 0x5c04956d6d25 in trace__run /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:4335
#5 0x5c04956e112e in cmd_trace /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:5502
#6 0x5c04956eda7d in run_builtin /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:351
#7 0x5c04956ee0a8 in handle_internal_command /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:404
#8 0x5c04956ee37f in run_argv /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:448
#9 0x5c04956ee8e9 in main /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:556
#10 0x79eb3622a3b7 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
#11 0x79eb3622a47a in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360
#12 0x5c04955422d4 in _start (/home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf+0x4e02d4) (BuildId: 5b6cab2d59e96a4341741765ad6914a4d784dbc6)
0.000 ( 0.014 ms): Chrome_ChildIO/117244 write(fd: 238, buf: !, count: 1) = 1
Fixes: 5e58fcf ("perf trace: Allow allocating sc->arg_fmt even without the syscall tracepoint")
Signed-off-by: Howard Chu <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
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Feb 3, 2025
This fixes the following hard lockup in isolate_lru_folios() during memory reclaim. If the LRU mostly contains ineligible folios this may trigger watchdog. watchdog: Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 173 RIP: 0010:native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x255/0x2a0 Call Trace: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x31/0x40 folio_lruvec_lock_irqsave+0x5f/0x90 folio_batch_move_lru+0x91/0x150 lru_add_drain_per_cpu+0x1c/0x40 process_one_work+0x17d/0x350 worker_thread+0x27b/0x3a0 kthread+0xe8/0x120 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 lruvec->lru_lock owner: PID: 2865 TASK: ffff888139214d40 CPU: 40 COMMAND: "kswapd0" #0 [fffffe0000945e60] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffffa567a555 #1 [fffffe0000945e68] nmi_handle at ffffffffa563b171 #2 [fffffe0000945eb0] default_do_nmi at ffffffffa6575920 #3 [fffffe0000945ed0] exc_nmi at ffffffffa6575af4 #4 [fffffe0000945ef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffffa6601dde [exception RIP: isolate_lru_folios+403] RIP: ffffffffa597df53 RSP: ffffc90006fb7c28 RFLAGS: 00000002 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffffc90006fb7c60 RCX: ffffea04a2196f88 RDX: ffffc90006fb7c60 RSI: ffffc90006fb7c60 RDI: ffffea04a2197048 RBP: ffff88812cbd3010 R8: ffffea04a2197008 R9: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffea04a2197008 R13: ffffea04a2197048 R14: ffffc90006fb7de8 R15: 0000000003e3e937 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 <NMI exception stack> #5 [ffffc90006fb7c28] isolate_lru_folios at ffffffffa597df53 #6 [ffffc90006fb7cf8] shrink_active_list at ffffffffa597f788 #7 [ffffc90006fb7da8] balance_pgdat at ffffffffa5986db0 #8 [ffffc90006fb7ec0] kswapd at ffffffffa5987354 #9 [ffffc90006fb7ef8] kthread at ffffffffa5748238 crash> Scenario: User processe are requesting a large amount of memory and keep page active. Then a module continuously requests memory from ZONE_DMA32 area. Memory reclaim will be triggered due to ZONE_DMA32 watermark alarm reached. However pages in the LRU(active_anon) list are mostly from the ZONE_NORMAL area. Reproduce: Terminal 1: Construct to continuously increase pages active(anon). mkdir /tmp/memory mount -t tmpfs -o size=1024000M tmpfs /tmp/memory dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/memory/block bs=4M tail /tmp/memory/block Terminal 2: vmstat -a 1 active will increase. procs ---memory--- ---swap-- ---io---- -system-- ---cpu--- ... r b swpd free inact active si so bi bo 1 0 0 1445623076 45898836 83646008 0 0 0 1 0 0 1445623076 43450228 86094616 0 0 0 1 0 0 1445623076 41003480 88541364 0 0 0 1 0 0 1445623076 38557088 90987756 0 0 0 1 0 0 1445623076 36109688 93435156 0 0 0 1 0 0 1445619552 33663256 95881632 0 0 0 1 0 0 1445619804 31217140 98327792 0 0 0 1 0 0 1445619804 28769988 100774944 0 0 0 1 0 0 1445619804 26322348 103222584 0 0 0 1 0 0 1445619804 23875592 105669340 0 0 0 cat /proc/meminfo | head Active(anon) increase. MemTotal: 1579941036 kB MemFree: 1445618500 kB MemAvailable: 1453013224 kB Buffers: 6516 kB Cached: 128653956 kB SwapCached: 0 kB Active: 118110812 kB Inactive: 11436620 kB Active(anon): 115345744 kB Inactive(anon): 945292 kB When the Active(anon) is 115345744 kB, insmod module triggers the ZONE_DMA32 watermark. perf record -e vmscan:mm_vmscan_lru_isolate -aR perf script isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=1 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=2 nr_skipped=2 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=1 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=0 nr_skipped=0 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=0 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=28835844 nr_skipped=28835844 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=1 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=28835844 nr_skipped=28835844 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=0 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=29 nr_skipped=29 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=0 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=0 nr_skipped=0 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon See nr_scanned=28835844. 28835844 * 4k = 115343376KB approximately equal to 115345744 kB. If increase Active(anon) to 1000G then insmod module triggers the ZONE_DMA32 watermark. hard lockup will occur. In my device nr_scanned = 0000000003e3e937 when hard lockup. Convert to memory size 0x0000000003e3e937 * 4KB = 261072092 KB. [ffffc90006fb7c28] isolate_lru_folios at ffffffffa597df53 ffffc90006fb7c30: 0000000000000020 0000000000000000 ffffc90006fb7c40: ffffc90006fb7d40 ffff88812cbd3000 ffffc90006fb7c50: ffffc90006fb7d30 0000000106fb7de8 ffffc90006fb7c60: ffffea04a2197008 ffffea0006ed4a48 ffffc90006fb7c70: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffc90006fb7c80: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffc90006fb7c90: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffc90006fb7ca0: 0000000000000000 0000000003e3e937 ffffc90006fb7cb0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffc90006fb7cc0: 8d7c0b56b7874b00 ffff88812cbd3000 About the Fixes: Why did it take eight years to be discovered? The problem requires the following conditions to occur: 1. The device memory should be large enough. 2. Pages in the LRU(active_anon) list are mostly from the ZONE_NORMAL area. 3. The memory in ZONE_DMA32 needs to reach the watermark. If the memory is not large enough, or if the usage design of ZONE_DMA32 area memory is reasonable, this problem is difficult to detect. notes: The problem is most likely to occur in ZONE_DMA32 and ZONE_NORMAL, but other suitable scenarios may also trigger the problem. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: b2e1875 ("mm, vmscan: begin reclaiming pages on a per-node basis") Signed-off-by: liuye <[email protected]> Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]> Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]> Cc: Yang Shi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
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The bnxt_queue_mem_alloc() is called to allocate new queue memory when a queue is restarted. It internally accesses rx buffer descriptor corresponding to the index. The rx buffer descriptor is allocated and set when the interface is up and it's freed when the interface is down. So, if queue is restarted if interface is down, kernel panic occurs. Splat looks like: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 000000000000b240 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 1563 Comm: ncdevmem2 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc2+ #9 844ddba6e7c459cafd0bf4db9a3198e Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME Z690-P D4, BIOS 0603 11/01/2021 RIP: 0010:bnxt_queue_mem_alloc+0x3f/0x4e0 [bnxt_en] Code: 41 54 4d 89 c4 4d 69 c0 c0 05 00 00 55 48 89 f5 53 48 89 fb 4c 8d b5 40 05 00 00 48 83 ec 15 RSP: 0018:ffff9dcc83fef9e8 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: ffffffffc0457720 RBX: ffff934ed8d40000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 000000000000001f RSI: ffff934ea508f800 RDI: ffff934ea508f808 RBP: ffff934ea508f800 R08: 000000000000b240 R09: ffff934e84f4b000 R10: ffff9dcc83fefa30 R11: ffff934e84f4b000 R12: 000000000000001f R13: ffff934ed8d40ac0 R14: ffff934ea508fd40 R15: ffff934e84f4b000 FS: 00007fa73888c740(0000) GS:ffff93559f780000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000000000b240 CR3: 0000000145a2e000 CR4: 00000000007506f0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x20/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x15a/0x460 ? exc_page_fault+0x6e/0x180 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? __pfx_bnxt_queue_mem_alloc+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_en 7f85e76f4d724ba07471d7e39d9e773aea6597b7] ? bnxt_queue_mem_alloc+0x3f/0x4e0 [bnxt_en 7f85e76f4d724ba07471d7e39d9e773aea6597b7] netdev_rx_queue_restart+0xc5/0x240 net_devmem_bind_dmabuf_to_queue+0xf8/0x200 netdev_nl_bind_rx_doit+0x3a7/0x450 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd9/0x130 genl_rcv_msg+0x184/0x2b0 ? __pfx_netdev_nl_bind_rx_doit+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_genl_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 ... Reviewed-by: Somnath Kotur <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Fixes: 2d694c2 ("bnxt_en: implement netdev_queue_mgmt_ops") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Mina Almasry <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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Chia-Yu Chang says: ==================== AccECN protocol preparation patch series Please find the v7 v7 (03-Mar-2025) - Move 2 new patches added in v6 to the next AccECN patch series v6 (27-Dec-2024) - Avoid removing removing the potential CA_ACK_WIN_UPDATE in ack_ev_flags of patch #1 (Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>) - Add reviewed-by tag in patches #2, #3, #4, #5, #6, #7, #8, #12, #14 - Foloiwng 2 new pathces are added after patch #9 (Patch that adds SKB_GSO_TCP_ACCECN) * New patch #10 to replace exisiting SKB_GSO_TCP_ECN with SKB_GSO_TCP_ACCECN in the driver to avoid CWR flag corruption * New patch #11 adds AccECN for virtio by adding new negotiation flag (VIRTIO_NET_F_HOST/GUEST_ACCECN) in feature handshake and translating Accurate ECN GSO flag between virtio_net_hdr (VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_ACCECN) and skb header (SKB_GSO_TCP_ACCECN) - Add detailed changelog and comments in #13 (Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>) - Move patch #14 to the next AccECN patch series (Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>) v5 (5-Nov-2024) - Add helper function "tcp_flags_ntohs" to preserve last 2 bytes of TCP flags of patch #4 (Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>) - Fix reverse X-max tree order of patches #4, #11 (Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>) - Rename variable "delta" as "timestamp_delta" of patch #2 fo clariety - Remove patch #14 in this series (Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>, Joel Granados <[email protected]>) v4 (21-Oct-2024) - Fix line length warning of patches #2, #4, #8, #10, #11, #14 - Fix spaces preferred around '|' (ctx:VxV) warning of patch #7 - Add missing CC'ed of patches #4, #12, #14 v3 (19-Oct-2024) - Fix build error in v2 v2 (18-Oct-2024) - Fix warning caused by NETIF_F_GSO_ACCECN_BIT in patch #9 (Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>) The full patch series can be found in https://github.com/L4STeam/linux-net-next/commits/upstream_l4steam/ The Accurate ECN draft can be found in https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-28 ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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perf test 11 hwmon fails on s390 with this error
# ./perf test -Fv 11
--- start ---
---- end ----
11.1: Basic parsing test : Ok
--- start ---
Testing 'temp_test_hwmon_event1'
Using CPUID IBM,3931,704,A01,3.7,002f
temp_test_hwmon_event1 -> hwmon_a_test_hwmon_pmu/temp_test_hwmon_event1/
FAILED tests/hwmon_pmu.c:189 Unexpected config for
'temp_test_hwmon_event1', 292470092988416 != 655361
---- end ----
11.2: Parsing without PMU name : FAILED!
--- start ---
Testing 'hwmon_a_test_hwmon_pmu/temp_test_hwmon_event1/'
FAILED tests/hwmon_pmu.c:189 Unexpected config for
'hwmon_a_test_hwmon_pmu/temp_test_hwmon_event1/',
292470092988416 != 655361
---- end ----
11.3: Parsing with PMU name : FAILED!
#
The root cause is in member test_event::config which is initialized
to 0xA0001 or 655361. During event parsing a long list event parsing
functions are called and end up with this gdb call stack:
#0 hwmon_pmu__config_term (hwm=0x168dfd0, attr=0x3ffffff5ee8,
term=0x168db60, err=0x3ffffff81c8) at util/hwmon_pmu.c:623
#1 hwmon_pmu__config_terms (pmu=0x168dfd0, attr=0x3ffffff5ee8,
terms=0x3ffffff5ea8, err=0x3ffffff81c8) at util/hwmon_pmu.c:662
#2 0x00000000012f870c in perf_pmu__config_terms (pmu=0x168dfd0,
attr=0x3ffffff5ee8, terms=0x3ffffff5ea8, zero=false,
apply_hardcoded=false, err=0x3ffffff81c8) at util/pmu.c:1519
#3 0x00000000012f88a4 in perf_pmu__config (pmu=0x168dfd0, attr=0x3ffffff5ee8,
head_terms=0x3ffffff5ea8, apply_hardcoded=false, err=0x3ffffff81c8)
at util/pmu.c:1545
#4 0x00000000012680c4 in parse_events_add_pmu (parse_state=0x3ffffff7fb8,
list=0x168dc00, pmu=0x168dfd0, const_parsed_terms=0x3ffffff6090,
auto_merge_stats=true, alternate_hw_config=10)
at util/parse-events.c:1508
#5 0x00000000012684c6 in parse_events_multi_pmu_add (parse_state=0x3ffffff7fb8,
event_name=0x168ec10 "temp_test_hwmon_event1", hw_config=10,
const_parsed_terms=0x0, listp=0x3ffffff6230, loc_=0x3ffffff70e0)
at util/parse-events.c:1592
#6 0x00000000012f0e4e in parse_events_parse (_parse_state=0x3ffffff7fb8,
scanner=0x16878c0) at util/parse-events.y:293
#7 0x00000000012695a0 in parse_events__scanner (str=0x3ffffff81d8
"temp_test_hwmon_event1", input=0x0, parse_state=0x3ffffff7fb8)
at util/parse-events.c:1867
#8 0x000000000126a1e8 in __parse_events (evlist=0x168b580,
str=0x3ffffff81d8 "temp_test_hwmon_event1", pmu_filter=0x0,
err=0x3ffffff81c8, fake_pmu=false, warn_if_reordered=true,
fake_tp=false) at util/parse-events.c:2136
#9 0x00000000011e36aa in parse_events (evlist=0x168b580,
str=0x3ffffff81d8 "temp_test_hwmon_event1", err=0x3ffffff81c8)
at /root/linux/tools/perf/util/parse-events.h:41
#10 0x00000000011e3e64 in do_test (i=0, with_pmu=false, with_alias=false)
at tests/hwmon_pmu.c:164
#11 0x00000000011e422c in test__hwmon_pmu (with_pmu=false)
at tests/hwmon_pmu.c:219
#12 0x00000000011e431c in test__hwmon_pmu_without_pmu (test=0x1610368
<suite.hwmon_pmu>, subtest=1) at tests/hwmon_pmu.c:23
where the attr::config is set to value 292470092988416 or 0x10a0000000000
in line 625 of file ./util/hwmon_pmu.c:
attr->config = key.type_and_num;
However member key::type_and_num is defined as union and bit field:
union hwmon_pmu_event_key {
long type_and_num;
struct {
int num :16;
enum hwmon_type type :8;
};
};
s390 is big endian and Intel is little endian architecture.
The events for the hwmon dummy pmu have num = 1 or num = 2 and
type is set to HWMON_TYPE_TEMP (which is 10).
On s390 this assignes member key::type_and_num the value of
0x10a0000000000 (which is 292470092988416) as shown in above
trace output.
Fix this and export the structure/union hwmon_pmu_event_key
so the test shares the same implementation as the event parsing
functions for union and bit fields. This should avoid
endianess issues on all platforms.
Output after:
# ./perf test -F 11
11.1: Basic parsing test : Ok
11.2: Parsing without PMU name : Ok
11.3: Parsing with PMU name : Ok
#
Fixes: 531ee0f ("perf test: Add hwmon "PMU" test")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Richter <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
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Ian told me that there are many memory leaks in the hierarchy mode. I
can easily reproduce it with the follwing command.
$ make DEBUG=1 EXTRA_CFLAGS=-fsanitize=leak
$ perf record --latency -g -- ./perf test -w thloop
$ perf report -H --stdio
...
Indirect leak of 168 byte(s) in 21 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7f3414c16c65 in malloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:75
#1 0x55ed3602346e in map__get util/map.h:189
#2 0x55ed36024cc4 in hist_entry__init util/hist.c:476
#3 0x55ed36025208 in hist_entry__new util/hist.c:588
#4 0x55ed36027c05 in hierarchy_insert_entry util/hist.c:1587
#5 0x55ed36027e2e in hists__hierarchy_insert_entry util/hist.c:1638
#6 0x55ed36027fa4 in hists__collapse_insert_entry util/hist.c:1685
#7 0x55ed360283e8 in hists__collapse_resort util/hist.c:1776
#8 0x55ed35de0323 in report__collapse_hists /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/builtin-report.c:735
#9 0x55ed35de15b4 in __cmd_report /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1119
#10 0x55ed35de43dc in cmd_report /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1867
#11 0x55ed35e66767 in run_builtin /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:351
#12 0x55ed35e66a0e in handle_internal_command /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:404
#13 0x55ed35e66b67 in run_argv /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:448
#14 0x55ed35e66eb0 in main /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:556
#15 0x7f340ac33d67 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
...
$ perf report -H --stdio 2>&1 | grep -c '^Indirect leak'
93
I found that hist_entry__delete() missed to release child entries in the
hierarchy tree (hroot_{in,out}). It needs to iterate the child entries
and call hist_entry__delete() recursively.
After this change:
$ perf report -H --stdio 2>&1 | grep -c '^Indirect leak'
0
Reported-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Tested-by Thomas Falcon <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
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The env.pmu_mapping can be leaked when it reads data from a pipe on AMD.
For a pipe data, it reads the header data including pmu_mapping from
PERF_RECORD_HEADER_FEATURE runtime. But it's already set in:
perf_session__new()
__perf_session__new()
evlist__init_trace_event_sample_raw()
evlist__has_amd_ibs()
perf_env__nr_pmu_mappings()
Then it'll overwrite that when it processes the HEADER_FEATURE record.
Here's a report from address sanitizer.
Direct leak of 2689 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7fed8f814596 in realloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:98
#1 0x5595a7d416b1 in strbuf_grow util/strbuf.c:64
#2 0x5595a7d414ef in strbuf_init util/strbuf.c:25
#3 0x5595a7d0f4b7 in perf_env__read_pmu_mappings util/env.c:362
#4 0x5595a7d12ab7 in perf_env__nr_pmu_mappings util/env.c:517
#5 0x5595a7d89d2f in evlist__has_amd_ibs util/amd-sample-raw.c:315
#6 0x5595a7d87fb2 in evlist__init_trace_event_sample_raw util/sample-raw.c:23
#7 0x5595a7d7f893 in __perf_session__new util/session.c:179
#8 0x5595a7b79572 in perf_session__new util/session.h:115
#9 0x5595a7b7e9dc in cmd_report builtin-report.c:1603
#10 0x5595a7c019eb in run_builtin perf.c:351
#11 0x5595a7c01c92 in handle_internal_command perf.c:404
#12 0x5595a7c01deb in run_argv perf.c:448
#13 0x5595a7c02134 in main perf.c:556
#14 0x7fed85833d67 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
Let's free the existing pmu_mapping data if any.
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
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When a bio with REQ_PREFLUSH is submitted to dm, __send_empty_flush()
generates a flush_bio with REQ_OP_WRITE | REQ_PREFLUSH | REQ_SYNC,
which causes the flush_bio to be throttled by wbt_wait().
An example from v5.4, similar problem also exists in upstream:
crash> bt 2091206
PID: 2091206 TASK: ffff2050df92a300 CPU: 109 COMMAND: "kworker/u260:0"
#0 [ffff800084a2f7f0] __switch_to at ffff80004008aeb8
#1 [ffff800084a2f820] __schedule at ffff800040bfa0c4
#2 [ffff800084a2f880] schedule at ffff800040bfa4b4
#3 [ffff800084a2f8a0] io_schedule at ffff800040bfa9c4
#4 [ffff800084a2f8c0] rq_qos_wait at ffff8000405925bc
#5 [ffff800084a2f940] wbt_wait at ffff8000405bb3a0
#6 [ffff800084a2f9a0] __rq_qos_throttle at ffff800040592254
#7 [ffff800084a2f9c0] blk_mq_make_request at ffff80004057cf38
#8 [ffff800084a2fa60] generic_make_request at ffff800040570138
#9 [ffff800084a2fae0] submit_bio at ffff8000405703b4
#10 [ffff800084a2fb50] xlog_write_iclog at ffff800001280834 [xfs]
#11 [ffff800084a2fbb0] xlog_sync at ffff800001280c3c [xfs]
#12 [ffff800084a2fbf0] xlog_state_release_iclog at ffff800001280df4 [xfs]
#13 [ffff800084a2fc10] xlog_write at ffff80000128203c [xfs]
#14 [ffff800084a2fcd0] xlog_cil_push at ffff8000012846dc [xfs]
#15 [ffff800084a2fda0] xlog_cil_push_work at ffff800001284a2c [xfs]
#16 [ffff800084a2fdb0] process_one_work at ffff800040111d08
#17 [ffff800084a2fe00] worker_thread at ffff8000401121cc
#18 [ffff800084a2fe70] kthread at ffff800040118de4
After commit 2def284 ("xfs: don't allow log IO to be throttled"),
the metadata submitted by xlog_write_iclog() should not be throttled.
But due to the existence of the dm layer, throttling flush_bio indirectly
causes the metadata bio to be throttled.
Fix this by conditionally adding REQ_IDLE to flush_bio.bi_opf, which makes
wbt_should_throttle() return false to avoid wbt_wait().
Signed-off-by: Jinliang Zheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tianxiang Peng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hao Peng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>
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Apr 10, 2025
As reported by CVE-2025-29481 [1], it is possible to corrupt a BPF ELF file such that arbitrary BPF instructions are loaded by libbpf. This can be done by setting a symbol (BPF program) section offset to a large (unsigned) number such that <section start + symbol offset> overflows and points before the section data in the memory. Consider the situation below where: - prog_start = sec_start + symbol_offset <-- size_t overflow here - prog_end = prog_start + prog_size prog_start sec_start prog_end sec_end | | | | v v v v .....................|################################|............ The CVE report in [1] also provides a corrupted BPF ELF which can be used as a reproducer: $ readelf -S crash Section Headers: [Nr] Name Type Address Offset Size EntSize Flags Link Info Align ... [ 2] uretprobe.mu[...] PROGBITS 0000000000000000 00000040 0000000000000068 0000000000000000 AX 0 0 8 $ readelf -s crash Symbol table '.symtab' contains 8 entries: Num: Value Size Type Bind Vis Ndx Name ... 6: ffffffffffffffb8 104 FUNC GLOBAL DEFAULT 2 handle_tp Here, the handle_tp prog has section offset ffffffffffffffb8, i.e. will point before the actual memory where section 2 is allocated. This is also reported by AddressSanitizer: ================================================================= ==1232==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7c7302fe0000 at pc 0x7fc3046e4b77 bp 0x7ffe64677cd0 sp 0x7ffe64677490 READ of size 104 at 0x7c7302fe0000 thread T0 #0 0x7fc3046e4b76 in memcpy (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe4b76) #1 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__init_prog /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:856 #2 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__add_programs /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:928 #3 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__elf_collect /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3930 #4 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object_open /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8067 #5 0x00000040f176 in bpf_object__open_file /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8090 #6 0x000000400c16 in main /poc/poc.c:8 #7 0x7fc3043d25b4 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x35b4) #8 0x7fc3043d2667 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3667) #9 0x000000400b34 in _start (/poc/poc+0x400b34) 0x7c7302fe0000 is located 64 bytes before 104-byte region [0x7c7302fe0040,0x7c7302fe00a8) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fc3046e716b in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe716b) #1 0x7fc3045ee600 in __libelf_set_rawdata_wrlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xb600) #2 0x7fc3045ef018 in __elf_getdata_rdlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xc018) #3 0x00000040642f in elf_sec_data /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3740 The problem here is that currently, libbpf only checks that the program end is within the section bounds. There used to be a check `while (sec_off < sec_sz)` in bpf_object__add_programs, however, it was removed by commit 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions"). Put the above condition back to bpf_object__init_prog to make sure that the program start is also within the bounds of the section to avoid the potential buffer overflow. [1] https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md Reported-by: lmarch2 <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Fixes: 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions") Link: https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md Link: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-29481 Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <[email protected]>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf-rc bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
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Apr 10, 2025
As reported by CVE-2025-29481 [1], it is possible to corrupt a BPF ELF file such that arbitrary BPF instructions are loaded by libbpf. This can be done by setting a symbol (BPF program) section offset to a large (unsigned) number such that <section start + symbol offset> overflows and points before the section data in the memory. Consider the situation below where: - prog_start = sec_start + symbol_offset <-- size_t overflow here - prog_end = prog_start + prog_size prog_start sec_start prog_end sec_end | | | | v v v v .....................|################################|............ The CVE report in [1] also provides a corrupted BPF ELF which can be used as a reproducer: $ readelf -S crash Section Headers: [Nr] Name Type Address Offset Size EntSize Flags Link Info Align ... [ 2] uretprobe.mu[...] PROGBITS 0000000000000000 00000040 0000000000000068 0000000000000000 AX 0 0 8 $ readelf -s crash Symbol table '.symtab' contains 8 entries: Num: Value Size Type Bind Vis Ndx Name ... 6: ffffffffffffffb8 104 FUNC GLOBAL DEFAULT 2 handle_tp Here, the handle_tp prog has section offset ffffffffffffffb8, i.e. will point before the actual memory where section 2 is allocated. This is also reported by AddressSanitizer: ================================================================= ==1232==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7c7302fe0000 at pc 0x7fc3046e4b77 bp 0x7ffe64677cd0 sp 0x7ffe64677490 READ of size 104 at 0x7c7302fe0000 thread T0 #0 0x7fc3046e4b76 in memcpy (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe4b76) #1 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__init_prog /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:856 #2 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__add_programs /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:928 #3 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__elf_collect /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3930 #4 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object_open /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8067 #5 0x00000040f176 in bpf_object__open_file /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8090 #6 0x000000400c16 in main /poc/poc.c:8 #7 0x7fc3043d25b4 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x35b4) #8 0x7fc3043d2667 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3667) #9 0x000000400b34 in _start (/poc/poc+0x400b34) 0x7c7302fe0000 is located 64 bytes before 104-byte region [0x7c7302fe0040,0x7c7302fe00a8) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fc3046e716b in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe716b) #1 0x7fc3045ee600 in __libelf_set_rawdata_wrlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xb600) #2 0x7fc3045ef018 in __elf_getdata_rdlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xc018) #3 0x00000040642f in elf_sec_data /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3740 The problem here is that currently, libbpf only checks that the program end is within the section bounds. There used to be a check `while (sec_off < sec_sz)` in bpf_object__add_programs, however, it was removed by commit 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions"). Put the above condition back to bpf_object__init_prog to make sure that the program start is also within the bounds of the section to avoid the potential buffer overflow. [1] https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md Reported-by: lmarch2 <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Fixes: 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions") Link: https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md Link: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-29481 Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <[email protected]>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf-rc bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
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Apr 15, 2025
As shown in [1], it is possible to corrupt a BPF ELF file such that
arbitrary BPF instructions are loaded by libbpf. This can be done by
setting a symbol (BPF program) section offset to a large (unsigned)
number such that <section start + symbol offset> overflows and points
before the section data in the memory.
Consider the situation below where:
- prog_start = sec_start + symbol_offset <-- size_t overflow here
- prog_end = prog_start + prog_size
prog_start sec_start prog_end sec_end
| | | |
v v v v
.....................|################################|............
The report in [1] also provides a corrupted BPF ELF which can be used as
a reproducer:
$ readelf -S crash
Section Headers:
[Nr] Name Type Address Offset
Size EntSize Flags Link Info Align
...
[ 2] uretprobe.mu[...] PROGBITS 0000000000000000 00000040
0000000000000068 0000000000000000 AX 0 0 8
$ readelf -s crash
Symbol table '.symtab' contains 8 entries:
Num: Value Size Type Bind Vis Ndx Name
...
6: ffffffffffffffb8 104 FUNC GLOBAL DEFAULT 2 handle_tp
Here, the handle_tp prog has section offset ffffffffffffffb8, i.e. will
point before the actual memory where section 2 is allocated.
This is also reported by AddressSanitizer:
=================================================================
==1232==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7c7302fe0000 at pc 0x7fc3046e4b77 bp 0x7ffe64677cd0 sp 0x7ffe64677490
READ of size 104 at 0x7c7302fe0000 thread T0
#0 0x7fc3046e4b76 in memcpy (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe4b76)
#1 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__init_prog /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:856
#2 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__add_programs /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:928
#3 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__elf_collect /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3930
#4 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object_open /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8067
#5 0x00000040f176 in bpf_object__open_file /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8090
#6 0x000000400c16 in main /poc/poc.c:8
#7 0x7fc3043d25b4 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x35b4)
#8 0x7fc3043d2667 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3667)
#9 0x000000400b34 in _start (/poc/poc+0x400b34)
0x7c7302fe0000 is located 64 bytes before 104-byte region [0x7c7302fe0040,0x7c7302fe00a8)
allocated by thread T0 here:
#0 0x7fc3046e716b in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe716b)
#1 0x7fc3045ee600 in __libelf_set_rawdata_wrlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xb600)
#2 0x7fc3045ef018 in __elf_getdata_rdlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xc018)
#3 0x00000040642f in elf_sec_data /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3740
The problem here is that currently, libbpf only checks that the program
end is within the section bounds. There used to be a check
`while (sec_off < sec_sz)` in bpf_object__add_programs, however, it was
removed by commit 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program
sections to support overriden weak functions").
Add a check for detecting the overflow of `sec_off + prog_sz` to
bpf_object__init_prog to fix this issue.
[1] https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md
Reported-by: lmarch2 <[email protected]>
Link: https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md
Fixes: 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions")
Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <[email protected]>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf-rc bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Apr 15, 2025
As shown in [1], it is possible to corrupt a BPF ELF file such that
arbitrary BPF instructions are loaded by libbpf. This can be done by
setting a symbol (BPF program) section offset to a large (unsigned)
number such that <section start + symbol offset> overflows and points
before the section data in the memory.
Consider the situation below where:
- prog_start = sec_start + symbol_offset <-- size_t overflow here
- prog_end = prog_start + prog_size
prog_start sec_start prog_end sec_end
| | | |
v v v v
.....................|################################|............
The report in [1] also provides a corrupted BPF ELF which can be used as
a reproducer:
$ readelf -S crash
Section Headers:
[Nr] Name Type Address Offset
Size EntSize Flags Link Info Align
...
[ 2] uretprobe.mu[...] PROGBITS 0000000000000000 00000040
0000000000000068 0000000000000000 AX 0 0 8
$ readelf -s crash
Symbol table '.symtab' contains 8 entries:
Num: Value Size Type Bind Vis Ndx Name
...
6: ffffffffffffffb8 104 FUNC GLOBAL DEFAULT 2 handle_tp
Here, the handle_tp prog has section offset ffffffffffffffb8, i.e. will
point before the actual memory where section 2 is allocated.
This is also reported by AddressSanitizer:
=================================================================
==1232==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7c7302fe0000 at pc 0x7fc3046e4b77 bp 0x7ffe64677cd0 sp 0x7ffe64677490
READ of size 104 at 0x7c7302fe0000 thread T0
#0 0x7fc3046e4b76 in memcpy (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe4b76)
#1 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__init_prog /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:856
#2 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__add_programs /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:928
#3 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__elf_collect /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3930
#4 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object_open /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8067
#5 0x00000040f176 in bpf_object__open_file /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8090
#6 0x000000400c16 in main /poc/poc.c:8
#7 0x7fc3043d25b4 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x35b4)
#8 0x7fc3043d2667 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3667)
#9 0x000000400b34 in _start (/poc/poc+0x400b34)
0x7c7302fe0000 is located 64 bytes before 104-byte region [0x7c7302fe0040,0x7c7302fe00a8)
allocated by thread T0 here:
#0 0x7fc3046e716b in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe716b)
#1 0x7fc3045ee600 in __libelf_set_rawdata_wrlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xb600)
#2 0x7fc3045ef018 in __elf_getdata_rdlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xc018)
#3 0x00000040642f in elf_sec_data /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3740
The problem here is that currently, libbpf only checks that the program
end is within the section bounds. There used to be a check
`while (sec_off < sec_sz)` in bpf_object__add_programs, however, it was
removed by commit 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program
sections to support overriden weak functions").
Add a check for detecting the overflow of `sec_off + prog_sz` to
bpf_object__init_prog to fix this issue.
[1] https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md
Reported-by: lmarch2 <[email protected]>
Link: https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md
Fixes: 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions")
Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <[email protected]>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf-rc bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Apr 15, 2025
As shown in [1], it is possible to corrupt a BPF ELF file such that
arbitrary BPF instructions are loaded by libbpf. This can be done by
setting a symbol (BPF program) section offset to a large (unsigned)
number such that <section start + symbol offset> overflows and points
before the section data in the memory.
Consider the situation below where:
- prog_start = sec_start + symbol_offset <-- size_t overflow here
- prog_end = prog_start + prog_size
prog_start sec_start prog_end sec_end
| | | |
v v v v
.....................|################################|............
The report in [1] also provides a corrupted BPF ELF which can be used as
a reproducer:
$ readelf -S crash
Section Headers:
[Nr] Name Type Address Offset
Size EntSize Flags Link Info Align
...
[ 2] uretprobe.mu[...] PROGBITS 0000000000000000 00000040
0000000000000068 0000000000000000 AX 0 0 8
$ readelf -s crash
Symbol table '.symtab' contains 8 entries:
Num: Value Size Type Bind Vis Ndx Name
...
6: ffffffffffffffb8 104 FUNC GLOBAL DEFAULT 2 handle_tp
Here, the handle_tp prog has section offset ffffffffffffffb8, i.e. will
point before the actual memory where section 2 is allocated.
This is also reported by AddressSanitizer:
=================================================================
==1232==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7c7302fe0000 at pc 0x7fc3046e4b77 bp 0x7ffe64677cd0 sp 0x7ffe64677490
READ of size 104 at 0x7c7302fe0000 thread T0
#0 0x7fc3046e4b76 in memcpy (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe4b76)
#1 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__init_prog /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:856
#2 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__add_programs /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:928
#3 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__elf_collect /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3930
#4 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object_open /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8067
#5 0x00000040f176 in bpf_object__open_file /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8090
#6 0x000000400c16 in main /poc/poc.c:8
#7 0x7fc3043d25b4 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x35b4)
#8 0x7fc3043d2667 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3667)
#9 0x000000400b34 in _start (/poc/poc+0x400b34)
0x7c7302fe0000 is located 64 bytes before 104-byte region [0x7c7302fe0040,0x7c7302fe00a8)
allocated by thread T0 here:
#0 0x7fc3046e716b in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe716b)
#1 0x7fc3045ee600 in __libelf_set_rawdata_wrlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xb600)
#2 0x7fc3045ef018 in __elf_getdata_rdlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xc018)
#3 0x00000040642f in elf_sec_data /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3740
The problem here is that currently, libbpf only checks that the program
end is within the section bounds. There used to be a check
`while (sec_off < sec_sz)` in bpf_object__add_programs, however, it was
removed by commit 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program
sections to support overriden weak functions").
Add a check for detecting the overflow of `sec_off + prog_sz` to
bpf_object__init_prog to fix this issue.
[1] https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md
Reported-by: lmarch2 <[email protected]>
Link: https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md
Fixes: 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions")
Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <[email protected]>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf-rc bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Apr 15, 2025
As shown in [1], it is possible to corrupt a BPF ELF file such that
arbitrary BPF instructions are loaded by libbpf. This can be done by
setting a symbol (BPF program) section offset to a large (unsigned)
number such that <section start + symbol offset> overflows and points
before the section data in the memory.
Consider the situation below where:
- prog_start = sec_start + symbol_offset <-- size_t overflow here
- prog_end = prog_start + prog_size
prog_start sec_start prog_end sec_end
| | | |
v v v v
.....................|################################|............
The report in [1] also provides a corrupted BPF ELF which can be used as
a reproducer:
$ readelf -S crash
Section Headers:
[Nr] Name Type Address Offset
Size EntSize Flags Link Info Align
...
[ 2] uretprobe.mu[...] PROGBITS 0000000000000000 00000040
0000000000000068 0000000000000000 AX 0 0 8
$ readelf -s crash
Symbol table '.symtab' contains 8 entries:
Num: Value Size Type Bind Vis Ndx Name
...
6: ffffffffffffffb8 104 FUNC GLOBAL DEFAULT 2 handle_tp
Here, the handle_tp prog has section offset ffffffffffffffb8, i.e. will
point before the actual memory where section 2 is allocated.
This is also reported by AddressSanitizer:
=================================================================
==1232==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7c7302fe0000 at pc 0x7fc3046e4b77 bp 0x7ffe64677cd0 sp 0x7ffe64677490
READ of size 104 at 0x7c7302fe0000 thread T0
#0 0x7fc3046e4b76 in memcpy (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe4b76)
#1 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__init_prog /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:856
#2 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__add_programs /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:928
#3 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__elf_collect /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3930
#4 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object_open /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8067
#5 0x00000040f176 in bpf_object__open_file /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8090
#6 0x000000400c16 in main /poc/poc.c:8
#7 0x7fc3043d25b4 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x35b4)
#8 0x7fc3043d2667 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3667)
#9 0x000000400b34 in _start (/poc/poc+0x400b34)
0x7c7302fe0000 is located 64 bytes before 104-byte region [0x7c7302fe0040,0x7c7302fe00a8)
allocated by thread T0 here:
#0 0x7fc3046e716b in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe716b)
#1 0x7fc3045ee600 in __libelf_set_rawdata_wrlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xb600)
#2 0x7fc3045ef018 in __elf_getdata_rdlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xc018)
#3 0x00000040642f in elf_sec_data /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3740
The problem here is that currently, libbpf only checks that the program
end is within the section bounds. There used to be a check
`while (sec_off < sec_sz)` in bpf_object__add_programs, however, it was
removed by commit 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program
sections to support overriden weak functions").
Add a check for detecting the overflow of `sec_off + prog_sz` to
bpf_object__init_prog to fix this issue.
[1] https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md
Fixes: 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions")
Reported-by: lmarch2 <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <[email protected]>
Link: https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf-rc bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jun 6, 2025
Commit e77aff5 ("binderfs: fix use-after-free in binder_devices") addressed a use-after-free where devices could be released without first being removed from the binder_devices list. However, there is a similar path in binder_free_proc() that was missed: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in binder_remove_device+0xd4/0x100 Write of size 8 at addr ffff0000c773b900 by task umount/467 CPU: 12 UID: 0 PID: 467 Comm: umount Not tainted 6.15.0-rc7-00138-g57483a362741 #9 PREEMPT Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: binder_remove_device+0xd4/0x100 binderfs_evict_inode+0x230/0x2f0 evict+0x25c/0x5dc iput+0x304/0x480 dentry_unlink_inode+0x208/0x46c __dentry_kill+0x154/0x530 [...] Allocated by task 463: __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x13c/0x324 binderfs_binder_device_create.isra.0+0x138/0xa60 binder_ctl_ioctl+0x1ac/0x230 [...] Freed by task 215: kfree+0x184/0x31c binder_proc_dec_tmpref+0x33c/0x4ac binder_deferred_func+0xc10/0x1108 process_one_work+0x520/0xba4 [...] ================================================================== Call binder_remove_device() within binder_free_proc() to ensure the device is removed from the binder_devices list before being kfreed. Cc: [email protected] Fixes: 12d909c ("binderfs: add new binder devices to binder_devices") Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=4af454407ec393de51d6 Tested-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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Remove redundant netif_napi_del() call from disconnect path. A WARN may be triggered in __netif_napi_del_locked() during USB device disconnect: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 11 at net/core/dev.c:7417 __netif_napi_del_locked+0x2b4/0x350 This happens because netif_napi_del() is called in the disconnect path while NAPI is still enabled. However, it is not necessary to call netif_napi_del() explicitly, since unregister_netdev() will handle NAPI teardown automatically and safely. Removing the redundant call avoids triggering the warning. Full trace: lan78xx 1-1:1.0 enu1: Failed to read register index 0x000000c4. ret = -ENODEV lan78xx 1-1:1.0 enu1: Failed to set MAC down with error -ENODEV lan78xx 1-1:1.0 enu1: Link is Down lan78xx 1-1:1.0 enu1: Failed to read register index 0x00000120. ret = -ENODEV ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 11 at net/core/dev.c:7417 __netif_napi_del_locked+0x2b4/0x350 Modules linked in: flexcan can_dev fuse CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc2-00624-ge926949dab03 #9 PREEMPT Hardware name: SKOV IMX8MP CPU revC - bd500 (DT) Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : __netif_napi_del_locked+0x2b4/0x350 lr : __netif_napi_del_locked+0x7c/0x350 sp : ffffffc085b673c0 x29: ffffffc085b673c0 x28: ffffff800b7f2000 x27: ffffff800b7f20d8 x26: ffffff80110bcf58 x25: ffffff80110bd978 x24: 1ffffff0022179eb x23: ffffff80110bc000 x22: ffffff800b7f5000 x21: ffffff80110bc000 x20: ffffff80110bcf38 x19: ffffff80110bcf28 x18: dfffffc000000000 x17: ffffffc081578940 x16: ffffffc08284cee0 x15: 0000000000000028 x14: 0000000000000006 x13: 0000000000040000 x12: ffffffb0022179e8 x11: 1ffffff0022179e7 x10: ffffffb0022179e7 x9 : dfffffc000000000 x8 : 0000004ffdde8619 x7 : ffffff80110bcf3f x6 : 0000000000000001 x5 : ffffff80110bcf38 x4 : ffffff80110bcf38 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 1ffffff0022179e7 x0 : 0000000000000000 Call trace: __netif_napi_del_locked+0x2b4/0x350 (P) lan78xx_disconnect+0xf4/0x360 usb_unbind_interface+0x158/0x718 device_remove+0x100/0x150 device_release_driver_internal+0x308/0x478 device_release_driver+0x1c/0x30 bus_remove_device+0x1a8/0x368 device_del+0x2e0/0x7b0 usb_disable_device+0x244/0x540 usb_disconnect+0x220/0x758 hub_event+0x105c/0x35e0 process_one_work+0x760/0x17b0 worker_thread+0x768/0xce8 kthread+0x3bc/0x690 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 irq event stamp: 211604 hardirqs last enabled at (211603): [<ffffffc0828cc9ec>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x84/0x98 hardirqs last disabled at (211604): [<ffffffc0828a9a84>] el1_dbg+0x24/0x80 softirqs last enabled at (211296): [<ffffffc080095f10>] handle_softirqs+0x820/0xbc8 softirqs last disabled at (210993): [<ffffffc080010288>] __do_softirq+0x18/0x20 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- lan78xx 1-1:1.0 enu1: failed to kill vid 0081/0 Fixes: ec4c7e1 ("lan78xx: Introduce NAPI polling support") Suggested-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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A crash in conntrack was reported while trying to unlink the conntrack
entry from the hash bucket list:
[exception RIP: __nf_ct_delete_from_lists+172]
[..]
#7 [ff539b5a2b043aa0] nf_ct_delete at ffffffffc124d421 [nf_conntrack]
#8 [ff539b5a2b043ad0] nf_ct_gc_expired at ffffffffc124d999 [nf_conntrack]
#9 [ff539b5a2b043ae0] __nf_conntrack_find_get at ffffffffc124efbc [nf_conntrack]
[..]
The nf_conn struct is marked as allocated from slab but appears to be in
a partially initialised state:
ct hlist pointer is garbage; looks like the ct hash value
(hence crash).
ct->status is equal to IPS_CONFIRMED|IPS_DYING, which is expected
ct->timeout is 30000 (=30s), which is unexpected.
Everything else looks like normal udp conntrack entry. If we ignore
ct->status and pretend its 0, the entry matches those that are newly
allocated but not yet inserted into the hash:
- ct hlist pointers are overloaded and store/cache the raw tuple hash
- ct->timeout matches the relative time expected for a new udp flow
rather than the absolute 'jiffies' value.
If it were not for the presence of IPS_CONFIRMED,
__nf_conntrack_find_get() would have skipped the entry.
Theory is that we did hit following race:
cpu x cpu y cpu z
found entry E found entry E
E is expired <preemption>
nf_ct_delete()
return E to rcu slab
init_conntrack
E is re-inited,
ct->status set to 0
reply tuplehash hnnode.pprev
stores hash value.
cpu y found E right before it was deleted on cpu x.
E is now re-inited on cpu z. cpu y was preempted before
checking for expiry and/or confirm bit.
->refcnt set to 1
E now owned by skb
->timeout set to 30000
If cpu y were to resume now, it would observe E as
expired but would skip E due to missing CONFIRMED bit.
nf_conntrack_confirm gets called
sets: ct->status |= CONFIRMED
This is wrong: E is not yet added
to hashtable.
cpu y resumes, it observes E as expired but CONFIRMED:
<resumes>
nf_ct_expired()
-> yes (ct->timeout is 30s)
confirmed bit set.
cpu y will try to delete E from the hashtable:
nf_ct_delete() -> set DYING bit
__nf_ct_delete_from_lists
Even this scenario doesn't guarantee a crash:
cpu z still holds the table bucket lock(s) so y blocks:
wait for spinlock held by z
CONFIRMED is set but there is no
guarantee ct will be added to hash:
"chaintoolong" or "clash resolution"
logic both skip the insert step.
reply hnnode.pprev still stores the
hash value.
unlocks spinlock
return NF_DROP
<unblocks, then
crashes on hlist_nulls_del_rcu pprev>
In case CPU z does insert the entry into the hashtable, cpu y will unlink
E again right away but no crash occurs.
Without 'cpu y' race, 'garbage' hlist is of no consequence:
ct refcnt remains at 1, eventually skb will be free'd and E gets
destroyed via: nf_conntrack_put -> nf_conntrack_destroy -> nf_ct_destroy.
To resolve this, move the IPS_CONFIRMED assignment after the table
insertion but before the unlock.
Pablo points out that the confirm-bit-store could be reordered to happen
before hlist add resp. the timeout fixup, so switch to set_bit and
before_atomic memory barrier to prevent this.
It doesn't matter if other CPUs can observe a newly inserted entry right
before the CONFIRMED bit was set:
Such event cannot be distinguished from above "E is the old incarnation"
case: the entry will be skipped.
Also change nf_ct_should_gc() to first check the confirmed bit.
The gc sequence is:
1. Check if entry has expired, if not skip to next entry
2. Obtain a reference to the expired entry.
3. Call nf_ct_should_gc() to double-check step 1.
nf_ct_should_gc() is thus called only for entries that already failed an
expiry check. After this patch, once the confirmed bit check passes
ct->timeout has been altered to reflect the absolute 'best before' date
instead of a relative time. Step 3 will therefore not remove the entry.
Without this change to nf_ct_should_gc() we could still get this sequence:
1. Check if entry has expired.
2. Obtain a reference.
3. Call nf_ct_should_gc() to double-check step 1:
4 - entry is still observed as expired
5 - meanwhile, ct->timeout is corrected to absolute value on other CPU
and confirm bit gets set
6 - confirm bit is seen
7 - valid entry is removed again
First do check 6), then 4) so the gc expiry check always picks up either
confirmed bit unset (entry gets skipped) or expiry re-check failure for
re-inited conntrack objects.
This change cannot be backported to releases before 5.19. Without
commit 8a75a2c ("netfilter: conntrack: remove unconfirmed list")
|= IPS_CONFIRMED line cannot be moved without further changes.
Cc: Razvan Cojocaru <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/[email protected]/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/[email protected]/
Fixes: 1397af5 ("netfilter: conntrack: remove the percpu dying list")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
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pert script tests fails with segmentation fault as below:
92: perf script tests:
--- start ---
test child forked, pid 103769
DB test
[ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ]
[ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.012 MB /tmp/perf-test-script.7rbftEpOzX/perf.data (9 samples) ]
/usr/libexec/perf-core/tests/shell/script.sh: line 35:
103780 Segmentation fault (core dumped)
perf script -i "${perfdatafile}" -s "${db_test}"
--- Cleaning up ---
---- end(-1) ----
92: perf script tests : FAILED!
Backtrace pointed to :
#0 0x0000000010247dd0 in maps.machine ()
#1 0x00000000101d178c in db_export.sample ()
#2 0x00000000103412c8 in python_process_event ()
#3 0x000000001004eb28 in process_sample_event ()
#4 0x000000001024fcd0 in machines.deliver_event ()
#5 0x000000001025005c in perf_session.deliver_event ()
#6 0x00000000102568b0 in __ordered_events__flush.part.0 ()
#7 0x0000000010251618 in perf_session.process_events ()
#8 0x0000000010053620 in cmd_script ()
#9 0x00000000100b5a28 in run_builtin ()
#10 0x00000000100b5f94 in handle_internal_command ()
#11 0x0000000010011114 in main ()
Further investigation reveals that this occurs in the `perf script tests`,
because it uses `db_test.py` script. This script sets `perf_db_export_mode = True`.
With `perf_db_export_mode` enabled, if a sample originates from a hypervisor,
perf doesn't set maps for "[H]" sample in the code. Consequently, `al->maps` remains NULL
when `maps__machine(al->maps)` is called from `db_export__sample`.
As al->maps can be NULL in case of Hypervisor samples , use thread->maps
because even for Hypervisor sample, machine should exist.
If we don't have machine for some reason, return -1 to avoid segmentation fault.
Reported-by: Disha Goel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Aditya Bodkhe <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Disha Goel <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Suggested-by: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
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Without the change `perf `hangs up on charaster devices. On my system
it's enough to run system-wide sampler for a few seconds to get the
hangup:
$ perf record -a -g --call-graph=dwarf
$ perf report
# hung
`strace` shows that hangup happens on reading on a character device
`/dev/dri/renderD128`
$ strace -y -f -p 2780484
strace: Process 2780484 attached
pread64(101</dev/dri/renderD128>, strace: Process 2780484 detached
It's call trace descends into `elfutils`:
$ gdb -p 2780484
(gdb) bt
#0 0x00007f5e508f04b7 in __libc_pread64 (fd=101, buf=0x7fff9df7edb0, count=0, offset=0)
at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/pread64.c:25
#1 0x00007f5e52b79515 in read_file () from /<<NIX>>/elfutils-0.192/lib/libelf.so.1
#2 0x00007f5e52b25666 in libdw_open_elf () from /<<NIX>>/elfutils-0.192/lib/libdw.so.1
#3 0x00007f5e52b25907 in __libdw_open_file () from /<<NIX>>/elfutils-0.192/lib/libdw.so.1
#4 0x00007f5e52b120a9 in dwfl_report_elf@@ELFUTILS_0.156 ()
from /<<NIX>>/elfutils-0.192/lib/libdw.so.1
#5 0x000000000068bf20 in __report_module (al=al@entry=0x7fff9df80010, ip=ip@entry=139803237033216, ui=ui@entry=0x5369b5e0)
at util/dso.h:537
#6 0x000000000068c3d1 in report_module (ip=139803237033216, ui=0x5369b5e0) at util/unwind-libdw.c:114
#7 frame_callback (state=0x535aef10, arg=0x5369b5e0) at util/unwind-libdw.c:242
#8 0x00007f5e52b261d3 in dwfl_thread_getframes () from /<<NIX>>/elfutils-0.192/lib/libdw.so.1
#9 0x00007f5e52b25bdb in get_one_thread_cb () from /<<NIX>>/elfutils-0.192/lib/libdw.so.1
#10 0x00007f5e52b25faa in dwfl_getthreads () from /<<NIX>>/elfutils-0.192/lib/libdw.so.1
#11 0x00007f5e52b26514 in dwfl_getthread_frames () from /<<NIX>>/elfutils-0.192/lib/libdw.so.1
#12 0x000000000068c6ce in unwind__get_entries (cb=cb@entry=0x5d4620 <unwind_entry>, arg=arg@entry=0x10cd5fa0,
thread=thread@entry=0x1076a290, data=data@entry=0x7fff9df80540, max_stack=max_stack@entry=127,
best_effort=best_effort@entry=false) at util/thread.h:152
#13 0x00000000005dae95 in thread__resolve_callchain_unwind (evsel=0x106006d0, thread=0x1076a290, cursor=0x10cd5fa0,
sample=0x7fff9df80540, max_stack=127, symbols=true) at util/machine.c:2939
#14 thread__resolve_callchain_unwind (thread=0x1076a290, cursor=0x10cd5fa0, evsel=0x106006d0, sample=0x7fff9df80540,
max_stack=127, symbols=true) at util/machine.c:2920
#15 __thread__resolve_callchain (thread=0x1076a290, cursor=0x10cd5fa0, evsel=0x106006d0, evsel@entry=0x7fff9df80440,
sample=0x7fff9df80540, parent=parent@entry=0x7fff9df804a0, root_al=root_al@entry=0x7fff9df80440, max_stack=127, symbols=true)
at util/machine.c:2970
#16 0x00000000005d0cb2 in thread__resolve_callchain (thread=<optimized out>, cursor=<optimized out>, evsel=0x7fff9df80440,
sample=<optimized out>, parent=0x7fff9df804a0, root_al=0x7fff9df80440, max_stack=127) at util/machine.h:198
#17 sample__resolve_callchain (sample=<optimized out>, cursor=<optimized out>, parent=parent@entry=0x7fff9df804a0,
evsel=evsel@entry=0x106006d0, al=al@entry=0x7fff9df80440, max_stack=max_stack@entry=127) at util/callchain.c:1127
#18 0x0000000000617e08 in hist_entry_iter__add (iter=iter@entry=0x7fff9df80480, al=al@entry=0x7fff9df80440, max_stack_depth=127,
arg=arg@entry=0x7fff9df81ae0) at util/hist.c:1255
#19 0x000000000045d2d0 in process_sample_event (tool=0x7fff9df81ae0, event=<optimized out>, sample=0x7fff9df80540,
evsel=0x106006d0, machine=<optimized out>) at builtin-report.c:334
#20 0x00000000005e3bb1 in perf_session__deliver_event (session=0x105ff2c0, event=0x7f5c7d735ca0, tool=0x7fff9df81ae0,
file_offset=2914716832, file_path=0x105ffbf0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1367
#21 0x00000000005e8d93 in do_flush (oe=0x105ffa50, show_progress=false) at util/ordered-events.c:245
#22 __ordered_events__flush (oe=0x105ffa50, how=OE_FLUSH__ROUND, timestamp=<optimized out>) at util/ordered-events.c:324
#23 0x00000000005e1f64 in perf_session__process_user_event (session=0x105ff2c0, event=0x7f5c7d752b18, file_offset=2914835224,
file_path=0x105ffbf0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1419
#24 0x00000000005e47c7 in reader__read_event (rd=rd@entry=0x7fff9df81260, session=session@entry=0x105ff2c0,
--Type <RET> for more, q to quit, c to continue without paging--
quit
prog=prog@entry=0x7fff9df81220) at util/session.c:2132
#25 0x00000000005e4b37 in reader__process_events (rd=0x7fff9df81260, session=0x105ff2c0, prog=0x7fff9df81220)
at util/session.c:2181
#26 __perf_session__process_events (session=0x105ff2c0) at util/session.c:2226
#27 perf_session__process_events (session=session@entry=0x105ff2c0) at util/session.c:2390
#28 0x0000000000460add in __cmd_report (rep=0x7fff9df81ae0) at builtin-report.c:1076
#29 cmd_report (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at builtin-report.c:1827
#30 0x00000000004c5a40 in run_builtin (p=p@entry=0xd8f7f8 <commands+312>, argc=argc@entry=1, argv=argv@entry=0x7fff9df844b0)
at perf.c:351
#31 0x00000000004c5d63 in handle_internal_command (argc=argc@entry=1, argv=argv@entry=0x7fff9df844b0) at perf.c:404
#32 0x0000000000442de3 in run_argv (argcp=<synthetic pointer>, argv=<synthetic pointer>) at perf.c:448
#33 main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=0x7fff9df844b0) at perf.c:556
The hangup happens because nothing in` perf` or `elfutils` checks if a
mapped file is easily readable.
The change conservatively skips all non-regular files.
Signed-off-by: Sergei Trofimovich <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
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Symbolize stack traces by creating a live machine. Add this
functionality to dump_stack and switch dump_stack users to use
it. Switch TUI to use it. Add stack traces to the child test function
which can be useful to diagnose blocked code.
Example output:
```
$ perf test -vv PERF_RECORD_
...
7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields:
7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields : Running (1 active)
^C
Signal (2) while running tests.
Terminating tests with the same signal
Internal test harness failure. Completing any started tests:
: 7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields:
---- unexpected signal (2) ----
#0 0x55788c6210a3 in child_test_sig_handler builtin-test.c:0
#1 0x7fc12fe49df0 in __restore_rt libc_sigaction.c:0
#2 0x7fc12fe99687 in __internal_syscall_cancel cancellation.c:64
#3 0x7fc12fee5f7a in clock_nanosleep@GLIBC_2.2.5 clock_nanosleep.c:72
#4 0x7fc12fef1393 in __nanosleep nanosleep.c:26
#5 0x7fc12ff02d68 in __sleep sleep.c:55
#6 0x55788c63196b in test__PERF_RECORD perf-record.c:0
#7 0x55788c620fb0 in run_test_child builtin-test.c:0
#8 0x55788c5bd18d in start_command run-command.c:127
#9 0x55788c621ef3 in __cmd_test builtin-test.c:0
#10 0x55788c6225bf in cmd_test ??:0
#11 0x55788c5afbd0 in run_builtin perf.c:0
#12 0x55788c5afeeb in handle_internal_command perf.c:0
#13 0x55788c52b383 in main ??:0
#14 0x7fc12fe33ca8 in __libc_start_call_main libc_start_call_main.h:74
#15 0x7fc12fe33d65 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 libc-start.c:128
#16 0x55788c52b9d1 in _start ??:0
---- unexpected signal (2) ----
#0 0x55788c6210a3 in child_test_sig_handler builtin-test.c:0
#1 0x7fc12fe49df0 in __restore_rt libc_sigaction.c:0
#2 0x7fc12fea3a14 in pthread_sigmask@GLIBC_2.2.5 pthread_sigmask.c:45
#3 0x7fc12fe49fd9 in __GI___sigprocmask sigprocmask.c:26
#4 0x7fc12ff2601b in __longjmp_chk longjmp.c:36
#5 0x55788c6210c0 in print_test_result.isra.0 builtin-test.c:0
#6 0x7fc12fe49df0 in __restore_rt libc_sigaction.c:0
#7 0x7fc12fe99687 in __internal_syscall_cancel cancellation.c:64
#8 0x7fc12fee5f7a in clock_nanosleep@GLIBC_2.2.5 clock_nanosleep.c:72
#9 0x7fc12fef1393 in __nanosleep nanosleep.c:26
#10 0x7fc12ff02d68 in __sleep sleep.c:55
#11 0x55788c63196b in test__PERF_RECORD perf-record.c:0
#12 0x55788c620fb0 in run_test_child builtin-test.c:0
#13 0x55788c5bd18d in start_command run-command.c:127
#14 0x55788c621ef3 in __cmd_test builtin-test.c:0
#15 0x55788c6225bf in cmd_test ??:0
#16 0x55788c5afbd0 in run_builtin perf.c:0
#17 0x55788c5afeeb in handle_internal_command perf.c:0
#18 0x55788c52b383 in main ??:0
#19 0x7fc12fe33ca8 in __libc_start_call_main libc_start_call_main.h:74
#20 0x7fc12fe33d65 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 libc-start.c:128
#21 0x55788c52b9d1 in _start ??:0
7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields : Skip (permissions)
```
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
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Calling perf top with branch filters enabled on Intel CPU's
with branch counters logging (A.K.A LBR event logging [1]) support
results in a segfault.
$ perf top -e '{cpu_core/cpu-cycles/,cpu_core/event=0xc6,umask=0x3,frontend=0x11,name=frontend_retired_dsb_miss/}' -j any,counter
...
Thread 27 "perf" received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
[Switching to Thread 0x7fffafff76c0 (LWP 949003)]
perf_env__find_br_cntr_info (env=0xf66dc0 <perf_env>, nr=0x0, width=0x7fffafff62c0) at util/env.c:653
653 *width = env->cpu_pmu_caps ? env->br_cntr_width :
(gdb) bt
#0 perf_env__find_br_cntr_info (env=0xf66dc0 <perf_env>, nr=0x0, width=0x7fffafff62c0) at util/env.c:653
#1 0x00000000005b1599 in symbol__account_br_cntr (branch=0x7fffcc3db580, evsel=0xfea2d0, offset=12, br_cntr=8) at util/annotate.c:345
#2 0x00000000005b17fb in symbol__account_cycles (addr=5658172, start=5658160, sym=0x7fffcc0ee420, cycles=539, evsel=0xfea2d0, br_cntr=8) at util/annotate.c:389
#3 0x00000000005b1976 in addr_map_symbol__account_cycles (ams=0x7fffcd7b01d0, start=0x7fffcd7b02b0, cycles=539, evsel=0xfea2d0, br_cntr=8) at util/annotate.c:422
#4 0x000000000068d57f in hist__account_cycles (bs=0x110d288, al=0x7fffafff6540, sample=0x7fffafff6760, nonany_branch_mode=false, total_cycles=0x0, evsel=0xfea2d0) at util/hist.c:2850
#5 0x0000000000446216 in hist_iter__top_callback (iter=0x7fffafff6590, al=0x7fffafff6540, single=true, arg=0x7fffffff9e00) at builtin-top.c:737
#6 0x0000000000689787 in hist_entry_iter__add (iter=0x7fffafff6590, al=0x7fffafff6540, max_stack_depth=127, arg=0x7fffffff9e00) at util/hist.c:1359
#7 0x0000000000446710 in perf_event__process_sample (tool=0x7fffffff9e00, event=0x110d250, evsel=0xfea2d0, sample=0x7fffafff6760, machine=0x108c968) at builtin-top.c:845
#8 0x0000000000447735 in deliver_event (qe=0x7fffffffa120, qevent=0x10fc200) at builtin-top.c:1211
#9 0x000000000064ccae in do_flush (oe=0x7fffffffa120, show_progress=false) at util/ordered-events.c:245
#10 0x000000000064d005 in __ordered_events__flush (oe=0x7fffffffa120, how=OE_FLUSH__TOP, timestamp=0) at util/ordered-events.c:324
#11 0x000000000064d0ef in ordered_events__flush (oe=0x7fffffffa120, how=OE_FLUSH__TOP) at util/ordered-events.c:342
#12 0x00000000004472a9 in process_thread (arg=0x7fffffff9e00) at builtin-top.c:1120
#13 0x00007ffff6e7dba8 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:448
#14 0x00007ffff6f01b8c in __GI___clone3 () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone3.S:78
The cause is that perf_env__find_br_cntr_info tries to access a
null pointer pmu_caps in the perf_env struct. A similar issue exists
for homogeneous core systems which use the cpu_pmu_caps structure.
Fix this by populating cpu_pmu_caps and pmu_caps structures with
values from sysfs when calling perf top with branch stack sampling
enabled.
[1], LBR event logging introduced here:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Falcon <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
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When testing F2FS with xfstests using UFS backed virtual disks the kernel complains sometimes that f2fs_release_decomp_mem() calls vm_unmap_ram() from an invalid context. Example trace from f2fs/007 test: f2fs/007 5s ... [12:59:38][ 8.902525] run fstests f2fs/007 [ 11.468026] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/vmalloc.c:2978 [ 11.471849] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 68, name: irq/22-ufshcd [ 11.475357] preempt_count: 1, expected: 0 [ 11.476970] RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 [ 11.478531] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 68 Comm: irq/22-ufshcd Tainted: G W 6.16.0-rc5-xfstests-ufs-g40f92e79b0aa #9 PREEMPT(none) [ 11.478535] Tainted: [W]=WARN [ 11.478536] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 11.478537] Call Trace: [ 11.478543] <TASK> [ 11.478545] dump_stack_lvl+0x4e/0x70 [ 11.478554] __might_resched.cold+0xaf/0xbe [ 11.478557] vm_unmap_ram+0x21/0xb0 [ 11.478560] f2fs_release_decomp_mem+0x59/0x80 [ 11.478563] f2fs_free_dic+0x18/0x1a0 [ 11.478565] f2fs_finish_read_bio+0xd7/0x290 [ 11.478570] blk_update_request+0xec/0x3b0 [ 11.478574] ? sbitmap_queue_clear+0x3b/0x60 [ 11.478576] scsi_end_request+0x27/0x1a0 [ 11.478582] scsi_io_completion+0x40/0x300 [ 11.478583] ufshcd_mcq_poll_cqe_lock+0xa3/0xe0 [ 11.478588] ufshcd_sl_intr+0x194/0x1f0 [ 11.478592] ufshcd_threaded_intr+0x68/0xb0 [ 11.478594] ? __pfx_irq_thread_fn+0x10/0x10 [ 11.478599] irq_thread_fn+0x20/0x60 [ 11.478602] ? __pfx_irq_thread_fn+0x10/0x10 [ 11.478603] irq_thread+0xb9/0x180 [ 11.478605] ? __pfx_irq_thread_dtor+0x10/0x10 [ 11.478607] ? __pfx_irq_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 11.478609] kthread+0x10a/0x230 [ 11.478614] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 11.478615] ret_from_fork+0x7e/0xd0 [ 11.478619] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 11.478621] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 11.478623] </TASK> This patch modifies in_task() check inside f2fs_read_end_io() to also check if interrupts are disabled. This ensures that pages are unmapped asynchronously in an interrupt handler. Fixes: bff139b ("f2fs: handle decompress only post processing in softirq") Signed-off-by: Jan Prusakowski <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
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BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000002ec PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 28 UID: 0 PID: 343 Comm: kworker/28:1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 6.17.0-rc2+ #9 NONE Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: smc_hs_wq smc_listen_work [smc] RIP: 0010:smc_ib_is_sg_need_sync+0x9e/0xd0 [smc] ... Call Trace: <TASK> smcr_buf_map_link+0x211/0x2a0 [smc] __smc_buf_create+0x522/0x970 [smc] smc_buf_create+0x3a/0x110 [smc] smc_find_rdma_v2_device_serv+0x18f/0x240 [smc] ? smc_vlan_by_tcpsk+0x7e/0xe0 [smc] smc_listen_find_device+0x1dd/0x2b0 [smc] smc_listen_work+0x30f/0x580 [smc] process_one_work+0x18c/0x340 worker_thread+0x242/0x360 kthread+0xe7/0x220 ret_from_fork+0x13a/0x160 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> If the software RoCE device is used, ibdev->dma_device is a null pointer. As a result, the problem occurs. Null pointer detection is added to prevent problems. Fixes: 0ef69e7 ("net/smc: optimize for smc_sndbuf_sync_sg_for_device and smc_rmb_sync_sg_for_cpu") Signed-off-by: Liu Jian <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Guangguan Wang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Zhu Yanjun <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: D. Wythe <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
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Steven Rostedt reported a crash with "ftrace=function" kernel command line: [ 0.159269] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000001c [ 0.160254] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 0.160975] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 0.161697] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 0.162055] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [ 0.162619] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.17.0-rc2-test-00006-g48d06e78b7cb-dirty #9 PREEMPT(undef) [ 0.164141] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 0.165439] RIP: 0010:kmem_cache_alloc_noprof (mm/slub.c:4237) [ 0.166186] Code: 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 49 89 fc 53 48 83 e4 f0 48 83 ec 20 8b 05 c9 b6 7e 01 <44> 8b 77 1c 65 4c 8b 2d b5 ea 20 02 4c 89 6c 24 18 41 89 f5 21 f0 [ 0.168811] RSP: 0000:ffffffffb2e03b30 EFLAGS: 00010086 [ 0.169545] RAX: 0000000001fff33f RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 0.170544] RDX: 0000000000002800 RSI: 0000000000002800 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 0.171554] RBP: ffffffffb2e03b80 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: ffffffffb2e03c90 [ 0.172549] R10: ffffffffb2e03c90 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 0.173544] R13: ffffffffb2e03c90 R14: ffffffffb2e03c90 R15: 0000000000000001 [ 0.174542] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9d2808114000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 0.175684] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 0.176486] CR2: 000000000000001c CR3: 000000007264c001 CR4: 00000000000200b0 [ 0.177483] Call Trace: [ 0.177828] <TASK> [ 0.178123] mas_alloc_nodes (lib/maple_tree.c:176 (discriminator 2) lib/maple_tree.c:1255 (discriminator 2)) [ 0.178692] mas_store_gfp (lib/maple_tree.c:5468) [ 0.179223] execmem_cache_add_locked (mm/execmem.c:207) [ 0.179870] execmem_alloc (mm/execmem.c:213 mm/execmem.c:313 mm/execmem.c:335 mm/execmem.c:475) [ 0.180397] ? ftrace_caller (arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S:169) [ 0.180922] ? __pfx_ftrace_caller (arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S:158) [ 0.181517] execmem_alloc_rw (mm/execmem.c:487) [ 0.182052] arch_ftrace_update_trampoline (arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c:266 arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c:344 arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c:474) [ 0.182778] ? ftrace_caller_op_ptr (arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S:182) [ 0.183388] ftrace_update_trampoline (kernel/trace/ftrace.c:7947) [ 0.184024] __register_ftrace_function (kernel/trace/ftrace.c:368) [ 0.184682] ftrace_startup (kernel/trace/ftrace.c:3048) [ 0.185205] ? __pfx_function_trace_call (kernel/trace/trace_functions.c:210) [ 0.185877] register_ftrace_function_nolock (kernel/trace/ftrace.c:8717) [ 0.186595] register_ftrace_function (kernel/trace/ftrace.c:8745) [ 0.187254] ? __pfx_function_trace_call (kernel/trace/trace_functions.c:210) [ 0.187924] function_trace_init (kernel/trace/trace_functions.c:170) [ 0.188499] tracing_set_tracer (kernel/trace/trace.c:5916 kernel/trace/trace.c:6349) [ 0.189088] register_tracer (kernel/trace/trace.c:2391) [ 0.189642] early_trace_init (kernel/trace/trace.c:11075 kernel/trace/trace.c:11149) [ 0.190204] start_kernel (init/main.c:970) [ 0.190732] x86_64_start_reservations (arch/x86/kernel/head64.c:307) [ 0.191381] x86_64_start_kernel (??:?) [ 0.191955] common_startup_64 (arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:419) [ 0.192534] </TASK> [ 0.192839] Modules linked in: [ 0.193267] CR2: 000000000000001c [ 0.193730] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- The crash happens because on x86 ftrace allocations from execmem require maple tree to be initialized. Move maple tree initialization that depends only on slab availability earlier in boot so that it will happen right after mm_core_init(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 5d79c2b ("x86/ftrace: enable EXECMEM_ROX_CACHE for ftrace allocations") Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <[email protected]> Reported-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Tested-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <[email protected]> Cc: Borislav Betkov <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleinxer <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
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…tack-analysis' Eduard Zingerman says: ==================== bpf: replace path-sensitive with path-insensitive live stack analysis Consider the following program, assuming checkpoint is created for a state at instruction (3): 1: call bpf_get_prandom_u32() 2: *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = 42 -- checkpoint #1 -- 3: if r0 != 0 goto +1 4: exit; 5: r0 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) 6: exit The verifier processes this program by exploring two paths: - 1 -> 2 -> 3 -> 4 - 1 -> 2 -> 3 -> 5 -> 6 When instruction (5) is processed, the current liveness tracking mechanism moves up the register parent links and records a "read" mark for stack slot -8 at checkpoint #1, stopping because of the "write" mark recorded at instruction (2). This patch set replaces the existing liveness tracking mechanism with a path-insensitive data flow analysis. The program above is processed as follows: - a data structure representing live stack slots for instructions 1-6 in frame #0 is allocated; - when instruction (2) is processed, record that slot -8 is written at instruction (2) in frame #0; - when instruction (5) is processed, record that slot -8 is read at instruction (5) in frame #0; - when instruction (6) is processed, propagate read mark for slot -8 up the control flow graph to instructions 3 and 2. The key difference is that the new mechanism operates on a control flow graph and associates read and write marks with pairs of (call chain, instruction index). In contrast, the old mechanism operates on verifier states and register parent links, associating read and write marks with verifier states. Motivation ========== As it stands, this patch set makes liveness tracking slightly less precise, as it no longer distinguishes individual program paths taken by the verifier during symbolic execution. See the "Impact on verification performance" section for details. However, this change is intended as a stepping stone toward the following goals: - Short term, integrate precision tracking into liveness analysis and remove the following code: - verifier backedge states accumulation in is_state_visited(); - most of the logic for precision tracking; - jump history tracking. - Long term, help with more efficient loop verification handling. Why integrating precision tracking? ----------------------------------- In a sense, precision tracking is very similar to liveness tracking. The data flow equations for liveness tracking look as follows: live_after = U [state[s].live_before for s in insn_successors(i)] state[i].live_before = (live_after / state[i].must_write) U state[i].may_read While data flow equations for precision tracking look as follows: precise_after = U [state[s].precise_before for s in insn_successors(i)] // if some of the instruction outputs are precise, // assume its inputs to be precise induced_precise = ⎧ state[i].may_read if (state[i].may_write ∩ precise_after) ≠ ∅ ⎨ ⎩ ∅ otherwise state[i].precise_before = (precise_after / state[i].must_write) ∩ induced_precise Where: - `may_read` set represents a union of all possibly read slots (any slot in `may_read` set might be by the instruction); - `must_write` set represents an intersection of all possibly written slots (any slot in `must_write` set is guaranteed to be written by the instruction). - `may_write` set represents a union of all possibly written slots (any slot in `may_write` set might be written by the instruction). This means that precision tracking can be implemented as a logical extension of liveness tracking: - track registers as well as stack slots; - add bit masks to represent `precise_before` and `may_write`; - add above equations for `precise_before` computation; - (linked registers require some additional consideration). Such extension would allow removal of: - precision propagation logic in verifier.c: - backtrack_insn() - mark_chain_precision() - propagate_{precision,backedges}() - push_jmp_history() and related data structures, which are only used by precision tracking; - add_scc_backedge() and related backedge state accumulation in is_state_visited(), superseded by per-callchain function state accumulated by liveness analysis. The hope here is that unifying liveness and precision tracking will reduce overall amount of code and make it easier to reason about. How this helps with loops? -------------------------- As it stands, this patch set shares the same deficiency as the current liveness tracking mechanism. Liveness marks on stack slots cannot be used to prune states when processing iterator-based loops: - such states still have branches to be explored; - meaning that not all stack slot reads have been discovered. For example: 1: while(iter_next()) { 2: if (...) 3: r0 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) 4: if (...) 5: r0 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 16) 6: ... 7: } For any checkpoint state created at instruction (1), it is only possible to rely on read marks for slots fp[-8] and fp[-16] once all child states of (1) have been explored. Thus, when the verifier transitions from (7) to (1), it cannot rely on read marks. However, sacrificing path-sensitivity makes it possible to run analysis defined in this patch set before main verification pass, if estimates for value ranges are available. E.g. for the following program: 1: while(iter_next()) { 2: r0 = r10 3: r0 += r2 4: r0 = *(u64 *)(r2 + 0) 5: ... 6: } If an estimate for `r2` range is available before the main verification pass, it can be used to populate read marks at instruction (4) and run the liveness analysis. Thus making conservative liveness information available during loops verification. Such estimates can be provided by some form of value range analysis. Value range analysis is also necessary to address loop verification from another angle: computing boundaries for loop induction variables and iteration counts. The hope here is that the new liveness tracking mechanism will support the broader goal of making loop verification more efficient. Validation ========== The change was tested on three program sets: - bpf selftests - sched_ext - Meta's internal set of programs Commit [#8] enables a special mode where both the current and new liveness analyses are enabled simultaneously. This mode signals an error if the new algorithm considers a stack slot dead while the current algorithm assumes it is alive. This mode was very useful for debugging. At the time of posting, no such errors have been reported for the above program sets. [#8] "bpf: signal error if old liveness is more conservative than new" Impact on memory consumption ============================ Debug patch [1] extends the kernel and veristat to count the amount of memory allocated for storing analysis data. This patch is not included in the submission. The maximal observed impact for the above program sets is 2.6Mb. Data below is shown in bytes. For bpf selftests top 5 consumers look as follows: File Program liveness mem ----------------------- ---------------- ------------ pyperf180.bpf.o on_event 2629740 pyperf600.bpf.o on_event 2287662 pyperf100.bpf.o on_event 1427022 test_verif_scale3.bpf.o balancer_ingress 1121283 pyperf_subprogs.bpf.o on_event 756900 For sched_ext top 5 consumers loog as follows: File Program liveness mem --------- ------------------------------- ------------ bpf.bpf.o lavd_enqueue 164686 bpf.bpf.o lavd_select_cpu 157393 bpf.bpf.o layered_enqueue 154817 bpf.bpf.o lavd_init 127865 bpf.bpf.o layered_dispatch 110129 For Meta's internal set of programs top consumer is 1Mb. [1] kernel-patches/bpf@085588e Impact on verification performance ================================== Veristat results below are reported using `-f insns_pct>1 -f !insns<500` filter and -t option (BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ flag). master vs patch-set, selftests (out of ~4K programs) ---------------------------------------------------- File Program Insns (A) Insns (B) Insns (DIFF) -------------------------------- -------------------------------------- --------- --------- --------------- cpumask_success.bpf.o test_global_mask_nested_deep_array_rcu 1622 1655 +33 (+2.03%) strobemeta_bpf_loop.bpf.o on_event 2163 2684 +521 (+24.09%) test_cls_redirect.bpf.o cls_redirect 36001 42515 +6514 (+18.09%) test_cls_redirect_dynptr.bpf.o cls_redirect 2299 2339 +40 (+1.74%) test_cls_redirect_subprogs.bpf.o cls_redirect 69545 78497 +8952 (+12.87%) test_l4lb_noinline.bpf.o balancer_ingress 2993 3084 +91 (+3.04%) test_xdp_noinline.bpf.o balancer_ingress_v4 3539 3616 +77 (+2.18%) test_xdp_noinline.bpf.o balancer_ingress_v6 3608 3685 +77 (+2.13%) master vs patch-set, sched_ext (out of 148 programs) ---------------------------------------------------- File Program Insns (A) Insns (B) Insns (DIFF) --------- ---------------- --------- --------- --------------- bpf.bpf.o chaos_dispatch 2257 2287 +30 (+1.33%) bpf.bpf.o lavd_enqueue 20735 22101 +1366 (+6.59%) bpf.bpf.o lavd_select_cpu 22100 24409 +2309 (+10.45%) bpf.bpf.o layered_dispatch 25051 25606 +555 (+2.22%) bpf.bpf.o p2dq_dispatch 961 990 +29 (+3.02%) bpf.bpf.o rusty_quiescent 526 534 +8 (+1.52%) bpf.bpf.o rusty_runnable 541 547 +6 (+1.11%) Perf report =========== In relative terms, the analysis does not consume much CPU time. For example, here is a perf report collected for pyperf180 selftest: # Children Self Command Shared Object Symbol # ........ ........ ........ .................... ........................................ ... 1.22% 1.22% veristat [kernel.kallsyms] [k] bpf_update_live_stack ... Changelog ========= v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/T/ v1 -> v2: - compute_postorder() fixed to handle jumps with offset -1 (syzbot). - is_state_visited() in patch #9 fixed access to uninitialized `err` (kernel test robot, Dan Carpenter). - Selftests added. - Fixed bug with write marks propagation from callee to caller, see verifier_live_stack.c:caller_stack_write() test case. - Added a patch for __not_msg() annotation for test_loader based tests. v2: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250918-callchain-sensitive-liveness-v2-0-214ed2653eee@gmail.com/ v2 -> v3: - Added __diag_ignore_all("-Woverride-init", ...) in liveness.c for bpf_insn_successors() (suggested by Alexei). Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <[email protected]> ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250918-callchain-sensitive-liveness-v3-0-c3cd27bacc60@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
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Petr Machata says: ==================== bridge: Allow keeping local FDB entries only on VLAN 0 The bridge FDB contains one local entry per port per VLAN, for the MAC of the port in question, and likewise for the bridge itself. This allows bridge to locally receive and punt "up" any packets whose destination MAC address matches that of one of the bridge interfaces or of the bridge itself. The number of these local "service" FDB entries grows linearly with number of bridge-global VLAN memberships, but that in turn will tend to grow quadratically with number of ports and per-port VLAN memberships. While that does not cause issues during forwarding lookups, it does make dumps impractically slow. As an example, with 100 interfaces, each on 4K VLANs, a full dump of FDB that just contains these 400K local entries, takes 6.5s. That's _without_ considering iproute2 formatting overhead, this is just how long it takes to walk the FDB (repeatedly), serialize it into netlink messages, and parse the messages back in userspace. This is to illustrate that with growing number of ports and VLANs, the time required to dump this repetitive information blows up. Arguably 4K VLANs per interface is not a very realistic configuration, but then modern switches can instead have several hundred interfaces, and we have fielded requests for >1K VLAN memberships per port among customers. FDB entries are currently all kept on a single linked list, and then dumping uses this linked list to walk all entries and dump them in order. When the message buffer is full, the iteration is cut short, and later restarted. Of course, to restart the iteration, it's first necessary to walk the already-dumped front part of the list before starting dumping again. So one possibility is to organize the FDB entries in different structure more amenable to walk restarts. One option is to walk directly the hash table. The advantage is that no auxiliary structure needs to be introduced. With a rough sketch of this approach, the above scenario gets dumped in not quite 3 s, saving over 50 % of time. However hash table iteration requires maintaining an active cursor that must be collected when the dump is aborted. It looks like that would require changes in the NDO protocol to allow to run this cleanup. Moreover, on hash table resize the iteration is simply restarted. FDB dumps are currently not guaranteed to correspond to any one particular state: entries can be missed, or be duplicated. But with hash table iteration we would get that plus the much less graceful resize behavior, where swaths of FDB are duplicated. Another option is to maintain the FDB entries in a red-black tree. We have a PoC of this approach on hand, and the above scenario is dumped in about 2.5 s. Still not as snappy as we'd like it, but better than the hash table. However the savings come at the expense of a more expensive insertion, and require locking during dumps, which blocks insertion. The upside of these approaches is that they provide benefits whatever the FDB contents. But it does not seem like either of these is workable. However we intend to clean up the RB tree PoC and present it for consideration later on in case the trade-offs are considered acceptable. Yet another option might be to use in-kernel FDB filtering, and to filter the local entries when dumping. Unfortunately, this does not help all that much either, because the linked-list walk still needs to happen. Also, with the obvious filtering interface built around ndm_flags / ndm_state filtering, one can't just exclude pure local entries in one query. One needs to dump all non-local entries first, and then to get permanent entries in another run filter local & added_by_user. I.e. one needs to pay the iteration overhead twice, and then integrate the result in userspace. To get significant savings, one would need a very specific knob like "dump, but skip/only include local entries". But if we are adding a local-specific knobs, maybe let's have an option to just not duplicate them in the first place. All this FDB duplication is there merely to make things snappy during forwarding. But high-radix switches with thousands of VLANs typically do not process much traffic in the SW datapath at all, but rather offload vast majority of it. So we could exchange some of the runtime performance for a neater FDB. To that end, in this patchset, introduce a new bridge option, BR_BOOLOPT_FDB_LOCAL_VLAN_0, which when enabled, has local FDB entries installed only on VLAN 0, instead of duplicating them across all VLANs. Then to maintain the local termination behavior, on FDB miss, the bridge does a second lookup on VLAN 0. Enabling this option changes the bridge behavior in expected ways. Since the entries are only kept on VLAN 0, FDB get, flush and dump will not perceive them on non-0 VLANs. And deleting the VLAN 0 entry affects forwarding on all VLANs. This patchset is loosely based on a privately circulated patch by Nikolay Aleksandrov. The patchset progresses as follows: - Patch #1 introduces a bridge option to enable the above feature. Then patches #2 to #5 gradually patch the bridge to do the right thing when the option is enabled. Finally patch #6 adds the UAPI knob and the code for when the feature is enabled or disabled. - Patches #7, #8 and #9 contain fixes and improvements to selftest libraries - Patch #10 contains a new selftest ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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Petr Machata says: ==================== selftests: Mark auto-deferring functions clearly selftests/net/lib.sh contains a suite of iproute2 wrappers that automatically schedule the corresponding cleanup through defer. The fact they do so is however not immediately obvious, one needs to know which functions are handling the deferral behind the scenes, and which expect the caller to handle cleanups themselves. A convention for these auto-deferring functions would help both writing and patch review. This patchset does so by marking these functions with an adf_ prefix. We already have a few such functions: forwarding/lib.sh has adf_mcd_start() and a few selftests add private helpers that conform to this convention. Patches #1 to #8 gradually convert individual functions, one per patch. Patch #9 renames an auto-deferring private helpers named dfr_* to adf_*. The plan is not to retro-rename all private helpers, but I happened to know about this one. Patches #10 to #12 introduce several autodefer helpers for commonly used forwarding/lib.sh functions, and opportunistically convert straightforward instances of 'action; defer counteraction' to the new helpers. Patch #13 adds some README verbiage to pitch defer and the adf_* convention. ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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Before disabling SR-IOV via config space accesses to the parent PF, sriov_disable() first removes the PCI devices representing the VFs. Since commit 9d16947 ("PCI: Add global pci_lock_rescan_remove()") such removal operations are serialized against concurrent remove and rescan using the pci_rescan_remove_lock. No such locking was ever added in sriov_disable() however. In particular when commit 18f9e9d ("PCI/IOV: Factor out sriov_add_vfs()") factored out the PCI device removal into sriov_del_vfs() there was still no locking around the pci_iov_remove_virtfn() calls. On s390 the lack of serialization in sriov_disable() may cause double remove and list corruption with the below (amended) trace being observed: PSW: 0704c00180000000 0000000c914e4b38 (klist_put+56) GPRS: 000003800313fb48 0000000000000000 0000000100000001 0000000000000001 00000000f9b520a8 0000000000000000 0000000000002fbd 00000000f4cc9480 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000180692828 00000000818e8000 000003800313fe2c 000003800313fb20 000003800313fad8 #0 [3800313fb20] device_del at c9158ad5c #1 [3800313fb88] pci_remove_bus_device at c915105ba #2 [3800313fbd0] pci_iov_remove_virtfn at c9152f198 #3 [3800313fc28] zpci_iov_remove_virtfn at c90fb67c0 #4 [3800313fc60] zpci_bus_remove_device at c90fb6104 #5 [3800313fca0] __zpci_event_availability at c90fb3dca #6 [3800313fd08] chsc_process_sei_nt0 at c918fe4a2 #7 [3800313fd60] crw_collect_info at c91905822 #8 [3800313fe10] kthread at c90feb390 #9 [3800313fe68] __ret_from_fork at c90f6aa64 #10 [3800313fe98] ret_from_fork at c9194f3f2. This is because in addition to sriov_disable() removing the VFs, the platform also generates hot-unplug events for the VFs. This being the reverse operation to the hotplug events generated by sriov_enable() and handled via pdev->no_vf_scan. And while the event processing takes pci_rescan_remove_lock and checks whether the struct pci_dev still exists, the lack of synchronization makes this checking racy. Other races may also be possible of course though given that this lack of locking persisted so long observable races seem very rare. Even on s390 the list corruption was only observed with certain devices since the platform events are only triggered by config accesses after the removal, so as long as the removal finished synchronously they would not race. Either way the locking is missing so fix this by adding it to the sriov_del_vfs() helper. Just like PCI rescan-remove, locking is also missing in sriov_add_vfs() including for the error case where pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device() is called without the PCI rescan-remove lock being held. Even in the non-error case, adding new PCI devices and buses should be serialized via the PCI rescan-remove lock. Add the necessary locking. Fixes: 18f9e9d ("PCI/IOV: Factor out sriov_add_vfs()") Signed-off-by: Niklas Schnelle <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Benjamin Block <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Farhan Ali <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Julian Ruess <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
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Pull request for series with
subject: bpf-lsm: Extend interoperability with IMA
version: 2
url: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/list/?series=614520