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A heap-based buffer over-read vulnerability was found in...
High severity
Unreviewed
Published
Apr 4, 2024
to the GitHub Advisory Database
•
Updated Aug 4, 2025
A heap-based buffer over-read vulnerability was found in the X.org server's ProcXIGetSelectedEvents() function. This issue occurs when byte-swapped length values are used in replies, potentially leading to memory leakage and segmentation faults, particularly when triggered by a client with a different endianness. This vulnerability could be exploited by an attacker to cause the X server to read heap memory values and then transmit them back to the client until encountering an unmapped page, resulting in a crash. Despite the attacker's inability to control the specific memory copied into the replies, the small length values typically stored in a 32-bit integer can result in significant attempted out-of-bounds reads.
The product reads from a buffer using buffer access mechanisms such as indexes or pointers that reference memory locations after the targeted buffer.
Learn more on MITRE.
CVE ID
CVE-2024-31080
GHSA ID
GHSA-mqqf-4p7r-rf89
Source code
No known source code
Dependabot alerts are not supported on this advisory because it does not have a package from a supported ecosystem with an affected and fixed version.
A heap-based buffer over-read vulnerability was found in the X.org server's ProcXIGetSelectedEvents() function. This issue occurs when byte-swapped length values are used in replies, potentially leading to memory leakage and segmentation faults, particularly when triggered by a client with a different endianness. This vulnerability could be exploited by an attacker to cause the X server to read heap memory values and then transmit them back to the client until encountering an unmapped page, resulting in a crash. Despite the attacker's inability to control the specific memory copied into the replies, the small length values typically stored in a 32-bit integer can result in significant attempted out-of-bounds reads.
References