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chore(deps): update dependency vite to v5.3.6 [security] (#2740)

This PR contains the following updates: | Package | Change | Age | Adoption | Passing | Confidence | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | [vite](https://vite.dev) ([source](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/tree/HEAD/packages/vite)) | [`5.3.1` -> `5.3.6`](https://renovatebot.com/diffs/npm/vite/5.3.1/5.3.6) | [![age](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/age/npm/vite/5.3.6?slim=true)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | [![adoption](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/adoption/npm/vite/5.3.6?slim=true)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | [![passing](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/compatibility/npm/vite/5.3.1/5.3.6?slim=true)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | [![confidence](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/confidence/npm/vite/5.3.1/5.3.6?slim=true)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | ### GitHub Vulnerability Alerts #### [CVE-2023-34092](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-353f-5xf4-qw67) The issue involves a security vulnerability in Vite where the server options can be bypassed using a double forward slash (`//`). This vulnerability poses a potential security risk as it can allow unauthorized access to sensitive directories and files. ### Steps to Fix. **Update Vite**: Ensure that you are using the latest version of Vite. Security issues like this are often fixed in newer releases.\n2. **Secure the server configuration**: In your `vite.config.js` file, review and update the server configuration options to restrict access to unauthorized requests or directories. ### Impact Only users explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using `--host` or the [`server.host` config option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-host)) are affected and only files in the immediate Vite project root folder could be exposed.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in vite@**4.3.9**, vite@**4.2.3**, vite@**4.1.5**, vite@**4.0.5** and in the latest minors of the previous two majors, vite@**3.2.7** and vite@**2.9.16**. ### Details Vite serves the application with under the root-path of the project while running on the dev mode. By default, Vite uses the server option fs.deny to protect sensitive files. But using a simple double forward-slash, we can bypass this restriction. \n\n### PoC\n1. Create a new latest project of Vite using any package manager. (here I'm using react and vue templates and pnpm for testing)\n2. Serve the application on dev mode using `pnpm run dev`.\n3. Directly access the file via url using double forward-slash (`//`) (e.g: `//.env`, `//.env.local`)\n4. The server option `fs.deny` was successfully bypassed. Proof Images: ![proof-1](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/30733517/241105344-6ecbc7f6-57b7-45c7-856a-6421a577dda1.png)\n![proof-2](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/30733517/241105349-ab9561e7-8aff-4f29-97f9-b784e673c122.png) #### [CVE-2024-23331](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-c24v-8rfc-w8vw) ### Summary [Vite dev server option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-fs-deny) `server.fs.deny` can be bypassed on case-insensitive file systems using case-augmented versions of filenames. Notably this affects servers hosted on Windows. This bypass is similar to https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-34092 -- with surface area reduced to hosts having case-insensitive filesystems. ### Patches Fixed in [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] ### Details Since `picomatch` defaults to case-sensitive glob matching, but the file server doesn't discriminate; a blacklist bypass is possible. See `picomatch` usage, where `nocase` is defaulted to `false`: https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/v5.1.0-beta.1/packages/vite/src/node/server/index.ts#L632 By requesting raw filesystem paths using augmented casing, the matcher derived from `config.server.fs.deny` fails to block access to sensitive files. ### PoC **Setup** 1. Created vanilla Vite project using `npm create vite@latest` on a Standard Azure hosted Windows 10 instance. - `npm run dev -- --host 0.0.0.0` - Publicly accessible for the time being here: http://20.12.242.81:5173/ 2. Created dummy secret files, e.g. `custom.secret` and `production.pem` 3. Populated `vite.config.js` with ```javascript export default { server: { fs: { deny: ['.env', '.env.*', '*.{crt,pem}', 'custom.secret'] } } } ``` **Reproduction** 1. `curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@fs//` - Descriptive error page reveals absolute filesystem path to project root 2. `curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@fs/C:/Users/darbonzo/Desktop/vite-project/vite.config.js` - Discoverable configuration file reveals locations of secrets 3. `curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@fs/C:/Users/darbonzo/Desktop/vite-project/custom.sEcReT` - Secrets are directly accessible using case-augmented version of filename **Proof** ![Screenshot 2024-01-19 022736](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/907968/298020728-3a8d3c06-fcfd-4009-9182-e842f66a6ea5.png) ### Impact **Who** - Users with exposed dev servers on environments with case-insensitive filesystems **What** - Files protected by `server.fs.deny` are both discoverable, and accessible #### [CVE-2024-31207](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-8jhw-289h-jh2g) ### Summary [Vite dev server option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-fs-deny) `server.fs.deny` did not deny requests for patterns with directories. An example of such a pattern is `/foo/**/*`. ### Impact Only apps setting a custom `server.fs.deny` that includes a pattern with directories, and explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using `--host` or [`server.host` config option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-host)) are affected. ### Patches Fixed in [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] ### Details `server.fs.deny` uses picomatch with the config of `{ matchBase: true }`. [matchBase](https://redirect.github.com/micromatch/picomatch/blob/master/README.md#options:~:text=Description-,basename,-boolean) only matches the basename of the file, not the path due to a bug ([https://github.com/micromatch/picomatch/issues/89](https://redirect.github.com/micromatch/picomatch/issues/89)). The vite config docs read like you should be able to set fs.deny to glob with picomatch. Vite also does not set `{ dot: true }` and that causes [dotfiles not to be denied](https://redirect.github.com/micromatch/picomatch/blob/master/README.md#options:~:text=error%20is%20thrown.-,dot,-boolean) unless they are explicitly defined. **Reproduction** Set fs.deny to `['**/.git/**']` and then curl for `/.git/config`. * with `matchBase: true`, you can get any file under `.git/` (config, HEAD, etc). * with `matchBase: false`, you cannot get any file under `.git/` (config, HEAD, etc). #### [CVE-2024-45811](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-9cwx-2883-4wfx) ### Summary The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser. ### Details `@fs` denies access to files outside of Vite serving allow list. Adding `?import&raw` to the URL bypasses this limitation and returns the file content if it exists. ### PoC ```sh $ npm create vite@latest $ cd vite-project/ $ npm install $ npm run dev $ echo "top secret content" > /tmp/secret.txt # expected behaviour $ curl "http://localhost:5173/@fs/tmp/secret.txt" <body> <h1>403 Restricted</h1> <p>The request url "/tmp/secret.txt" is outside of Vite serving allow list. # security bypassed $ curl "http://localhost:5173/@fs/tmp/secret.txt?import&raw" export default "top secret content\n" //# sourceMappingURL=data:application/json;base64,eyJ2... ``` #### [CVE-2024-45812](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-64vr-g452-qvp3) ### Summary We discovered a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in Vite when building scripts to `cjs`/`iife`/`umd` output format. The DOM Clobbering gadget in the module can lead to cross-site scripting (XSS) in web pages where scriptless attacker-controlled HTML elements (e.g., an img tag with an unsanitized name attribute) are present. Note that, we have identified similar security issues in Webpack: GHSA-4vvj-4cpr-p986 ### Details **Backgrounds** DOM Clobbering is a type of code-reuse attack where the attacker first embeds a piece of non-script, seemingly benign HTML markups in the webpage (e.g. through a post or comment) and leverages the gadgets (pieces of js code) living in the existing javascript code to transform it into executable code. More for information about DOM Clobbering, here are some references: [1] https://scnps.co/papers/sp23_domclob.pdf [2] https://research.securitum.com/xss-in-amp4email-dom-clobbering/ **Gadgets found in Vite** We have identified a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in Vite bundled scripts, particularly when the scripts dynamically import other scripts from the assets folder and the developer sets the build output format to `cjs`, `iife`, or `umd`. In such cases, Vite replaces relative paths starting with `__VITE_ASSET__` using the URL retrieved from `document.currentScript`. However, this implementation is vulnerable to a DOM Clobbering attack. The `document.currentScript` lookup can be shadowed by an attacker via the browser's named DOM tree element access mechanism. This manipulation allows an attacker to replace the intended script element with a malicious HTML element. When this happens, the src attribute of the attacker-controlled element is used as the URL for importing scripts, potentially leading to the dynamic loading of scripts from an attacker-controlled server. ``` const relativeUrlMechanisms = { amd: (relativePath) => { if (relativePath[0] !== ".") relativePath = "./" + relativePath; return getResolveUrl( `require.toUrl('${escapeId(relativePath)}'), document.baseURI` ); }, cjs: (relativePath) => `(typeof document === 'undefined' ? ${getFileUrlFromRelativePath( relativePath )} : ${getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath)})`, es: (relativePath) => getResolveUrl( `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', import.meta.url` ), iife: (relativePath) => getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath), // NOTE: make sure rollup generate `module` params system: (relativePath) => getResolveUrl( `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', module.meta.url` ), umd: (relativePath) => `(typeof document === 'undefined' && typeof location === 'undefined' ? ${getFileUrlFromRelativePath( relativePath )} : ${getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath, true)})` }; ``` ### PoC Considering a website that contains the following `main.js` script, the devloper decides to use the Vite to bundle up the program with the following configuration. ``` // main.js import extraURL from './extra.js?url' var s = document.createElement('script') s.src = extraURL document.head.append(s) ``` ``` // extra.js export default "https://myserver/justAnOther.js" ``` ``` // vite.config.js import { defineConfig } from 'vite' export default defineConfig({ build: { assetsInlineLimit: 0, // To avoid inline assets for PoC rollupOptions: { output: { format: "cjs" }, }, }, base: "./", }); ``` After running the build command, the developer will get following bundle as the output. ``` // dist/index-DDmIg9VD.js "use strict";const t=""+(typeof document>"u"?require("url").pathToFileURL(__dirname+"/extra-BLVEx9Lb.js").href:new URL("extra-BLVEx9Lb.js",document.currentScript&&document.currentScript.src||document.baseURI).href);var e=document.createElement("script");e.src=t;document.head.append(e); ``` Adding the Vite bundled script, `dist/index-DDmIg9VD.js`, as part of the web page source code, the page could load the `extra.js` file from the attacker's domain, `attacker.controlled.server`. The attacker only needs to insert an `img` tag with the `name` attribute set to `currentScript`. This can be done through a website's feature that allows users to embed certain script-less HTML (e.g., markdown renderers, web email clients, forums) or via an HTML injection vulnerability in third-party JavaScript loaded on the page. ``` <!DOCTYPE html> <html> <head> <title>Vite Example</title> If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box --- This PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/). View the [repository job log](https://developer.mend.io/github/fwouts/previewjs).  Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

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