dccp/tcp: fix routing redirect race

[ Upstream commit 45caeaa ]

As Eric Dumazet pointed out this also needs to be fixed in IPv6.
v2: Contains the IPv6 tcp/Ipv6 dccp patches as well.

We have seen a few incidents lately where a dst_enty has been freed
with a dangling TCP socket reference (sk->sk_dst_cache) pointing to that
dst_entry. If the conditions/timings are right a crash then ensues when the
freed dst_entry is referenced later on. A Common crashing back trace is:

 hardkernel#8 [] page_fault at ffffffff8163e648
    [exception RIP: __tcp_ack_snd_check+74]
.
.
 hardkernel#9 [] tcp_rcv_established at ffffffff81580b64
hardkernel#10 [] tcp_v4_do_rcv at ffffffff8158b54a
hardkernel#11 [] tcp_v4_rcv at ffffffff8158cd02
hardkernel#12 [] ip_local_deliver_finish at ffffffff815668f4
hardkernel#13 [] ip_local_deliver at ffffffff81566bd9
hardkernel#14 [] ip_rcv_finish at ffffffff8156656d
hardkernel#15 [] ip_rcv at ffffffff81566f06
hardkernel#16 [] __netif_receive_skb_core at ffffffff8152b3a2
hardkernel#17 [] __netif_receive_skb at ffffffff8152b608
hardkernel#18 [] netif_receive_skb at ffffffff8152b690
hardkernel#19 [] vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete at ffffffffa015eeaf [vmxnet3]
hardkernel#20 [] vmxnet3_poll_rx_only at ffffffffa015f32a [vmxnet3]
hardkernel#21 [] net_rx_action at ffffffff8152bac2
hardkernel#22 [] __do_softirq at ffffffff81084b4f
hardkernel#23 [] call_softirq at ffffffff8164845c
hardkernel#24 [] do_softirq at ffffffff81016fc5
hardkernel#25 [] irq_exit at ffffffff81084ee5
hardkernel#26 [] do_IRQ at ffffffff81648ff8

Of course it may happen with other NIC drivers as well.

It's found the freed dst_entry here:

 224 static bool tcp_in_quickack_mode(struct sock *sk)↩
 225 {↩
 226 ▹       const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);↩
 227 ▹       const struct dst_entry *dst = __sk_dst_get(sk);↩
 228 ↩
 229 ▹       return (dst && dst_metric(dst, RTAX_QUICKACK)) ||↩
 230 ▹       ▹       (icsk->icsk_ack.quick && !icsk->icsk_ack.pingpong);↩
 231 }↩

But there are other backtraces attributed to the same freed dst_entry in
netfilter code as well.

All the vmcores showed 2 significant clues:

- Remote hosts behind the default gateway had always been redirected to a
different gateway. A rtable/dst_entry will be added for that host. Making
more dst_entrys with lower reference counts. Making this more probable.

- All vmcores showed a postitive LockDroppedIcmps value, e.g:

LockDroppedIcmps                  267

A closer look at the tcp_v4_err() handler revealed that do_redirect() will run
regardless of whether user space has the socket locked. This can result in a
race condition where the same dst_entry cached in sk->sk_dst_entry can be
decremented twice for the same socket via:

do_redirect()->__sk_dst_check()-> dst_release().

Which leads to the dst_entry being prematurely freed with another socket
pointing to it via sk->sk_dst_cache and a subsequent crash.

To fix this skip do_redirect() if usespace has the socket locked. Instead let
the redirect take place later when user space does not have the socket
locked.

The dccp/IPv6 code is very similar in this respect, so fixing it there too.

As Eric Garver pointed out the following commit now invalidates routes. Which
can set the dst->obsolete flag so that ipv4_dst_check() returns null and
triggers the dst_release().

Fixes: ceb3320 ("ipv4: Kill routes during PMTU/redirect updates.")
Cc: Eric Garver <[email protected]>
Cc: Hannes Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maxwell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

Author: Jon Maxwell

net/dccp/ipv4.c

@@ -289,7 +289,8 @@ static void dccp_v4_err(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 info)
 
 	switch (type) {
 	case ICMP_REDIRECT:
-		dccp_do_redirect(skb, sk);
+		if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk))
+			dccp_do_redirect(skb, sk);
 		goto out;
 	case ICMP_SOURCE_QUENCH:
 		/* Just silently ignore these. */

net/dccp/ipv6.c

@@ -122,10 +122,12 @@ static void dccp_v6_err(struct sk_buff *skb, struct inet6_skb_parm *opt,
 	np = inet6_sk(sk);
 
 	if (type == NDISC_REDIRECT) {
-		struct dst_entry *dst = __sk_dst_check(sk, np->dst_cookie);
+		if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk)) {
+			struct dst_entry *dst = __sk_dst_check(sk, np->dst_cookie);
 
-		if (dst)
-			dst->ops->redirect(dst, sk, skb);
+			if (dst)
+				dst->ops->redirect(dst, sk, skb);
+		}
 		goto out;
 	}
 

net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c

@@ -423,7 +423,8 @@ void tcp_v4_err(struct sk_buff *icmp_skb, u32 info)
 
 	switch (type) {
 	case ICMP_REDIRECT:
-		do_redirect(icmp_skb, sk);
+		if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk))
+			do_redirect(icmp_skb, sk);
 		goto out;
 	case ICMP_SOURCE_QUENCH:
 		/* Just silently ignore these. */

net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c

@@ -376,10 +376,12 @@ static void tcp_v6_err(struct sk_buff *skb, struct inet6_skb_parm *opt,
 	np = inet6_sk(sk);
 
 	if (type == NDISC_REDIRECT) {
-		struct dst_entry *dst = __sk_dst_check(sk, np->dst_cookie);
+		if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk)) {
+			struct dst_entry *dst = __sk_dst_check(sk, np->dst_cookie);
 
-		if (dst)
-			dst->ops->redirect(dst, sk, skb);
+			if (dst)
+				dst->ops->redirect(dst, sk, skb);
+		}
 		goto out;
 	}